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IAbstract
This thesis deals with the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA)
between the European Union and the Republic of South Africa, which was concluded
in October 1999. In particular, the agreement is analysed in the light of the
negotiating process between the parties, the contents of the agreement, the
applicability of WTO law and the compatibility of the agreement with it and the Port
and Sherry Agreement.
Since the EU emphasised its aim to commence economic and development
cooperation with other African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries on a reciprocal
basis during the negotiations for a successor of the Lomé Convention, the TDCA
between the EU and South Africa had to be seen as a "pilot project" for future
cooperation agreements between countries at different levels of development. The
TDCA between the EU and South Africa is therefore not only very important for the
two concerned parties, but could serve as an example for further negotiations
between the EU and other ACP countries. Thus the purpose of this thesis is to
examine the TDCA between the EU and South Africa from a wider global
perspective.
The thesis is divided into six Chapters:
The first Chapter provides an introduction to the circumstances under which the
negotiations between the EU and South Africa commenced. It deals briefly with the
economic situation in South Africa during the apartheid era and presents reasons
why the parties wanted to enter into bilateral negotiations. The introductory part
furthermore presents an overview of the contents of the thesis.
The second chapter contains a detailed description of the negotiating process that
took place between the parties and shows why it took 43 months and 21 rounds of
negotiations to reach a deal. South Africa's partial accession to the Lomé Convention
and the conclusion of separate agreements such as the Wine and Spirits Agreement,
are also analysed.
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Chapter three presents the various components of the TOCA and illustrates what the
negotiators achieved. This chapter on the TOCA concludes with an evaluation of the
Agreement and shows the potential benefits to South Africa and the EU.
Since the Agreement had to satisfy international rules, the provisions of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and TradelWorld Trade Organisation (GATTIWTO) were of
major importance. The EC Treaty, however, does not contain any provision that
indicates whether, or how, an international agreement like the GATTIWTO penetrates
the Community legal order. In Chapter four, accordingly, questions are raised
regarding the extent to which the bilateral agreement between South Africa and the
EU was influenced by the GATTIWTO provisions and how these rules were
incorporated into the agreement. Furthermore, since the parties agreed on the
establishment of a free trade area, this chapter deals with the question of in how far
the TOCA is in line with Article XXIV GATT.
In addition to the GATT provisions, the TOCA is also affected by the Agreement on
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs). Therefore Chapter five
deals with TRIPs in connection with the TOCA. The use of the terms "Port" and
"Sherry" as the major stumbling block to the conclusion of the TOCA is analysed
more closely.
The final part, namely Chapter six, provides a summary of the results of the
investigation. Furthermore, a conclusion is provided with regard to the question of
whether the TOeA can be seen as an example for further trade relations between the
EU and other ACP countries.
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Opsomming
Hierdie tesis is gerig op die Handels-, Ontwikkelings- en Samewerkingsooreenkoms
(TDGA) tussen die Europese Unie (EU) en die Republiek van Suid Afrika wat in
Oktober 1999 gesluit is. Die ooreenkoms word veral in die lig van die
onderhandelingsproses tussen die partye, die inhoud van die ooreenkoms, die
toepaslikheid van Wêreldhandelsorganisasiereg en die versoenbaarheid daarvan
met die ooreenkoms en die Port en Sjerrie-ooreenkoms ontleed.
Aangesien die EU sy oogmerk van wederkerige ekonomiese en ontwikkelings-gerigte
samewerking met ander lande in Afrika en die Karibiese en Stille Oseaan-Eilande
gedurende die onderhandelings vir 'n opvolger van die Lomé Konvensie beklemtoon
het, moes die ooreenkoms tussen die EU en Suid-Afrika as 'n "loodsprojek" vir
toekomstige samewerkingsooreenkomste tussen lande wat op verskillende vlakke
van onwikkeling is, gesien word. Die Handels-, Ontwikkelings- en
Samewerkingsooreenkoms tussen die EU en Suid-Afrika is dus nie net baie belangrik
vir die betrokke partye nie, maar dit kan ook as 'n voorbeeld vir verdere
onderhandelings tussen die EU en lande van Afrika en die Karibiese- en Stille
Oseaan-Eilande dien. Die doel van dié tesis is om die Handels-, Ontwikkelings- en
Samewekingsooreenkoms tussen die EU en Suid-Afrika vanuit 'n meer globale
perspektief te beskou.
Die tesis is in ses Hoofstukke ingedeel:
Die eerste hoofstuk bied 'n inleiding tot die omstandighede waaronder die
onderhandelings tussen die EU en Suid-Afrika begin het. Dit behandel die Suid-
Afrikaanse ekonomiese situasie onder apartheid kortliks en toon hoekom die partye
tweesydige onderhandelings wou aanknoop. Verder bied die inleidende deel 'n
oorsig oor die inhoud van die tesis.
Die tweede hoofstuk bevat 'n gedetailleerde beskrywing van die
onderhandelingsproses wat tussen die partye plaasgevind het en toon aan waarom
dit drie-en-veertig maande geduur het en een-en-twintig onderhandelingsrondtes
gekos het om die saak te beklink. Suid-Afrika se gedeeltelike toetrede tot die Lomé
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Konvensie en die sluit van aparte ooreenkomste soos die Port- en Sjerrie-
ooreenkoms word ook ontleed.
Die daaropvolgende hoofstuk bespreek die verskillende komponente van die
Handels-, Ontwikkelings- en Samewerkingsooreenkoms en toon wat die
onderhandelaars bereik het. Hierdie hoofstuk oor die Ooreenkoms sluit af met 'n
evaluering daarvan en dui die potensiële voordele van die Ooreenkoms vir Suid-
Afrika en die EU aan.
Aangesien die Ooreenkoms internasionale reëls moes tevrede stel, was die
voorskrifte van die Algemene Ooreenkoms oor Tariewe en Handel (GATT) van
uiterste belang. Die EG-verdrag bevat egter geen voorskrif wat aandui óf, of hoé, 'n
internasionale ooreenkoms soos GATTNVTO die regsorde van die Europese
Gemeenskap binnedring nie. Die vraag oor in hoeverre die tweesydige ooreenkoms
tussen Suid-Afrika en die EU deur die GATTIWTO voorskrifte beïnvloed is, en oor
hoe hierdie reëls in die ooreenkoms opgeneem is, word dus in Hoofstuk vier
aangeraak. Aangesien die partye ooreengekom het om 'n vrye handeisarea tot stand
te bring, behandel hierdie hoofstuk ook die vraag oor in hoeverre die TOGA met
Artikel XXIV GATT strook.
Tesame met die GATT-voorskrifte word die TOGA ook deur die Ooreenkoms ten
opsigte van Handelsverwante Aspekte van Intellektuele Eiendomsreg (TRIPs)
geraak. Hoofstuk vyf behandel daarom hierdie aspek ten opsigte van die TOGA. Die
gebruik van die terme "Port" en "Sjerrie" as die vernaamste struikelblok tot die sluiting
van die TOG-ooreenkoms word ook deegliker ontleed.
Die laaste gedeelte, naamlik Hoofstuk ses, bied 'n opsomming van die resultate van
die ondersoek. Verder word 'n gevolgtrekking voorsien ten opsigte van vraag of die
TOGA as 'n voorbeeld vir verdere handelsverwantskappe tussen die EU en ander
lande in Afrika en die Karibiese en Stille Oseaan-eilande beskou kan word.
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1. Introduction
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent end of the Cold War saw
changing perceptions in the realm of international affairs. Significantly, international
economic activities increased and governments tried to promote this development by
lowering trade barriers between their countries. The reason behind this was the
conviction among international economists that freer trade increases the amount of
existing goods that are traded, diversifies economic links, promotes lasting
development and thus ultimately improves welfare.'
Due to its Apartheid regime, South Africa, espescially, was economically isolated
from both its immediate neighbours and the world at large. The European Community
(EC2), for example, adopted a number of restrictive measures in 1985 and 1986,
because of the aggravating political situation in South Africa. In 1985 the restrictive
measures included military sanctions such as an embargo on the import and export
of arms and paramilitary equipment, the refusal to cooperate militarily, and the
removal of EC military attaches. Furthermore, the cessation of oil exports to South
Africa, the prohibition of new collaboration in the nuclear sector and the ban on
export of sensitive equipment for security purposes were agreed upon. In 1986 the
EC adopted further measures to put more pressure on South Africa. These were a
partial ban on steel and iron imports from South Africa and the suspension of new
direct investment in South Africa, as well as the suspension of the import of gold
1 Jackson The World Trading System - Law and Policy of International Economic Relations (1998). 11-
21.
2 In the following the terms European Community (EC) and European Union (EU) are used. Until the
entry into force of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) in November 1993, the term (European
Community) was, as a matter of convention, employed to describe those twelve member states that
constituted three distinct communities. Those were: the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC),
Euratom and the European Economic Community (EEC). Since that date, these three communities
together form a part of a broader entity called the "European Union" (EU). The EU consists of three
main pillars: the first pillar is made up of the three communities (each now comprising fifteen Member
States); the second pillar relates to the cooperation in the field of Common Foreign and Security
policy (CFSP); and the third pillar relates to the cooperation in the field of Justice and Home Affairs
(CJHA). See Jackson The World Trading System (1998) 359. In this dissertation the term "EU" is
used in respect of the post-1993 period. The term "EC" is used in respect of the pre-1993 period or
when referring to a specific competence that does not extend to the broader European Union but
rather involves the European Community alone. Given that commercial policy forms part of the first
pillar, the term "EC" will consistently be used for the term European Community.
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5coins from South Africa." However, during this period the EC, in handling 38 % of the
South African imports and 21% of its exports, was still the country's most important
trading partner. 4
From February 1990, after the De Klerk Government began to introduce certain
domestic reforms, including the release of Nelson Mandela, the lifting of the state of
emergency, and the abolition of apartheid legislation, the EC policy towards South
Africa started to change and various measures prohibiting trade with South Africa
were repealed." With the first democratic elections in April 1994 and the installation of
the country's first democratic order, years of boycott and sanctions came to an end.
However, the isolation resulting from apartheid left the newly elected Government of
National Unity with empty hands regarding international agreements, both in the
trade and the cooperation spheres. Consequently Pretoria had to reposition and to
reintegrate South African economy within the global economy. 6
In the process of restructuring its trade and industrial policies one of the challenges
the new government was faced with were the negotiations over the conclusion of a
Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) with the European Union
(EU). As in the 1980s, trade relations with the EU were still of vital importance to the
South African economy. With a trade volume between the parties estimated at about
18 billion Euro (€) a year, accounting for over 40% of South Africa's imports, close to
40% of its exports and over 70% of direct investment, the EU has consistently been
South Africa's largest trading partner and market access to the EU has therefore
3 European Parliament-Barbara Simons Bericht im Namen des Ausschusses fur
AiJssenwirlschaftsbeziehungen tiber die Inkraftsetzung der winschettsbeschrëakenden Mal3nahmen
gegen die Republik Sudafrika durch die Mitgliedstaaten der Gemeinschaft (1987) 11-26.
4 Other important export markets for South African products were Japan (8,75%), the United States of
America (6,9%) and Switzerland (5,3%). See EU COM Handelsbeziehungen zur Republik Siidettike>
Antwort von Herrn De Clercq im Namen der Kommission (1986) 3-5. For an overview of the trade
between the EC and South Africa from 1983 until 1986 see European Parliament-Barbara Simons
Bericht im Namen des Ausschusses tur Aul3enwirtschaftsbeziehungen (1987) 22.
5 EU COM Sudafrika und die Europelsene Gemeinschaft: Leitlinien fOr eine Politik zur UntersWtzung
des Obergangs zur Demokratie-Mitteilung der Kommission an den Rat (1993) 3.The EC lifted the ban
on investments, repealed the regulation suspending import of gold coins and the decision suspending
imports of certain iron and steel products originating in South Africa. It was also decided to lift the oil
embargo.
6 Graumans "The European Union-South Africa negotiations: the sting is in the tail" Netherlands
Institute for Southern Africa Occasional Paper No 1 (1998) 4 at www.niza.nl/uklpublications/016/niza-
papernol-1998.htm (09.03.2001). .
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6been of specific interest for South Afnca." However, the negotiating process for the
new trade partnership could only be finalised after 43 months and 21 rounds of
negotiations during the course of 1999 - 2000.8 Philip Lowe, the European Chief
Negotiator, described the negotiations as the toughest and meanest the EU had ever
led", and many reasons could. be given why it took the parties so long to reach a
deal. But one must bear in mind that the TOCA between the EU and South Africa
was not only drafted according to bilateral needs but also to meet international rules.
Therefore the TOCA has to be looked at from a global perspective and other
circumstances have to be taken into consideration.
During the same period negotiations regarding future trade relations between the EU
and the 70 countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP) were under
discussion."? Under the Lomé Convention, which was the framework for trade and
development ties between the EU and 70 ACP countries since 1975, standards of
living in the ACP countries have improved markedly in terms of health, education and
access to essential services, but the overall situation during this time was still critical:
41 of the 50 least-developed countries were ACP countries." For this reason, the
European Commission thought that the forthcoming institutional milestone in ACP-EU
cooperation would be the right occasion for a detailed review and frank and
substantial debate on the future of these ties.12
Under these circumstances the TOCA as the first Free Trade Agreement between the
EU and a country, which can in certain terms be qualified as a developing country."
had to be seen as a "pilot project" for future cooperation and trade agreements
between developed and developing countries. Therefore the negotiations between
the EU and South Africa were not only of enormous significance for the concerned
7 EU COM Part,!ers in Progress- The EU / SA TOCA for the 21st century (1999) 7.
8 EU COM Partners in Progress (1999) 39.
9 EU COM Partners in Progress (1999) 40.
10 The Lomé Convention came to an end on 29 February 2000 and negotiations between the
Contracting Parties should start eighteen months before that date, namely in September 1998.
11 EU COM Green Paper on relations between the European Union and the ACP countries on the eve
of the zr' century - Challenges and options for a new partnership (1996) 1. '
12 EU COM Green Paper (1996) 2.
13 South Africa' s status as a developed or as developing country is discussed in Chapter 2.2.4.1;
Stevens & Kennan Trade between South Africa and Europe: Future prospects and policy choices
(1995) 26.
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7parties but also for all other African, Caribbean and Pacific countries that might have
to negotiate their trade relations with the European Union in the future. Of course, 18
months after the entry into force of the agreement it is still too early to give a concrete
analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of the TDCA for the economic
situation in the EU and South Africa. Nevertheless, the demanding negotiation
process between the EU and South Africa, various issues arising between the parties
and, finally, the results of the negotiations, are of enormous interest and could serve
as an important example for future trade relations between the EU and other ACP
states.
Thus, the purpose of this dissertation is to reflect these concerns and to view the
TDCA between the EU and South Africa from a global perspective.
The dissertation is divided into six chapters.
Chapter two contains a detailed description of the historical development of the
cooperation between South Africa and the EU, from the first democratic elections in
1994 to the most recent developments. Furthermore the European Programme for
Reconstruction and Development (EPRD), the Science and Technology Agreement,
the South African proposal for accession to the Lomé Convention, the EU's rejection
thereof and its two-track approach will be examined. This chapter introduces the
main issues of disagreement between the EU and South Africa and discusses the
process of developing its negotiation mandate within the EU. It also presents South
Africa's Trade and Development Agreement proposal, the beginning of detailed trade
negotiations - especially in respect of the agreement on wines and spirits - and,
finally, their conclusion in 1999.14 This chapter will conclude with the conclusion of
the TDCA, the conclusion of the Cotonou Agreement as the successor of the Lomé
Convention in February 2000 and with the latest developments.
The TDCA does not consist of trade provisions only, but contains various other
components. These are: political dialogue, the free trade area and trade-related
issues between the two parties involved, economic and development cooperation,
cooperation in social, cultural and other areas and an institutional provision." In
14 The agreement on wines and spirits is still under discussion and has not been concluded yet. The
parties except its conclusion during the year 2001. .
15 EU COM Agreement on Trade, Development and Cooperation between the European Community
and its Member States on the one part, and the Republic of South Africa, on the other part at
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8order to understand the contents and the legal aspects of the TOCA, each
component will be presented in chapter three. Tables will show the percentage of the
liberalisation of products between the EU and South Africa and illustrate how the
TOCA will function. Furthermore the protocol on the rules of origin and the sectoral
agreements on fishing and wine and spirits, which are part of the TOCA,16 will be
presented. This chapter on the TOCA will conclude with an evaluation of the
Agreement showing the potential benefits to South Africa and to the EU.
Since the TOCA had to satisfy international rules, the provisions of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) - trade regime were of major importance.
The EU, in particular, repeatedly emphasised its determination that every accord had
to be in line with the rules of the World Trade Organisation (WTO).17 However, apart
from article 300 (7) EC Treaty (ECT), which provides that international agreements
are binding on the institutions and on the Member States, the EC Treaty does not
contain any provision that indicates whether, or how, an international agreement like
the GATTIWTO penetrates the Community legal order."
In Chapter four, accordingly, the question of to what extent the bilateral agreement
between South Africa and the EU was influenced by the GATTIWTO provisions and
how these rules were incorporated into the agreement is raised. Ooes the European
Court of Justice (ECJ) recognize the GATTIWTO provisions as such as a source of
law, that is, do these provisions, as they stand, constitute a criterion of validity, or can
they only bé applied after having been transformed into a rule of Community law?
How are the GATTIWTO provisions incorporated into the South African and the
www.europa.eu.inUeur-lexlde/lif/daU1999/de_299A1204_02.htm (29.05.2000); EU COM Partners in
Progress (1999) 5; Department of Trade and Industry SA/EU Negotiations - Trade, Development and
Cooperation Agreement (1999) 8; Trade & Industry and Foreign Affairs Portfolio Committees
Economic Affairs Select Committee SA-EU Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement: Briefing
at the Joint Meeting 17 September 1999 (1999) 4-10; www.southafricahouse.com/tradeeu-sa.htm
(09.03.2001 ).
16 EU COM TDCA between the EU and RSA (1999) 37; www.europa.eu.inUeur-
lexide/lif/daU1999/de_299A 1204_02.htm (29.05.2000). -
17 EU COM Speech of Philip Lowe at the Conference of the South African Institute of International
Affairs 2-3 September 1999:Assessing the EU - SA Agreement-Main parameters of the EU-SA
partnership (1999) at www.europa.eu.in/comm/dg08/speeches.htm (15.03.2001); Graumans "The
European Union - South Africa negotiations" Netherlands Institute for Southern Africa Occasional
Paper No 1 (1998) 10; www.niza.nl/uk/publications/016/niza-papernol-1998.htm (09.03.2001).
18 Bourgeois The European Court of Justice and the World Trade Organisation: Problems and
Challenges in: WeilIer (ed) The EU, the WTO and the NAFTA _ towards a common law of international
trade (2000) 77.
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9Community legal systems and in how far is the agreement in line with the GATTI
WTO provisions?
In an attempt to answer these questions, the status of an international agreement in
general and of the GATTIWTO provisions, in particular, in the South African as well
as the European Community legal systems, will firstly be examined. 19
Secondly, since the TDCA provides a departure from the Most Favoured Nation
obligation in favour of the EU and South Africa,2o the compatibility of the TDCA with
the GATTIWTO provisions has to be evaluated. In doing so, I consider the different
possible legal grounds for the EU and South Africa to be excused from the
GATTIWTO provisions.
These are: Part IV of the GATT and the Enabling Clause, which are designed for
developing countries, a waiver from the GATT obligations under Article IX WTO,
which can only be granted for any purpose by a 75% majority vote, and regional
trade arrangements under Article XXIV GATT.21 To be acceptable under Article XXIV
GATT, the arrangement must cover "substantially all trade", must be completed
within a "reasonable length of time" and all the WTO members must approve the
agreement unanimously." Differentiation based on development levels thus is
possible.23 However, the questions of under which exception the agreement between
the EU and South Africa falls, and whether the different criteria are fulfilled, need to
be answered here.
Apart from the fulfilment of the different criteria of Article XXIV GATT, one also has to
bear in mind that the granting of favourable trade relations only between the EU and
South Africa generates suspicion among neigbouring countries and other interested
19 Due to a very wide field of legal problems the question of the status of an international agreement
and of GATT has to be limited to the issue of direct applicability; following Eeckhout "The domestic
legal status of the WTO Agreement: interconnecting legal systems" The Common Market Law Review
(1997) 13, the question of the status of an international agreement includes the question whether the
agreement can be directly effective or not. However, direct effect is not necessarily the only technique
for answering the question of the legal status of an international agreement.
20 Stevens & Kennan Trade between South Africa and Europe (1995) III.
21 WTO Trading into the future (1998) 5-6.; WTO Training package: GATS, Intellectual Property
Rights, TRIPS (1999) section A slide 4; Thomas "The Lomé Trade Regime and the World Trade
Organization" lGD Occasional Paper No 21 (1999) 5; Graumans "The European Union - South Africa
negotiations" Netherlands Institute for Southern Africa Occasional Paper No 1 (1998) 4;
www.niza.nl/uk/publications/016/niza-papernol-1998.htm (09.03.2001).
22 Jackson The World Trading System (1998) 165-166; Thomas "Lomé and the WTO" lGD Occasional
PaperNo 21 (1999) 5;
23 Graumans "The European Union - South Africa negotiations" Netherlands Institute for Southern
Africa Occasional Paper No 1 (1998) 4; www.niza.nl/uk/publications/016/niza-papernol-1998.htm
(09.03.2001 ).
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third parties that the FTA may have adverse effects on their trade. Most countries in
the Southern African region have entered into formal trade relations with South Africa
under the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Agreement and some
are even more closely bound as members to the Southern African Customs Union
(SACU). Due to these strong and longstanding trade relations between the Southern
African countries, there is fear among these countries that the EU-SA FTA may have
a negative impact on their trade relations with either party of the TDCA and may lead
to disputes concerning their regional interests. Thus, it further is necessary to assess,
in this chapter, in how far the EU-SA FTA could have a negative impact on
neighbouring countries and whether these countries coutd institute, if the occasion
arises, any WTO dispute settlement proceedings against either party of the TDCA.
In addition to the GATT/WTO provisions, the TDCA is also touched on by the
Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs). As an integral part
of the WTO, the protection of TRIPs is guaranteed within the TDCA in terms of article
46 TDCA. 24 Therefore it is binding on the EU and South Africa. However the use of
the brand names "Port" and "Sherry" by local producers in South Africa and the EU
led to substantial disagreement between the parties. The EU maintained that "Port"
and "Sherry are "geographical indications" which need to be protected under the
TRIPs agreement as they related to certain places in Portugal and Spain. Therefore
the EU voiced its determination to reach an agreement that would stop South African
producers of fortified wines from using those names." After four years of tough
negotiations South Africa agreed in bilateral commitment to phase out the respective
terms on the domestic and the export market."
Nevertheless the question remains if there was a legal obligation to do so under
TRIPs. As a way of answering this question, chapter five deals with the trade-related
aspects of intellectual property rights in connection with the bilateral agreement
24 WTO TRIPs: Frequently asked questions at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_etripfq_e.htm
(15.03.2001); Hoekman/Kostecki The political economy of the world trading system _ from GATT to
WTO (1998) 148; www.europa.eu.int/eur-lexlde/lif/dat/1999/de_299A1204_02.htm (29.05.2000).
25 European Information SerVice EU/SA Africa Trade Pact deadline missed, Vienna Summit admits
(1998) at www.findarticies.com/cf_0/mOWXI/2368/53412434/pl/article.htrill (15.03.2001).
26 Appendix X of the TDCA at www.euro.pa.eu.int/eur.lexlen/treaties/dat/ec_cons_treaty_en.pdf
(21.02.2001); DTI TDCA (1999) 9; European Information Service EU/SA: Free Trade Pact Clinched At
Last at www.findarticlescom/cf_0/mOWXI/1999_Feb_3/53711311.jhtml (15.03.2001).
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between the EU and South Africa. "Port" and "Sherry" as the major stumbling block to
the conclusion of the agreement will be analysed more closely. Finally the chapter
will conclude with an evaluation of whether South Africa's commitment has to be
seen as a "precedent" under TRIPs or not.
In chapter six a summary containing the results of the examination is provided.
Moreover the question whether the TDCA can be seen as an example for further
trade relations between the EU and other ACP countries will be taken up again.
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2. Historical development of the post-apartheid cooperation between the RSA
and the EU
2.1 The prelude to the South African - European Union negotiations
After South Africa underwent the political transition to a democracy, it wanted to
become part of the international trading community again. The tremendous
international political support from other states during the apartheid era for the
democratic forces ensured that South Africa could count on international assistance
for its post-apartheid transformation."
Already at an extraordinary meeting in October 1993 the European Council
determined that South Africa would be discussed as a topic for "Joint Action" under
the provisions of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European
Union. Within this "Joint Action" the -EU agreed to provide substantial support for the
monitoring of the forthcoming elections in South Africa. Furthermore it requested that
internal work should begin to create an appropriate cooperation framework to
consolidate the economic and social foundation of South Africa's transition to
multiracial democracy. Consequently, a first exploratory visit of the European
Commission to South Africa took place in February 1994, in order to establish the
first political contact between the EU and South Africa.28
2.1.1 Package of immediate measures in April 1994
As an instant response to the successful election process in South Africa, the EU
.General Affairs Council meeting in Luxembourg on the 18 - 19 April called for a
"package of immediate measures" to support South Africa's transition to democracy
27 European Parliament-Barbara Simons Bericht im Namen des Ausschusses tiir
Au/3enwirtschaftsbeziehungen (1987) 11; EU COM SDdafrika und die Europëiscne Gemeinschaft:
Leitlinien fDr eine Politik zur Unterstiltzung des Ubergangs zur Demokratie; Mitteilung der Kommission
an den Rat (1993) 12.
28 EU COM Mitteilung der Kommission an den Rat (1993) 3-6.
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and to contribute to reconstruction and development in South Africa.29 The EU
Council of Ministers recognised the importance of. trade and market access as an
instrument to facilitate South Africa's reintegration into the global economy. It
therefore lifted all sanctions and adopted the "package of immediate measures"."
In a very broad and general manner, the package of immediate measures contained
immediate interim measures as well as a framework for a comprehensive long-term
relationship, in order to establish a legal basis for the development of cooperation. 31
It stated the intention to extend the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) to
South Africa,32 provide technical assistance in liberalising South Africa's economy,
provide technical support for regional economic cooperation and to promote EU
investments in small and medium-sized enterprises in South Africa, through the
instruments of the European Community Investment Partners (ECIP) and the
Business Cooperation Network (BC - Net).33 Furthermore, the package entailed the
intention to initiate cooperation in areas such as industry, commerce,
telecommunication, science and technology, education and training and to introduce
a political dialogue between the EU and the new government of South Africa.
Regarding aid, intentions were expressed to transform the Special Programme for
the Victims of Apartheid'" into a European Programme for Reconstruction and
19 The European Commission presented this "Package of immediate measures" to the Council as early
as the e" of April 1994. See EU COM The Commission proposes measures to be submitted to the
new government in South Africa (1994) 1.
30 EU COM Penners in Progress (1999) 36; Graumans "The European Union - South Africa
negotiations" Netherlands Institute for Southern Africa Occasional Paper No 1 (1998) 4;
www.niza.nl/ukJpublications/016/niza-papernol-1998.htm (09.03.2001).
31 EU COM Penners in Progress (1999) 36; EU COM The Commission proposes measures (1994) 2-
3; Holland "South Africa, SADC and the European Union: matching bilateral with regional policies"
Journal of Modern African Studies (1995) 272; Graumans "The European Union - South Africa
negotiations" Netherlands Institute for Southern Africa Occasional Paper No 1 (1998) 4;
www.niza.nl/ukJpublications/016/niza-papernol-1998.htm (09.03.2001).
32 Goodison "Marginalisation or Integration? Implications for South Africa's Customs Union partners of
the South Africa-European Union trade deal" lGD Occasional Paper No 22 (1999) 12. The GSP status
for industrial products came into force in September 1994. It provides tariff reductions for a range of
South African industrial products, with the exception of coal and steel. Some 2000 non-sensitive
industrial and semi-industrial goods were given duty-free access. This nevertheless amounted to only
4.7% of South Africa's exports to the EU.
33 ECIP is a financial instrument made available by the European Commission, to support the
establishment of joint ventures, privatization and private infrastructure projects in developing
economies. BC-Net is a financial instrument to provide technical assistance in liberalising developing
economies and to provide tech~ical support for regional economic cooperation.
34 The Special Programme was launched in 1986 and supported anti-apartheid movements in South
Africa.
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Development (EPRD) allocating considerable amounts of money in support of the
Reconstruction and Development Programme. This meant a shift from decentralised
Non-Governmental Organisations-based cooperation programmes towards a state-
to-state type of cooperation."
These measures became the basis on which discussions with the new Government
of National Unity were centred. It is important to note that these were proposals for
consideration by South Africa, not a prescriptive ultimatum. The most important of the
EU's immediate interim measures was a commitment to remove those international
and European sanctions still in place." This was achieved within a month. The actual
initial package of measures was presented without prejudice as to the form of the
future, more global arrangement, but were also considered to be consistent with, and
a legal basis for, the foundations of a longer-term agreement. Consequently, it
suggested a simplified structure that contained three broad clauses concerning
human rights, a comprehensive cooperation agreement and provisions for specific
bilateral policies. However, the enlarged scope of the elements contained within the
joint action demanded that the main features of these initial measures be'
expanslve."
On 10 May 1994, Nelson Mandela was inaugurated as the new president of South
Africa and the first official visit of a European delegation took place in June 1994.38
The Berlin Conference on regional cooperation between the EU and the Southern
African Development Community (SADC), dating from the fifth to the sixth of
September 1994, provided an opportunity to establish future EU-SA relations in a
wider Southern African context. The Conference agreed that the important areas to
be investigated were political dialogue, private investment, regional cooperation and
trade and development cooperation." In the area of trade cooperation the European
35 EU COM Vorschlag fur eine veroranunq des Rates tiber die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit mit
Sudafrika (1995) 1.
36 EU COM Mitteilung der Kommission an den Rat (1993) 3.
37 Holland "SA, SADC and the EU" Journal of Modem African Studies (1995) 272.
38 EU COM Periners in Progress (1999) 36; Holland "SA, SADC and the EU" Journal of Modem
African Studies (1995) 272.
39 Kibble, Goodison, Tsie The uneasy triangle - South Africa, Southern Africa and Europe in the post-
aparlheid era (1995) 54; Graumans "Redefining relations between SA and the EU, An Analysis Of The
South Africa-European Union Trade And Cooperation Negotiations: 1994-1997" FGD Occasional
Paper No 10 (1997) 11.
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Commission indicated that a "window on Lomé" was being considered. 40 While no
details were given, this option could be understood as entailing offering South Africa
Lomé status but limiting the application of certain provisions.
2.1.2 Interim Cooperation Agreement in October 1994
After a second exploratory visit by the European Commission in July 1994, a first
simplified Interim Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and South
Africa was signed in October 1994 by Sir Leon Brittan, on behalf of the Commission,
and by Thabo Mbeki, the First Deputy President of South Africa. The EU Council
approved it in December 1994.41
It is an elementary text, which basically contains a mutual undertaking to cooperate in
all the areas of respective cornpetence.V The agreement was limited to just nine
general clauses and valid for an indefinite period. Article 1 stressed that "an essential
element of the agreement shall be based on respect all areas within their respective
of human rights and democratic principles". According to article 2 of the agreement,
the general purpose was to strenghten "relations with a view to promoting
harmonious, balanced and lasting social and economic development and cooperation
in spheres of competence, including trade". Article 4 provided the necessary
framework for European Investment Bank (EIB) operations in South Africa. A Council
Decision granting a Community guarantee to the Bank against losses under loans for
projects in South Africa was taken in March 1995, and has been renewed since
then." The interim nature of the agreement is underlined in Article 3, which states
that it does not "in any way prejudice discussions or negotiations between them
regarding other possible contractual arrangements". Further, Article 6 highlights
40 Graumans "Redefining relations between SA and the EU" FGD Occasional Paper No 10 (1997) 11;
Davies For.ging a new relationship with the EU in: Bertelsmann-Scott, Mills and Sidiropoulos (ed) The
EU-SA Agreement, South Africa, Southern Africa and the European Union (2000) 6; Goodison
"Marginalisation or Integration?" lGD Occasional Paper No 22 (1999) 13.
41 Wirtschafts- und Sozialausschuss (WSA) Stellungnahme des Wirtschafts - und Sozialausschusses
zum Thema "Die Beziehungen der Europëischen Union zu der Republik SOdafrika" (20. 12~1995) 4;
Holland "SA, SADC and the EU" Journal of Modem African Studies (1995) 272;
42 EU COM Partners in Progress (1999) 36.
43 WSA Stellungnahme des WSA (1995) 5; EU COM Partners in Progress (1999) 37.
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regional considerations, and reflects the guidelines agreed to in the EU-SADC
Declaration adopted by the Berlin Conference in September 1994.44
A third exploratory visit to South Africa was undertaken by the Commission in
October 1994. It invited the South African government to engage in negotiations
towards a comprehensive and long-term relationship, which the South African
government acceptec."
2.1.3 Conclusion
The first phase marked by official exchanges· between the EU and the new
government of South Africa has been labelled by some as disappointing. The interim
Cooperation Agreement, for example, is criticized for being excessively limited and
failing to resolve the question of the membership of the Lomé Convention."
With regard to the Lomé Convention, the text of the 1994 Agreement specifically
avoided prejudicing the content of a longer-term relationship or its legal basts." The
Agreement was designed purely to provide a legal basis for the development of
future cooperation and not to serve as an immediate and comprehensive panacea. It
avoided a policy vacuum prior to the negotiation of a long-term arrangement and
served an important political function as it symbolised the EU's continuing interest in
post-apartheid South Atrica." On closer reading, criticism of its scope is unfounded.
As noted above, Article 2 proposed the promotion of cooperation in all areas
including trade.
The prelude to the negotiations on a long-term trade and cooperation framework,
however, showed the EU's interests diverging from South Africa's. Both parties had
started work on researching the framework and content of a long-term cooperation
and trade relationship and were preparing the ground for future talks. The different
44 EU COM Partners in Progress (1999) 36; Holland "SA, SADC and the EU" Journal of Modern
African Studies (1995) 275.
45 Graumans "Redefining relations between SA and the EU" FGD Occasional Paper No 10 (1997) 13.
46 Kibble et al. The uneasy triangle (1995) 55.
47 Holland "SA, SADC and the EU" Journal of Modern African Studies (1995) 276.
48 Holland "SA, SADC and the EU" Journal of Modern African Studies (1995) 275.
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views on these parameters became clear when South Africa applied for Lomé
membership at the end of 1994.49
2.2 South Africa and the Lomé Convention
2.2.1 The South African request for a Lomé-minus membership
After conclusion of the Interim Cooperation Agreement, South Africa formally
accepted the EU invitation to work towards a comprehensive and long-term
relationship in October 1994. Deputy President Thabo Mbeki formally requested the
opening of "negotiations with a view to establishing the closest possible relationship
with the Lomé Convention" from the EU Presidency in November 1994. He
furthermore required that these should also "cover a possible agreement with the
European Union on specific elements that might more appropriately be
accommodated outside the Lomé Convention, to the benefit of the existing Lomé
members and South Africa itself."so South Africa acknowledged that a Lomé-minus
arrangement would be most suitable, because of South Africa's level of development
and economic structure. Lomé-minus, in South Africa's perspective, would mean an
alignment with the Convention in a manner which would be acceptable to current
African, Caribbean, Pacific (ACP) members and in the mutual interest of all
partners.F' In practice, South Africa would not seek access to the Special Protocols
and would not draw from the European Development Fund (EDF).s2 A second track
49 Graumans "Redefining relations between SA and the EU" FGD Occasional Paper No 10 (1997)
(1997) 13.
50 EU COM Partners in Progress (1999) 38; EU COM Commission recommendation fora Council
decision (1995) 4; Graumans 'The European Union - South Africa negotiations" Netherlands Institute
for Southern Africa Occasional Paper No 1 (1998) 4; www.niza.nl/uk/publications/016/niza-papernol-
1998.htm (09.03.2001).
51 Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) Interdepartmental discussion paper - Appendix III: Basis
for negotiations for a Trade and Development Agreement between the Republic of South Africa and
the European Union (1996) 161.
52 The EDF is a fund, which is funded directly from the budget of the European Union Investment Bank
(EIB) The EIB is owned and financed by the Member States of the EU and not by the EU budget.
According to Art. 267 ECT the EIB uses parts of its fund for the financial assistance of less developed
countries.
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would be created to deal with these issues in bilateral aqreernents.f Nonetheless,
South Africa wanted to benefit from the trade provisions of the Convention.
The SACU, the SADC, the ACP countries and the European Parliament
overwhelmingly supported the Lomé bid.54 ACP support resulted from the recognition
that South Africa's accession could strenghten the ACP's bargaining position with the
EU for a post-Lomé trade and cooperation framework. It further reflected the fact that
the ACP saw little or no direct trade competition emerging from improved South
African access to the EU market. 55
To evaluate South Africa's request to enter the Lomé Convention, the historical
background and the main features of the Convention will be examined first.
2.2.2 Background to the Lomé Convention
The Lomé Convention provides the framework for trade and development
cooperation between the EU and, by now, 71 ACP countries. This relationship grew
out of a set of links which were in existence when the European Community was
established. Most of the ACP countries are in Africa and most of them are former
colonies of members of the EU.56 Thus the EU Member States had special
responsibilities towards them.
The Lomé treaties had their historical roots in the concept of association provided for
in Part IV of the Treaty of Rome.57 The EEC Treaty stated that these countries and
territories were associated with the EEC, and it had the aim of promoting their
economic and social development and of establishing a close economic relationship
between them and the EEC. After most of the overseas countries and territories
referred to in these articles became independent, their relations with the European
Community had to be restructured on the basis of multilateral treaties.
53 Goodison "Marginalisation or Integration?" lGD Occasional Paper No 22 (1999) 15-16.
54 DTI Basis for negotiations (1996) 161; Goodison "Marginalisation or Integration?" lGD Occasional
Paper No 22 (1999) 16-17; Keet "The European Union's proposed free trade agreement with South
Africa: The implications and some counter-proposals" Development Southern Africa (1996) 558.
55 Kibble et al. The uneasy triangle (1995) 53.
56 Links The EU and Southern Africa: Between Lomé and a Free Trade Agreement (1998) 59.
57 Titled "The association of overseas countries and territories"; see Articles 182-188 ECT.
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Consequently, the EEC and 18 African states, former colonies of France, Italy and
Belgium, in 1963 concluded the first Yaounde Convention, which was replaced by
Yaounde II, signed in 1969. These Conventions were supplemented by the two
Arusha agreements of 1968 and 1969. Although these were preferential trade and
aid agreements, they still bore the marks of the paternalistic approach that most
European countries maintained towards their former colonies.
These treaties were replaced by the first Lomé Convention, signed in February 1975.
It was a comprehensive trade-and-aid agreement between the Member States of the
European Community and a group of 46 ACP countries. The accord stated its
objective as being to promote and expedite the economic, cultural and social
development of the ACP states and to consolidate and diversify their relations with
the European Community, in a spirit of solidarity and mutual interest. The
fundamental principles underlying the Convention included equality between
partners, respect for each other's sovereignty, mutual interest and
interdependence. 58
Apart from receiving development aid from the EU,59the member states also enjoyed
preferential access to European markets." The Convention made special provision
for the ACP countries in two areas, namely trade and financial cooperation. Under
trade it offered unrestricted, non-reciprocal, and duty-free access with regard to
industrial products (including coal, steel, textiles, clothing), duty reductions and
quantitative access for agricultural products." The Convention differentiated between
two types of agricultural products, namely tropical products that do not compete with
European farmers and products that are exempted from restrictions applied by the
58 Links The EU and Southern Africa (1998) 59.
59 Links The EU and Southern Africa (1998) 60: With regard to aid, two main instruments are used to
assist the ACP countries. These are the European Devélopment Fund, which provides grants and risk
capital, and the European Investment Bank, which provides loans for national and regional
development programmes. The EU, for example, had earmarked funds totalling more than 80 billion
Rand for development aid programmes to the ACP countries for the period 1995-2000. These
comprised EU-funded initiatives such as Stabex, which compensates countries heavily dependent on
one or more staple products for severe fluctuations in their export earnlnqs. or Sysmin, which provides
finance for the upkeep or reconstruction of mining installations during periods when their operation is
curtailed by unforeseen circumstances.
60 Bertelsmann-Scott "The European Union, South Africa and the Free Trade Agreement" South
African Yearbook of International Affairs (2000) 117-118.
61 Graumans "Redefining relations between SA and the EU" FGD Occasional Paper No 10 (1997) 4-5;
Bertelsmann-Scott "The EU, SA and the FTA" SAYII (2000) 118.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
20
Common Agriculture Policy of the EU.62 An additional four protocols for sugar, beef
and veal, rum and bananas were attached to the Lomé Convention.f These
protocols gave free access to EU markets for a fixed quantity of exports from
selected and traditional suppliers." Under financial cooperation, the Convention
provided for massive aid packaqes."
Concerning its time frame, the Convention was reviewed at regular intervals. The last
Convention, Lomé IV, covered the period 1990 until 2000 and numbered 71 ACP
countries. Lomé IV bis expired in February 2000 and was replaced by the Cotonou
Aqreernent.'"
2.2.3 Reasons for South Africa's request for Lomé-minus membership
The fact that the Lomé Convention, at the time, was scheduled to expire in 2000
raised the question as to why South Africa sought access to Lomé IV bis.
2.2.3.1 Implementation within a relatively short term
That access to Lomé IV bis would be an option which could be implemented within a
relatively short term, compared to the lengthy process of negotiating an agreement
especially tailored for South Africa's needs, has been regarded as a major reason for
this request. It would give South Africa time to research and analyse the future
course of its trade relations with the EU and Southern Africa in greater detail.6?
62 Bertelsmann-Scott "The EU, SA and the FTA" SA YII (2000) 118; see Chapter 3.1.2.3 for further
explanation of the Common Agricultural Policy.
63 EU COM "La Convention de Lomé IV, telle que révisée par laccord signé ilMaurice le 4 novembre
1995" Le Courier No 155(1996) 168-170.
64 Graumans "Redefining relations between SA and the EU" FGD Occasional Paper No 10 (1997) 5.
65 Bertelsmann-Scott "The EU, SA and the FTA" SAYII (2000) 118.
66 Maasdorp "Study on the impact of introducing reciprocity into trade relations between the EU and
the SADC region" lGD Occasional Paper No 21 (1999) 16; for a detailed explanation of the expiry of
the Lomé Convention and for a description of its successor, the Cotonou Agreement, see Chapter
2.12.
67 Graumans "Redefining relations between SA and the EU" FGD Occasional Paper No 10 (1997) 14.
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2.2.3.2 Non-reciprocity and best preferential market access
Furthermore, Lomé membership would also provide preferential access to EU
markets, ahead of other more competitive international exporters, without opening
the South African market to European products, due to the non-reciprocity of the
Lomé agreement. This would protect the South African industrial sector, most of it
vulnerable and uncompetitive at the time, from competition with the EU. Thus
membership of the Lomé Convention was regarded as the most advantageous of all
possible trade links with the EU, offering the best preferential market access, such as
duty- and quota-free access for all industrial goods.68
2.2.3.3 Facilitation of regional integration
Since South Africa's neighbours were members of the Lomé Convention, it was
further argued that accession to the Lomé Convention would bring South Africa's
trade access to the EU market in harmony with that of the SADC.6g With South
Africa's relatively well-developed industrial base and access to the EU's extensive
markets under Lomé, joint manufacturing ventures in Southern Africa were expected
to provide the basis for qualitatively more advanced economic diversification and
development across the whole region. This, in turn, would help to consolidate an
effective new economic grouping in Africa." Finally, as far as South Africa was
concerned, the acceptance of these factors would have facilitated a shorter
negotiating process."
68 Keet The "EU's proposed FTA" Development Southern Africa (1996) 556.
69 OTI Basis for negotiations for a TOA (1996) 161; Holland "SA, SAOG and the EU" Journal of Modern
African Studies (1995) 277.
70 OTI Basis for negotiations for a TOA (1996) 161; Keet "The EU's proposed FTA" Development
Southern Africa (1996) 556.
71 OTI Basis for negotiations for a TOA (1996) 161.
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2.2.4 EU's rejection of South Africa's request
The European Union rejected South Africa's request for access to the Lomé
Convention and advanced the following arguments to support its position."
2.2.4.1 South Africa's status as a developed country
The EU's position was based on the fact that South Africa was officially classified by
the WTO as a developed, lower middle income country and that its inclusion in the
Lomé Convention would have violated Article 363 (1) of the Convention, which
requires that any acceding state's economy is "comparable to those of the ACP
countries."
The EU doubted this comparability. From its point of view the exclusion of South
Africa was based on the regulation that the Lomé system of non-reciprocal trade
preferences was specifically designed to assist the development of some of the
world's poorest countries and on the dual nature of the South African economy." In
certain respects, South Africa more closely resembles a "developed" than a
"developing" country. With a per capita gross national product (GNP) of US$ 3040 in
1994, South Africa already ranked amongst upper middle income countries like
72 Keet "The EU' s proposed FTA" Development Southern Africa (1996)556 - 557; Rojahn & Roehm
"Das Freihandelsabkommen EU-SGdafrika: Testfall filr eine neue Lomé Politik der EU" Ifo-
Schnelldienst(1999) 18; Goodison "Marginalisation or Integration?" I.GD Occasional PaperNo 22
(1999) 18; Graumans "The European Union - South Africa negotiations" Netherlands Institute for
Southern Africa Occasional Paper No 1 (1998) 4; www.niza.nl/uklpublications/016/niza-papernol-
1998.htm (09.03.2001).
73 Eisenberg "South Africa, Countertrade and The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade"
Stellenbosch Law Review, Vol. 4 No 2 (1993) 143-144; Solignac Lecomte The impact of the EU-SA
Agreement on Lomé in: Bertelsmann-Scott, Mills, Sidiropoulos (ed) The EU-SA Agreement: South
Africa, Southern Africa and the European Union (2000) 56; Holland "SA, SADC and the EU" Journal
of Modern African Studies (1995) 278; Keet "The EU' s proposed FTA" Development Southern Africa
(1996) 557; Goodison "Marginalisation or Integration?" lGD Occasional Paper No 22 (1999) 18 ;
Stevens & Page Trading with South Africa: the policy options for the EC (1992) Viii - IX; Stevens &
Kennan Trade between South Africa and Europe (1995) 26; Graumans "The European Union - South
Africa negotiations" Netherlands Institute for Southern Africa Occasional Paper No 1 (1998) 10;
www.niza.nl/uklpublications/016/niza-papernol-1998.htm (09.03.2001): However, classification in the
WTO is by self-selection, and thus it is for South Africa to choose what category of country it falls
under. The current classification dates back to 1945.
74 EU COM "South Africa: Lomé IV 86th·s member" The Courier No 164 (1997) 3; Lowe "Combat
poverty and help our ACP partners to expand trade, investment and employment: these are the 21st
century challenges" The Courier No 169 (1997) 3; EU COM Partners in Progress (1999) 25.
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Malaysia, Brazil and the Czech Republic." Furthermore its gross domestic product
(GDP), with 120 billion US$, was larger than of Ireland, Portugal, Greece and
Finland, all of them Member States of the EU.76
However, taking into consideration the specific situation of South Africa, I think that
this categorization seems questionable.
The United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) Human Development Report
for 1995 showed that, while South Africa as a whole was rated 70th in the world
according to its human development indicators, "white" South Africa on its own would
rank in the top 40 countries, whereas "black" South Africa would be 128th of 174
countries. According to this report, certain indicators such as life expectancy, child
mortality rates and adult illiteracy showed that the situation for the majority of the
black population was as bad as those in many least developed countries. 77 The gap
between rich and poor has basically remained unaltered since this 1995 report. A
report of the World Bank shows that, while South Africa's per capita income places it
among the middle income countries, its income disparities are among the most
extreme in the world. Thirteen percent of the population (about 5.4 million people) live
under "first world" conditions. At the other extreme, 53 % of the population (about 22
million people) live under "third world" conditions. In this group, only one quarter of
households have access to electricity and running water, only half have primary
school education, and more than a third of the children suffer from chronic
malnutrition."
75 EU COM "South Africa" The Courier No 164 (1997) 3.
76 Bertelsmann-Scott "The EU, SA and the FTA" SAYII (1997) 268.
77 United Nations Human Development Report 1995 at www.undp.org/hdro/98hdi.htm (08.05.2001);
Keet "The EU's proposed FTA" Development Southern Africa (1996) 557.
78 World Bank The World Bank Group countries: South Africa at www.worldbank.org/afr/zaz.htm
(08.05.2001 ).
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2.2.4.2 Criticism from other WTO Members
Since the EU regarded South Africa as a developed country, it further stated that
South Africa's accession to the Lomé Convention would be subject to major criticism
from other WTO members.I?
However, the WTO signatories acknowledged the fact that its classification as a
developed lower middle income country in terms of GOP does not represent the
general economic situation of the vast majority of black South Africans during the
anti-apartheid years.80 Furthermore, both the United States of America (USA) and
Japan have classified South Africa as an "economy in transition"," similar to eastern
European countries, which would mean the enjoyment of advantages similar to those
accorded to developing countries, but on a more temporary basis. The USA even
expressed having no objection to accession of South Africa to the Lomé
Conventlon.Y
2.2.4.3 Negative impact on the ACP countries
An initial response in Europe to South Africa's interest in joining Lomé was that its
membership would be contrary to Article 363 (4) of the Lomé Convention, which
stipulates that accession of a new member state should not adversely affect the
advantages accruing to the ACP states. The EU agued that the other ACP countries
would feel threatened by South Africa's higher level of economic development, which
could lead to a replacement of their existing exports to the EU.83
Indeed the volume of South African exports to the EU would have been equivalent to
50% of all the ACP exports to the EU. According to the EU, this would have
adversely affected the existing exports of ACP countries to the EU. However,
79 Goodison "Marginalisation or Integration?" lGD Occasional Paper No 22 (1999) 18; Solignac
Lecomte The impact on Lomé (2000) 56; Holland "SA, SAOG and the EU" Journal of Modem African
Studies (1995) 278; Graumans "Redefining relations between SA and the EU" FGD Occasional Paper
No 10 (1997) 14.
80 Keet 'The EU's proposed FTA" Development Southern Africa (1996) 557.
81 Bertelsmann-Scott, Mills & Gibb The EU - SA Agreement in a global context in: Bertelsmann-Scott,
Mills, Sidiropoulos (ed) The EU-SA Agreement, South Africa and the European Union (2000) 25;
Stevens & Kennan Trade between South Africa and Europe (1995) 8. They argue that SA even has
many trading characteristics of a much poorer developing country.
82 Graumans "Redefining relations between SA and the EU" FGD Occasional Paper No 10 (1997) 15.
83 Keet "The EU's proposed FTA" Development Southern Africa (1996) 556; Goodison
"Marginalisation or Integration?" lGD Occasional Paper No 22 (1999) 18.
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although half of the ACP exports to the EU would have been equivalent, the South
African products - mostly minerals and a few agricultural products - were of a very
different profile. The mineral exports of the ACP countries entered the EU duty-free
and the agricultural exports constituted only a small percentage of South Africa's
exports to the EU.84 Therefore Keet and Graumans argued that the fear of an
increase in trade competition among the ACP countries was disproportionate with
regard to the volume of the equivalent exports suggested.85
Furthermore, Jenkins and Naudé stated that South Africa's economic and political
weight could strenghten the ACP countries in their negotiations with the EU on the
future of the Lomé convention. With the SADC countries stressing that South Africa's
entry into Lomé was important for the consolidation of the Southern African region,
the ACP countries supported South Africa's adrnlsslon."
2.2.4.4 Fear of competition
Moreover, the EU put forward that the export of South African agricultural products
could pose a threat to the European agricultural sector, because many of South
Africa's agricultural exports are the same as those produced in certain European
countries. Southern European countries, especially, were concerned about the import
of citrus fruits."
However, in my opinion, any menace that South African agricultural products present
to the European agricultural sector seems to be much exaggerated. South Africa has
an insignificant market share in the EU, with her total agricultural exports to the EU
comprising less than 2% of the EU's total agricultural imports.88In 1995, Greece was
the country most likely to be affected, since it competed on six items which, together,
accounted for 3.25% of the country's exports to other EU member states. Spain and
Portugal came next, followed by Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg. These
two groups experienced competition in products which respectively accounted for just
84 Graumans "Redefining relations between SA and the EU" FGD Occasional Paper No 10 (1997) 15.
85 Keet "The EU's proposed FTA" Development Southern Africa (1996) 557.
86 Keet "The EU' s proposed FTA" Development Southern Africa (1996) 557-558.
87 Jenkins / Naudé "Reciprocity in trade relations between South Africa and Europe" Development
Southern Africa (1996) 18.
88 OTI Basis for negotiations for a TDA (1996) 166.
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over and just under 1% of their total exports to other member states. None of the
other countries appeared to have any significant area of overlap: where they had
exports of the same products as those of interest to South Africa, the values involved
were so small as to be less than 0.5% of their total intra-EU exports.f" Concerning
citrus fruit, the fear of European farmers was also exaggerated. These mainly grow in
one small part of South Africa, the Western Cape, and they enter the European
market during the European off-season and do not directly compete with European
producers. From my point of view South African agricultural exports thus present no
direct threat to EU producers."
2.2.5 Evaluation of South Africa's request to enter the Lomé Convention and
of the EU's rejection thereof
Regarding the arguments put forward by the EU, the real reason for the EU position
seems to be the fear of increasing competition from South African exports for the
European economy. Although South African exports did not constitute a threat to the
European market at the time," it is important to note that South Africa's potential
exports would be competing with those of Eastern European countries, which,
according to the Agenda 2000,92 are potential future members of the European
Union. Viewed in this light and taking South Africa's status as a "developed" country
into consideration, South -Africa had a strong case in. that - despite the European
Union's argument - its admission to Lomé would not have been incompatible with the
WTO's provisions for less developed countries.
The question whether South Africa's request for Lomé -membership was
advantageous for South Africa or not, has been judged differently.
For some, Lomé membership was a very important option for South Africa, because
of the market access it could have provided for the country's agricultural produce, the
(
89 Stevens & Kennan Trade between South Africa and Europe (1995) 16.
90 DTI Basis for negotiations for a 'TOA (1996) 166.
91 Stevens & Kennan Trade between South Africa and Europe (1995) 4-13.
92 Agenda 2000 gives an overview of the policy of the EU after the year 2000 and deals with the
enlargement of the EU.
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regional cumulation provisions for manufactured goods and project tendering and
other rights. For South Africa's relatively weak industries, Lomé membership would
have provided access to EU markets ahead of other more competitive international
exporters. With South Africa's relatively developed industrial base and access to the
EU's vast market under Lomé, joint manufacturing ventures in Southern Africa could
have provided the basis for qualitatively more advanced economic diversification and
development across the whole region. This would have helped consolidate an
effective new economic grouping in Africa.93
Others harshly criticised South Africa's request to become a member of the Lomé
Convention as a mistake. From their point of view, by asking to join the other ACP
countries, South Africa put itself on the same level with some of the world's poorest
countries. South Africa gave signals to the world that it did not see itself as a growing
and forceful economy, but rather as a developing country in need of development aid
from the EU. It thereby cast great doubt on it being a stable and promising location
for ·investments. 94
In my view, both arguments have some truth in them. Though full membership was a
great temptation for South Africa, even partial membership had some undoubted
advantages. The economic areas where South Africa could benefit from membership
of the Convention included, inter alia, eligibility for tenders for projects in all ACP
countries (amounting to Euro 7,5 billion) financed from the 8th European
Development Fund (EDF) and full participation in the institutions of the Convention."
At a political level, South Africa received important opportunities for cooperation and
integration with the ACP states through the Lomé membership. This would assist
South Africa in redressing its historically isolated position.. both at an international
level and vis-a-vis its neighbours in the SADC region.96 Moreover, South Africa had
93Keet "The EU's proposed FTA" Development Southern Africa (1996) 556.
94Bertelsmann-Scott "The EU, SA and the FTA" SAYII (2000) 268; Jenkins I Naudé "Reciprocity in
trade relations" Development Bank Southern Africa (1996) 17-30.
95EU COM Partners in Progress (1999) 25; EU COM "South Africa" The Courier No 164 (1997) 2;
One has to bear in mind that, according to Article 267 ECT, the EDF should be used for the financial
assistance of less developed countries. Thus, South Africa' s participation in the EDF has to be seen
as a preferential treatment. See for further explanation of the EDF Chapter 2.2.1.
96EU COM Partners in Progress (1999) 25.
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the possibility of influencing the political dialogue between the EU and the ACP
countries with regard to the successor of Lomé IV bis, the Cotonou aqreernent."
2.3 Start of negotiations for a long-term framework of cooperation
2.3.1 Declaration of Intent of May 1995
As the political situation in South Africa evolved, the European Commission adapted
the emphasis and modalities of its operation. A Delegation of The European
Commission opened in 1994, and in 1995 the Special Programme was renamed "The
European Programme for Reconstruction and Development in South Africa (EPRD),
echoing the new South Africa's own Reconstruction and Development Programme
(RDP).98 Following the signing of a Declaration of Intent between the Commission,
97 Morrissey Post Lomé - new partnership agreed (2000) 5.
98 EU COM History of EU-SA Cooperation at www.eusa.org.za\HistoryofEUSACooperation.htm
(14.08.2000).
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represented by Commissioner Pinheiro, and the South African Government,
represented by Minister Jay Naidoo, in May 1995, the EPRD focused on the following
sectors: Education and Training, Health, Rural and Urban Development, Good
Governance and Private Sector Development. Support for the Private Sector
Development was targeted at enterprises and addressed the gender issue by giving
particular attention to the needs of women. Attention was also given to banks by
encouraging them to offer services to the disadvantaged population. 99
2.3.2 The EU two-track proposal in June 1995 and the official opening of the
negotiations
In reply to Mbeki's request of November 1994, the EU Council of Ministers approved
detailed directives for the European Commission to negotiate a long-term framework
for the relationship between the EU and the RSA on 19 June 1995. These directives
entailed the so-called two-track approach, consisting of:
• A protocol to the Lomé Convention covering terms and conditions of South
Africa's accession to the Convention; and
• A bilateral Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the European
Community and South Africa.1oo
On 30 June 1995 the negotiations between the Community and South Africa were
officially opened. Commissioner Pinheiro, on behalf of the Community, presented the
details of the EU proposals to his South Africa counterpart, Minister of Trade and
Industry Trevor Manuel, and expressed the Community's desire for the two-track
approach."?' Regarding the bilateral agreement on trade, the EU envisaged
99 EU COM Partners in Progress (1999) 15.
100 EU COM Empfehlung fOr einen gemeinsamen Standpunkt des Rates zur Genehmigung des
ProtokolIs Ober den Beitritt der Republik SOdafrika zum vierten AKP - EWG Abkommen in der
Fassung des am 4. November in Mauritius unterzeichneten Abkommens (1997) 2; WSA
Stellungnahme des WSA (1996) 5; DTI Basis for negotiations for a TOA (1996) 161; Graumans
"Redefining relations between SA and the EU" FGO Occasional Paper No 10 (1997) 16; Graumans
"The European Union - South Africa negotiations" Netherlands Institute for Southern Africa Occasional
Paper No 1 (1998) 5; www.niza.nlluklpublications/016/niza-papernol-1998.htm (09.03.2001).
101 DTI Basis for negotiations for a TOA (1996) 182; EU COM Partners in Progress (1999) 38; WSA
Stellungnahme des WSA (1996) 5; Graumans "Redefining relations between SA and the EU" FGO
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progressive and reciprocal liberalisation of trade. It therefore invited South Africa to
engage in negotiations leading to a free trade agreement (FTA).102 While the
Commissioner stressed that the FTA option was only a proposal put forward for
South Africa's consideration, the European Commission mandate maintained that it
would be the only option for South Africa to obtain increased market access to the
EU during the first phase of its transition.l'" According to the EU, an FTA should:
• Comply with WTO rules;
• Consider sensitive interests and products within the EU; and
• Cover the rights of establishment, provisions on services and the free
movement of capital and free settlement of current transactions in convertible
currencies.'?'
Separate agreements would need to be negotiated on fisheries, wine and spirits and
science and technology. This, however, had to happen in a comprehensive way,
which meant that negotiations on these agreements should be in parallel and
concluded in principle at the same time as the trade and cooperation agreement and
the protocol on accession to the Lomé Convention.l'"
The discussions and meetings following 30 June centred around reaching an
agreement on a framework for negotiations.
2.3.3 Technical discussions
Rounds of technical discussions were held in July and September 1995. The
principal objective of the European Commission in these discussions with South
Africa was to secure South Africa's agreement in principle to the concept of the FTA.
Occasional Paper No 10 (1997) 18; Goodison "Marginalisation or Integration?" lGD Occasional Paper
No 22 (1999) 21.
102 Graumans "Redefining relations between SA and the EU" FGD Occasional Paper No 10 (1997)
18; Keet "The EU's proposed FTA" Development Southern Africa (1996) 558; WSA Ste/lungnahme
des WSA (1996) 5-6.
103 OTI Basis for negotiations for a TOA (1996) 182.
104 WSA Ste/lungnahme des WSA (1996) 6-7; EU COM Commission Staff working paper: Towards a
free trade area between the European Union and South Africa (1996) 3.
105 EU COM Partners in Progress (1999) 7; Graumans "Redefining relations between SA and the EU"
FGD Occasional Paper No 10 (1997) 18.
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While the South African negotiators were mindful that the EU proposals would not
call for complete free trade, they were unclear what the precise scope of the
proposed FTA would be. For this reason they sought detailed information with regard
to specific products on which South Africa would be allowed duty-free access to the
EU market and for which specific products the EU would be seeking duty-free access
. to the South African market.l'"
The Commission negotiators, however, avoided discussing any of the tricky detailed
issues which South African representatives repeatedly raised. They shifted the focus
to discussion of general principles, with the aim of securing a firm and irrevocable
commitment "in principle" from the South African government to the conclusion of an
FTA with the EU and eventually the South African government agreed to accept the
establishment of a FTA as a long-term objective for EU-South Africa trade relations.
This South African commitment, however, was qualified by the insistence "that
nothing is agreed until everything is agreed".107Moreover South Africa expressed the
need to obtain a detailed proposal from the EU in terms of the coverage, products,
transition, and asymmetry of an FTA.
Concerning the agricultural sector, which the EU traditionally excluded from any
agreement, the South African government expressed considerable concern over the
impact of EU subsidies in the agricultural sector and wanted the impact of EU
subsidies included in any discussion on future trade relations in this sector.l'" Many
detailed points were raised in this regard in an effort to draw the relevant EU
departments into a meaningful process of dialogue on this issue. The EU's
Directorate General for Trade, however, showed a marked reluctance to be drawn on
these issues,109which made it clear to the parties that progress in future negotiations
of the agricultural sector would be difficult.
With regard to the economic restructuring in South Africa and the different levels of
development between South Africa and the EU, South Africa highlighted the need for
106 Goodison "Marginalisation or Integration?" lGD Occasional Paper No 22 (1999) ~9.
107 EU COM Partners in Progress (1997) 38; WSA Stellungnahme des WSA (1996) 8.
108 DTI Basis for negotiations for a TDA (1996) 165; Goodison The EU's trade and Development
Policy: South Africa and the SADC in: Foundation for Global Dialogue (ed) Trading on development:
Proceedings of a workshop on South Africa's trade and development relations with the European
Union (1997) 50.
109 Goodison "Marginalisation or Integration?" lGD Occasional Paper No 22 (1999) 22.
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a future FTA to have non-reciprocity for at least the first ten years of the agreement.
Concerning its relations to the BLNS countries, South Africa underlined that it was in
the process of renegotiating the SACU agreement with the BLNS. The intention was
to protect and preserve the integrity of the common customs union. The South
African authorities further stated that the lack of appreciation in the EU mandate for
the integrated nature of South Africa's economy within the SACU arid its current
efforts to integrate with the rest of Southern Africa in an FTA was alarming. As far as
Article 19 (1) of the SACU agreement (1969) was concerned, BLNS had the right to
approve or veto any agreement signed by South Africa with the EU following any
negotiation with the EU. Therefore their concerns had to be considered in an
agreement between South Africa and the EU.11o The European Commission
repeatedly assured the South African negotiators that all these regional and national
concerns could be addressed within the process of substantive negotiations, once a
more detailed supplementary negotiating mandate had been agreed upon by the EU
Council of Ministers.l"
2.3.4 The second EU mandate in March 1996
The need for complementary EU negotiating directives became apparent after these
first technical discussions. The EU invited the Member States to put forward lists of
sensitive products to be taken into account in the negotiations of the EU-SA FTA and
in the following months the EU-SA FTA was to be the subject of extensive discussion
among the EU Member States. Since they struggled with finalising the EU mandate
the Foreign Minister of the United Kingdom, Malcolm Rifkind, called on the EU
Foreign Ministers to make good their promises to South Africa to support its
democratic transition. He expressed alarm at the protectionist attitude of some of his
colleagues and disputed that the EU would be injured by South African exports.I"
Frustrated by the lack of progress of the EU in finalizing its mandate the South
African negotiators froze further discussions on. all aspects of the long-term
110 DTI Basis for negotiations fora TOA (1996)172-173; WSA Stellungnahme des WSA (1996) 8; See
Article 19 (1) of the SACU agreement in Appendix 1.
111 Goodison "Marginalisation or Integration?" lGD Occasional Paper No 22 (1999) 22; WSA
Stellungnahme des WSA (1996) 9.
112 DTI Basis for negotiations for a TOA (1996) 162.
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framework in December 1995 until such time as the Commission had received
complementary negotiating directives from the Council.113
However, agreement within the EU was not reached on the complementary
negotiating directives and it was decided by the General Affairs Council at its 29
January 1996 meeting to postpone a declslon.!" In March 1996, the EU Council of
Ministers finally presented complementary negotiating directives to the Commission
about what to offer South Africa in the FTA neqottatlons.!"
2.3.4.1 The contents of the EU offer
The offer of the EU provided for economic and development cooperation,
cooperation in other areas (such as environment, culture, science and technology),
as well as the establishment of regular political dialogue and several lnstitutlons.!"
In the trade area the Commission proposed that the FTA between South Africa and
the EU had to be in line with the WTO rules. It had to cover at least 90% of all actual
and potential trade between the two parties at the end of a ten- or, at most, twelve-
year transitional period and not leave out any significant sector.!" Its aim should be
to take into account the uneven development levels of the EU and South Africa.!"
While containing no details at the level of individual sectors and products, the offer
did set out the broad timetable under which tariffs would be eliminated on both non-
agricultural and agricultural products.
113 EU COM Commission Staff working paper (1996) 4; Graumans "The European Union - South
Africa negotiations" Netherlands Institute for Southern Africa Occasional Paper No 1 (1998) 5;
www.niza.nl/uk/publications/016/niza-papernol-1998.htm (09.03.2001).
114 Graumans "Redefining relations between SA and the EU" FGD Occasional Paper No 10 (1997) 20.
115 DTI Basis for negotiations for a TOA (1996) 162; EU COM Partners in Progress (1999) 38; Kuschel
Die zukïmftiqen Handels - und Wirtschaftsbeziehungen zwischen der Europaischen Union und
Siidafrika (1996) 269.
116 EU COM Bilateral Relations at www.europa.eu.inticomm/dg08/s-a/en/bilat.htm (15.03.2001).
117 Keet "The EU's proposed FTA" Development Southern Africa (1996) 558; Kuschel "Die zukunftiqen
Handels- und Wirtschaftsbeziehungen zwischen der Europáischen Union und Sudafrika"
Internationales Afrikaforum (1996) 269; Mills "Free trade with the European Union?" SAYIA (1996) 45.
118 EU COM Partners in Progress (1999) 8.
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According to this schedule, the EU had to eliminate duties on 60% of its imports from
South Africa in three phases over ten years, for the agricultural sector, starting with
25% in the first year, 5% over the next three years, and 30% in the remaining seven
years. South Africa, for its part, had to eliminate duties on 95% of its imports from the
EU in two phases over ten years, starting with 50% in the first year and 45% over the
rest of the ten years.l'"
For the non-agricultural sector these timetables proposed that the EU should
eliminate duties on 97% of its imports from South Africa in two phases over three
years, starting with 93% in the first year. South Africa, on the other hand, was bound
to eliminate duties on 88% of imports from the EU in three phases over ten years,
starting with 53% in the first year, 15% over the next three years and 20% over the
rest of the ten years.120
Significantly, both timetables called for tariff elimination to begin on certain products
from the time of the signing of the agreement, with duties being eliminated on further
volumes of trade in each of the succeeding years, until the agreed percentage of
duty-free access had been achieved within the specific time period.121
The directives further stipulated that liberalisation should comply with the principles of
the Common Agriculture Policy (CAp122) such as preference for agricultural products
from EU member states. An FTA with South Africa should also take into account the
EU's agreements with preferential partners and its economic interests.123
It was further proposed that a protocol concerning the rules of origin should be
annexed to the FTA agreement, and had to be inspired by the ongoing harmonisation
process in the EU of its preferential rules of origin applicable to third countries and be
consistent with those of the Lomé Convention. In particular the protocol had to
include a cumulation procedure, with the objective of promoting a closer economic
integration. Moreover, the EU mandate proposed that the FTA cater for the free
119 DTI Basis for negotiations for a TOA (1996) 165; Goodison The EU's Trade and Development
Policy (1997) 44-45; Keet "The EU's proposed FTA" Development Southern Africa (1996) 558-559.
120 DTI Basis for negotiations fora TOA (1996) 165; Goodison The EU's Trade and Development
Policy (1997) 44-45; Keet "The EU' s proposed FTA" Development Southern Africa (1996) 558-559.
121 Goodison "Marginalisation or Integration?" lGD Occasional Paper No 22 (1999) 23.
1~ -See for an explanation of CAP Chapter 3.1.2.3.
123 Graumans "Redefining relations between SA and the EU" FGD Occasional Paper No 10 (1997) 20.
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movement of capital, allowing all payments for current transactions to be made in a
freely convertible currency and ensuring the freedom of repatriation of foreign direct
investments and all profits. Only in cases of serious balance of payment problems
could these be overruled. 124
2.3.4.2 Evaluation of the EU offer
The EU's offer on tariff elimination was described from the South African side as
being unfairly favourable to Europe.
The EU trade mandate excluded more than 40% of South Africa's trade in
agricultural products to the EU, compared to only 5% of EU agricultural products to
South Africa.125 If the negative lists drawn up by the EU had remained unchanged
only 5% to 10% of South Africa's current exports to the EU would have benefited
from a material improvement in terms of access as a result of the FTA. For non-
agricultural products, South Africa would have had to eliminate duties on around 36%
of its EU imports, whereas Europe would only have had to liberalise duties on 4% to
7% of its South African imports.126
The likely adjustment costs for South Africa were thus said to be far greater than
those faced by the EU.127 In addition to this, the duty-free entry of up to 88% of EU
manufactured goods into South Africa would start with 53% in the very first year.
Taking into consideration the comparatively weaker competitiveness of South African
industries, this was likely to favour European enterprises disproportionately.l'"
These numbers can, however, give a wrong impression.
First of all, the EU' s proposal can be classified as a so-called "negative-list"
approach. That means that the EU was willing to liberalise on all items not specifically
mentioned on a negative list of exceptions. This approach was generally more
124 See Chapter 3.1.8 for an explanation of the rules of origin; Graumans "Redefining relations
between SA and the EU" FGD Occasional Paper No 10 (1997) 21.
125 DTI Basis for negotiations for a TDA (1996) 163; Louw "EU trade: SA battles hardening Europe"
Southern Africa Report (1997) 11; Keet "The EU' s proposed FTA" Development Southern Africa
(1996) 559.
126 Goodison The EU's Trade and Development Policy (1997) 41.
127 Goodison The EU's Trade and Development Policy (1997) 49.
128 DTI Basis for negotiations for a TDA (1996) 165; Keet "The EU' s proposed FTA" Development
Southern Africa (1996) 559.
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favourable to South Africa than a positive list, in which it would have had to negotiate
the inclusion of every item to be liberalised. Secondly, the EU proposals required
South Africa to eliminate tariffs on a far higher volume of trade, since South African
tariff levels were on average three times higher than EU tariffs.129 And, thirdly, it has
to be noted that 80% of South Africa's exports to the EU were duty-free already at
the time of the negotiations, due to the non-existence of tariffs for primary products.
In contrast, the percentage of EU exports entering South Africa duty-free at the same
time was only around 44%.130
In response to the reproach that it excluded a significant percentage of South Africa's
agricultural exports, the EU argued that the list of products left out of the FTA
predominantly were highly successful South African export products such as apples,
.pears, oranges, wines and cut flowers that constituted a threat for European
producers. These products nevertheless only constitute 4% of the EU's total imports
from South Africa and the tariffs on them only range from 10% to 25%.131 South
African fruit exporters have demonstrated in the past that they are able to sell these
goods in large quantities on the European market, despite the existing tariffs. In the
view of the EU, the FTA would not prevent these producers from doing so in the
future.132
Concerning the impact of the EU-SA FTA, it was notable that no reference was made
to the SACU in the EU offer. After six months of intense discussion with the EU, what
emerged was a supplementary negotiating directive, which reflected the particular
concerns of EU Member States with regard to the domestic impact of the proposed
FTA agreement, rather than the political commitments made by EU foreign ministers·
in the context of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy with regard to
Southern Africa.133
Although the EU did not fully appreciate and recognise the integrated nature of South
J
Africa's economy within Southern Africa, the EU mandate, in my opinion, at least
129 Goodison "Marginalisation or Integration?" lGD Occasional Paper No 22 (1999) 25.
130 Goodison The EU's Trade and Developmeni Policy (1997) 49; Graumans "Redefining relations
between SA and the EU" FGD Occasional Paper No 10 (1997) 9.
131 Mills "Free trade with the European Union" SAYIA (1996) 46.
132 EU COM Speech of Commissioner Pinheiro at the European Conference on Southern Africa in
Maastricht: Southern Africa - the challenge to Europe. Building a new framework for trade and
cooperation with South Africa and the other countries in the Southern African Region (1995) at
www.europa.eu.inUcomm/dg08/speeches.htm (15.03.2001).
133 DTI Basis for negotiations for a TDA (1996) 168; Goodison "Marginalisation or Integration?" lGD
Occasional Paper No 22 (1999) 25.
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presented a basis for discussion and debate, and in this way provided a negotiating
platform.
2.4 South Africa's counterproposal
2.4.1 The development of the proposal
After receiving the official EU mandate, South Africa initiated a process of domestic
and regional consultation to formulate its own mandate for negotiations with the EU.
This process involved consultations with the other SACU and SADC member states
and intensive research on the impact of the agreement on trade and economic
development in South and Southern Africa.134 The formulation of SA's mandate was
influenced to great extent by the signing of the SADC Protocol on Trade, in Maseru,
in August 1996. There, the SADC member states decided to move towards a free
trade area in the Southern African region. Equally important during this period was
the presentation by the EU in November 1996 of the Green Paper on future relations
with the ACP countries. Its central message was that the Lomé Convention had
become unviable in the context of the changed world system. The move from a bi- to
a multi-polar world system and the consequences of this for the EU called for a
change in the EU-ACP relationship. The South African negotiating mandate could
therefore be finalised only by the end of November 1996.135
2.4.2 The objectives of an agreement
The different portfolio committees met with officials of the Department of Trade and
Industry and Agriculture in August 1996, with the purpose of formulating a widely
endorsed and accepted negotiating rnandate.P" Their main criticism of the European
mandate was that it failed to take account of the very different sizes and levels of
. 134 Mills "Free Trade with the EU" SAYIA (1996) 46.
135 OTI Basis for negotiations for a TOA (1996); EU COM Green Paper (1996) 570 and at
www.europa.eu.inUcomm/developmenUpublicaUI-vert/lv_en.htm; Graumans "The European Union-
South Africa negotiations" Netherlands Institute for Southern Africa Occasional Paper No 1 (1998) 5,
www.niza.nlluk/publications/016/niza-papernol-1998.htm (09.03.2001).
136 Graumans "Redefining relations between SA and the EU" FGO Occasional Paper No 10 (1997) 24.
)
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development of the economies of South Africa and the EU, as well as of the vastly
different relative importance of each party as a competitor in the market of the
other.!" As a result of this meeting, the portfolio committees prepared a concrete
submission on the "preparation of a South African Mandate for Negotiation of ei
Bilateral Trade Agreement with the EU". This outlined the type of agreement the
South African parliament would be willing to endorse.P"
To achieve an agreement with the EU which would have contributed to placing the
South African economy on a new development-oriented growth path, an agreement
between the EU and South Africa would have had to meet the following objectives: 139
• The FTA should involve greater asymmetry in content, with the EU eliminating
tariffs on a significantly higher volume of trade than South Africa was required
to do;
• The concrete benefits from agreement should significantly outweigh the
adjustment costs, with these being skewed in favour of the weaker party,
South Africa;
• It should take full account of the implications for neighbouring Southern African
countries;
• It should involve a period of non-reciprocity before reciprocity kicked in;
• It should address the issue of EU agricultural producer and export subsidies, if
countervailing duties were not to remain a feature of trade between the EU
and South Africa;
• It should bring about a significant improvement in access to the EU market
and narrow the trade imbalance;
• It should distribute costs and benefits in accordance with the different sizes
and levels of the respective economies, with the broadest shoulders (EU)
bearing the heaviest burdens;
• It should reinforce regional cooperation and integration and create a positive
precedent for post Lomé trade relations;
137 Portfolio Committees on Agriculture, Water Affairs and Forestry, Foreign Affairs and Trade and
Industry Submission on Preparation of a South Africa Mandate for Negotiations of a Bilateral Trade
Agreement with the European Union (1996) 3.
138 Goodison The EU's trade and development policy (1996) 47.
139 OTI Basis for negotiations for a TOA (1996) 170-179.
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• The linkage of a trade agreement with agreements in other areas such as a
fisheries agreement should be rejected;
• It should provide an appropriate framework for political dialogue between
South Africa and the EU, allowing for the development of close relations in all
areas of common interest.
2.4.3 SACU submission
In the meantime, the SACU held a workshop in order to investigate the implications
of an FTA for Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland. This was followed with a
presentation of the research results illustrating the position and opinion of Southern
Africa to an EU-SA FTA.14o Since Article 19 (1) of the SACU agreement grants the
BLNS the right to approve or veto any agreement with the EU signed by South Africa,
the BLNS countries called upon South Africa to take its interests into account. The
following parts were regarded as essential parts of an FTA agreement between the
EU and South Africa: 141
• Regular consultation;
• The exclusion of highly sensitive BLNS products;
• A safeguard clause; 142
• The incorporation of South African materials and components as local content
in BLNS exports to the EU; and lastly
• The maintenance of the trade provisions of the Lomé Convention.
In addition to this regional input, the South African parliament held public hearings on
7 October 1996 regarding the negotiations with the EU. Various submissions from
different interest groups were received.143
140 Graumans "Redefining relations between SA and the EU" FGO Occasional Paper No 10 (1997) 26.
141 For an overview of the impact of the EU-SA FTA on the BLNS, see Goodison "Impact of the SA-EU
TOGA on the BLNS" lGD Occasional Paper No 24 (2000) 60-70.
142 The safeguard clause forms the final line of defence in protecting and defending industries that are
deemed to be sensitive to the introduction of free trade. It allows for remedial action in the case of
disruption of domestic markets.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
40
2.5 Trade and Development Agreement
After the South African Cabinet approved the final negotiation guidelines on 20
November 1996, South Africa presented its initial response to the European offer, a
Trade and Development Agreement (TDA), as late as in January 1997.144 South
Africa expressed the view that the TDA had to be seen as complementing the EU-
FTA proposal, and outlined the essential issues and changes to be made to the EU
proposal to assure an FTA that would be viable for South Africa.145
The TDA did not contain detailed negotiating directives but rather pointed out the
major issues of dissent between the parties and what changes the South African side
wished to be made in the EU'·s proposal. The TDA proposal differed from the EU's
FTA proposal in several areas.l'"
It could be described as a more developmental approach. In general, an agreement
with the EU should promote lasting, development-oriented economic growth in South
and Southern Africa. Secondly, it emphasised that South Africa's relations with its
SACU and SADC partners were ignored in the EU proposals. In the short term, an
FTA with the EU would directly impact on the SACU members and the TDA therefore
called for an agreement to take account of the needs and interests of SACU. The
TDA further emphasised de-linking the trade negotiations from the parallel
negotiations on agreements on science and technology, fisheries, wine and spirits,
and the Lomé Protocol. Additionally, it proposed that an agreement should be more
asymmetrical in content as well as in timing in the phasing in of a trade liberalisation
aqreement.?" Asymmetry in time means that a longer phase-in period for the
143 Graumans "Redefining relations between SA and the EU" FGD Occasional Paper No 10 (1997) 27:
these interest groups were the South African Chamber of Business, the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut
and different business sectors such as the motor vehicle and clothing industries.
144 Graumans "The European Union - South Africa negotiations" Netherlands Institute for Southern
Africa Occasional Paper No 1 (199B) 5; www.niza.nl/uklpublications/016/niza-papernol-1998.htm
(09.03.2001 ).
145 Goodison The EU's Trade and Development Policy (1996) 46.
146 See the summary of the proposal in Graumans "Redefining relations between SA and the EU" FGD
Occasional Paper No 10 (1997) 27.
147 Graumans "The European Union - South Africa negotiations" Netherlands Institute for Southern
Africa Occasional Paper No 1 (199B) 5; www.niza.nl/uklpublications/016/niza-papernol-199B.htm
(09.03.2001 ).
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elimination of tariffs should be granted to South Africa. Asymmetry in content means
that the EU should remove duties from a significantly higher percentage of total trade
than South Africa, proportional to the size, strength and level of development of the
economies of the two parties.
With these demands, South Africa challenged one of the major principles ofthe EU
mandate, namely that of WTO compatibility. While the EU has argued from the start
that this would be incompatible with WTO regulations, South Africa emphasised that
strict WTO rules not only do not exist regarding free trade areas between developing
and developed countries, but they also do not stipulate that the percentage of free
trade has to be the same on either side.148
2.6 Council Regulation on Development Cooperation with South Africa
In the meantime, on 22 November 1996, the EU Council adopted Regulation (EC)
No. 2259/96,149 the legal base covering development cooperation with South Africa,
referring to a financial amount of around 500 million ECU for the European
Programme for Reconstruction and Development (EPRD) for the period January
1996 until December 1999. The Regulation also confirmed the committment of the
European Commission to contribute to South Africa's durable economic and social
development and to consolidate the foundations laid for a democratic society."?
As part of this new trend of developing a more focused approach to development
cooperation between the two sides, the South African Government and the European
Commission signed a Multi-annual Indicative Programme (MIP) under the EPRD on
May 14, 1997. This provided a general framework for development cooperation
148 Graumans "Redefining relations between SA and the EU" FGD Occasional Paper No 10 (1997) 28.
149 One has to distinguish between directives and regulations. Regulations are described in Article 249
ECT as being general in application, binding in their entirety and directly applicable in all Member
States. As such, a regulation will invariably have direct effect. Directives are binding as to the result to
be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national
authorities the choice of form and methods. Occasionally, a directive will need national implementation
to create a legislative measure which is certain and clear enough to be directly effective.
150 EU COM Vorschlag tiir eine Verordnung des Rates (1995) 1-7; EU COM Europëisches Programm
tur Wiederaufbau und Entwicklung (Ratsverordnung 2259/96) Jahresbericht 1996/1997 (1998) 2-7; EU
Council Verordnung Nr. 2259/96 ties-Retes vom 22. November 1996 Ober die
Entwicklungszusammenarbeit mit SOdafrika (1996) 1-4;
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between the two sides for the following three years. The Agreement, worth 127.5
million € per annum in grants, was signed by Deputy Minister for Finance Gill Marcus
and Deputy Director-General Philippe Soubestre.P'
The Multi-annual Indicative Programme (MIP) focuses on four main priority sectors of
,
assistance. According to Article 2 of the Council Regulation 2259 I 96 these are:
support for basic social services such as education, health, water and sanitation;
support for private sector development; support for good governance and
democratisation programmes; and support for South African participation in SADC
regional development initiatives. In addition, human resource development,
environmental protection, human rights and gender issues are key elements in all EU
development programmes. 152
Local government, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), community-based
organisations and other decentralised cooperation partners will continue to play a
central role in the projects implemented within the sectors of the framework
agreement. According to the MIP, at least 25% of the resources allocated to the
EPRD will be used to finance projects of this kind.153
2.7 Science and Technology Agreement of December 1996
The Cooperation Agreement on Science and Technology was concluded in
December 1996 and it entered into force in November 1997.154 The Agreement
allowed for the participation of South Africa's research teams in all the (non-nuclear)
specific programmes of the EC's Fourth Framework Programme, covering the period
151 EU COM Europëisches Programm fOr Wiederaufbau und Entwicklung in SOdafrika
(Ratsverordnung 2259/96) Jahresbericht 1998 - Annex 7 MIP (2000) 2-12.
152 See Appendix 2 and 3; EU COM Partners in Progress (1999) 14; EU COM Jahresbericht 1998 -
Annex 7 MIP (2000) 3.
153 At the same time, the two sides also signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the European
Investment Bank totaling Euro 375 million in loans. This brought the total to be made available in
lending finance to South Africa by the EIB to about Euro 675 million during the period 1995-1999.
These loans were to be used to finance productive investment projects and develop South Africa's
economic infrastructure.
154 EU COM Partners in Progress (1999) 38; Bertelsmann-Scott "The EU, SA and the FTA" SAYI/
(2000) 113.
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1994-1998.155 It also provided European researchers with access to similar projects
in South Africa. In addition, South Africa participated, and will continue to do so, in a
sub-programme specifically designed for scientific and technological cooperation with
developing nations (INCO-OEV), funding projects in various fields, including the long-
lasting use of renewable natural resources, agricultural and agro-industrial
production, health and poputatlon.P"
2.8 The progress of negotiations from January 1997 to March 1997
After the presentation of the South African counterproposal of January 1997 (TOA) to
the EU, the following rounds of talks in 1997 focused on technical lssues.!" The
trade-related issues which were discussed ranged from safeguarding, anti-dumping
and countervailing action, intellectual property and competition policy, procurement
and the free movement of capital. As a first reaction to the South African criticism on
the impact of an FTA on the BLNS countries, the EU acknowledged that an FTA with
South Africa could have a negative impact on its customs union neighbours.
However, the EU emphasised that the EU-SA FTA would in the long term have a
positive effect for Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland. In the view of the EU
the removal of tariffs would present an opportunity for the consumers in the BLNS
countries to shift to lower cost producers, to thus enjoy significant savings and
greater freedom in choosing their import requirernents.l'" Regarding sensitive
sectors, the EU invited South Africa and the BLNS to submit lists of exclusions, in
155 EU COM Empfehlung fOr einen Beschluss des Rates Ober den Abschluf3 eines Abkommens
zwischen der Republik SOdafrika und der Europëischen Gemeinschaft Ober wissenschaftlich-
technische Zusammenarbeit (1996) 4: Every four years the EC develops a new "Framework
Programme" in the area of science and technical development. This Framework programme gives the
guidelines which areas of technical development will be financially assisted, in order to promote
science and technology.
156 EU COM Science and Technology Agreement (1996) 2-3.
157 Department of Foreign Affairs Joint Statement on EU/SA Bilateral Agreement at
www.polity.org.za/govdocs/pr/1997/pr0623a.html(09.03.2001 ).
158 See also Jenkins "Free Trade: South Africa, The SADC and Beyond" Optima (January 1998) 10-
12. Jenkins presents many arguments on why the TDCA is economically advantageous for South
Africa's neighbours.
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addition to which the preferences of the Lomé Convention for the BLNS would be
sustained .159
In February 1997, talks resumed to finalise the terms of South Africa's qualified
accession to the Lomé Convention. Spain, however, became a stumbling block to
South African Lomé participation as it first wanted a guarantee from South Africa that
it would gain access to its fishing waters before it would ratify South Africa's
accession to the Convention. Initially, Spain vetoed accession of South Africa but
lifted its veto on 25 March under pressure from the other EU member states.l'"
Thus the way for South Africa's accession to the Lomé Convention was free.
2.9 South Africa's accession to the Lomé Convention in April 1997
In order to facilitate the process of South Africa's accession a new paragraph to
Article 364 of the Lomé Convention was inserted into the revised Lomé IV-bis
Convention signed in Mauritius in November 1995. It stipulated that, if an agreement
would be reached before the entry into force of the provisions amending the
Convention, the ACP-EC Council of Ministers could approve South Africa's
membership without the need for separate ratification by the ACP and EU Member
States.161
The approval was finally given at the meeting of the ACP-EU Joint Council of
Ministers' meeting in Luxembourg on 24 - 25 April 1997.162 The South African
Parliament ratified the accession early in October 1997.
159 Graumans "Redefining relations between SA and the EU" FGD Occasional Paper No 10 (1997) 29.
160 Bertelsmann-Scott The EU-SA Agreement-Chronology in: Bertelsmann-Scott, Mills, Sidiropoulus
(ed) The EU-SA Agreement, South Africa, Southern Africa and the European Union (2000) 132.
161 Bertelsmann-Scott "The EU, SA and the FTA" SAYII (2000) 132.
162 EU COM Empfehlung fOr einen gemeinsamen Standpunkt des Rates (1997) 5; EU COM Partners
in Progress (1999) 38; Bertelsmann-Scott The EU-SA Agreement-Chronology (2000) 133.
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2.9.1 Qualified Membership
However, South Africa's status within the Convention was unusual. In response to
r-
the South African request for full accession to the Convention, the EU offered South
Africa a "qualified" membership of the Convention, instead of full accession. This
meant that certain articles of the Convention would not be applicable to South Africa
for the duration of Lomé IV bis. 163
The most significant of these was the exclusion of South Africa from the general
trade regime and special trade protocols of the Convention. This exclusion of South
Africa was based on the regulation that the Lomé system of trade preferences was
specifically designed to assist the development of some of the world's poorest
countries and on the dual nature of the South African economy.l'" For South Africa to
obtain membership that would be consistent with the interests of the existing Lomé
members, South Africa's trade with the European Union therefore, instead, had to be
defined in a separate bilateral trade and cooperation aqreernent.l'"
2.9.2 The legal basis of South Africa's accession to the Lomé Convention
Not only was the way of South Africa's accession to the Lomé Convention and its
status within the Convention unusual, but also its legal basis. The idea of "qualified"
or "associated" Lomé membership suggested by the EU was completely new. No
explicit legal basis was provided for it in the Convention, other than the general
provisions of Article 30 of the Lomé Convention. Article 30 (2) (a) of the Lomé
Convention empowered the Council of Ministers to take any political decision for the
attainment of the objectives of the Convention ..
As the decision to grant South Africa partial, but not full, membership of the
Convention was indeed a political decision and, according to the EU, necessary for
163 For the Articles applicable and not applicable to South Africa, see Chapter 2.9.3; EU COM
Empfehlung fDr einen gemeinsamen Standpunkt des Rates (1997) 5.
164 The issue of South Africa's status as a developed country was examined at 2.2.4.1; EU COM
"South Africa" The Courier No 164 (1997) 3; Lowe "Combat poverty" The Courier No 169 (1998) 3; EU
COM Partners in Progress (1999) 25.
165 EU COM Partners in Progress (1999) 25; EU COM "South Africa" The Courier No 164 (1997) 3.
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the attainment of its objectives, Article 30 (2) of the Lomé Convention was the
suitable basls.l'"
2.9.3 Main terms and conditions of South Africa's accession to the Lomé
Convention
2.9.3.1 Articles applicable to South Africa
The articles of the Lomé Convention applicable to South Africa concern technical
cooperation (Arts. 275-280), cultural and social cooperation (Arts. 139-155), regional
cooperation (Arts. 156-166), industrial development (Arts. 77:-98), and investment
promotion and protection (Arts. 258-274). It would furthermore participate in the
institutions of the Convention, the Joint ACP-EC Council of Ministers, the Committee
of Ambassadors and the Joint Assembly (Arts. 338-355), and would be eligible for
tenders for projects in all ACP countries financed from the 8th European Development
Fund (EDF), but excluding the preferential ACP treatrnent.!"
2.9.3.2 Articles not applicable to South Africa
South Africa, however, would not benefit from the general trade arrangements (Arts.
167-185), the special protocol on bananas (Protocol 5), rum (Protocol 6), beef and
veal (Protocol 7), sugar (Protocol 8), and coal and steel products (Protocol 9).
Furthermore, the commodity-specific provisions, especially the System for the
Stabilisation of Export Earnings for Agricultural Products (STABEX, Arts. 186-212)
and the System for Stabilisation of Export Earnings for Mining Products (SYSMIN,
Arts. 214-219), the structural adjustment support (Arts. 239-250), and the EDF
resources (except in the case of refugee assistance) would not be applicable to
South Africa. South Africa preferred to continue receiving financial assistance
166 Holland "SA, SADC and the EU" Journal of Modern African Studies (1995) 280.
167 EU COM Partners in Progress (1999) 25; EU COM EU-SA Trade and Economic Cooperation at
www.eusa.org.za/EU-SATrade&EconomicCoop/FreeTradeAgreement.htm. 4 (looked up 14.08.
2000); EU COM "South Africa" The Courier No 164 (1997) 2-3; Article 303 of the Lomé Convention
gives a 10% price preference to ACP tenders for work contracts of less than 5 million ECU. For
supplies contracts the preference is 15%; see Chapters 2.2.1 and 2.3 for further explanation of the
EDF.
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through the European Programme for Reconstruction and Development, which is
funded directly from the Community budget.168
The EU-funded initiatives such as STABEX, which compensates countries that are
heavily dependent on one or more staple products for severe fluctuations in their
export earnings, or SYSMIN, which provides finance for the upkeep or reconstruction
of mining installations during periods when their operation is curtailed by unforeseen
circumstances, have proved invaluable to a number of ACP states. For the period
1995-2000, the EU has earmarked funds totaling more than R 80 billion for
development aid programmes to the ACP states.l'"
The fact that these funds would not be applicable to South Africa as a qualified
member of the Lomé Convention, clearly underlines the EU's intention with regard to
a new future framework of cooperation with the ACP countries, which would take into
account the varying needs of countries and regional pecullarites."? As the EU
admitted in its Green Paper of November 1996, the principle of partnership under the
Lomé Convention has only been put into practice partly. Aid dependency, coping with
short-term needs, and dialogue on economic and social policies have proved difficult
to put into practice with countries with little institutional capacity, with the result that
partnership was limited to day-ta-day resource rnanaqernent.!" Concerning financial
cooperation, the fact that some financial resources were granted automatically, and
the EU' s tendency to take the initiative away from its weaker partners, have not
encouraged ACP governments to display the genuine political commitment expected
of them.172 For these reasons, the EU in its Green Paper stressed that future
cooperation could include a general overall agreement, with individual bilateral
agreements, with each of the ACP states, and the splitting of the Lomé Convention
into regional agreements because of the differences in needs and levels of
development amongst the ACP states.173
168 EU COM Partners in Progress (1999) 25; EU COM "South Africa" The Courier No 164 (1997) 2-3.
169 Links The EU and Southern Africa (1998) 61.
170 Links The EU and Southern Africa (1998) 68.
171 EU COM Green Paper (1996) IV.
172 EU COM Green Paper (1996) V; see Chapter 2.12 for further explanation of the negative aspects
of the Lomé Convention.
173 EU COM Green Paper (1996) VIII; see Chapter 2.12 for further explanation of the Cotonou
Agreement.
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Thus, the exclusion of South Africa from certain EU-funded initiatives and the
proposal for a trade agreement had to be seen as an example of future cooperation
with other ACP states.
2.10 The Continuation of Negotiations on the TOCA in October 1997
After the South African parliament ratified the partial accession to the Lomé
Convention early in October 1997, the negotiators of the two parties could
concentrate exclusively on the FTA.174For this reason, it was initially hoped that the
talks would be concluded swiftly.
However, once Minister Alec Erwin, on behalf of the Republic of South Africa,
presented a detailed line-by-line trade offer to the EU in November 1997,175 the
negotiating process gathered momentum at the end of 1997.176 This offer was
prepared in consultation with the neighbouring BLNS states. The initial offer covered
80% of current South African imports from the EU and liberalisation was scheduled
within a period of twelve years. The remaining 20% of trade, consisting of nearly
2500 tariff lines, was set aside in ten different protocols.!"
In January 1998, Professor Pinheiro tabled the EU' s corresponding offer on behalf of
the European Commission.l'" It was a line-by-line elaboration of the overall trade
proposal introduced to South Africa in March 1996. It included all traded and non-
traded products, and covered 90% of South African exports to the EU. The
agricultural exclusions listed in the negotiating directives approved by the Council in
March 1996, as well as an additional 4% of current trade for which the tariff treatment
was yet to be determined, were left aside.179
174 However, to fully participate in the institutions and to take advantage of the preferences of the
Convention, South Africa had to wait until the revised Lomé IV agreement was in.operation. Lomé IV
needed to be ratified by a two-thirds majority of the ACP states and all EU Member States and this did
not happen before 1998.
175 EU COM Partners in Progress (1999) 39; Links The EU and Southern Africa (1998) 67; Department
of Foreign Affairs Joint Statement on EU/SA Bilateral Agreement (1997) 1;
www.polity.org.za/govdocs/pr/1997/pr0623a.html(09.03.2001 ).
176 EU COM Partners in Progress (1999) 39; Davies Forging a new relationship with the EU (2000) 8.
177 www.eusa.org.za\EU-SATrade&EconomicCoop\FreeTradeAgreement.htm. 8 (14.08.2000).
178 Davies Forging a new relationship with the EU (2000) 8; EU COM Partners in Progress (1999) 39.
179 www.eusa.org.za\EU-SATrade&EconomicCoop\FreeTradeAgreement.htm. 8 (14.08.2000).
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The following five negotiating rounds that took place in 1998 were characterised by
postponed deadlines, threats to pull out of the talks and a general feeling that the
agreement would take many months to be concluded. On the one side, South Africa
was concerned about the agricultural coverage of the deal, which they believed to be
too paltry. On the other side, the EU was concerned about South Africa's insistence
on compensation for the loss of fiscal revenue in the neighbouring BLNS states as a
result of the Aqreement.l'"
2.11 The provisional entry into force of the TOeA and the continuous
negotiations on the Wine and Spirits Agreement
The EU' s demand that South Africa should phase out the use of the terms "Port" and
"Sherry" in the internal market emerged as the most serious threat to concluding the
EU-SA TOCA in December 1998.181 A number of constituencies in Europe wanted
South Africa to phase out the usage of the names "Port" and "Sherry" for the
country's fortified wines. They argued that these terms refer to geographical locations
in Portugal and Spain and should, therefore, be used exclusively by these two
countries.l'" South African producers have, however, used the names for
generations 183 and were only willing to remove the name from exports to third
countries, but not on bottles sold on the domestic rnarket.l'"
After 43 months and 21 rounds of talks, the two chief negotiators, South Africa's
Trade and Industry Minister Erwin and EU Commissioner Professor Pinheiro,
reached a political compromise on wine and on Port and Sherry in January 1999 at
180Bertelsmann-Scott The EU-SA Agreement-Chronology (2000) 133; Mbekeani Impact of the SA-EU
TOCA on the BLNS in: lGD Occasional Paper No 24 (ed) Regionalism and a Post-Lomé Convention
Trade Regime: Implications for Southern Africa _ Proceedings of a workshop organized by the
Institute for Global Dialogue, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the French Institute of South Africa (2000)
54; Because of their common external tariff with South Africa through the Southern Africa Customs
Union, the agreement means that the BLNS countries are obliged to accept a de facto FTA with the
EU. They stand to lose a significant portion of their fiscal revenue. See Chapter 4.2.1.4.2, for a
detailed explanation of this issue.
181Bertelsmann-Scott The EU-SA Agreement-Chronology (2000) 134.
182Adetailed examination of the Port and Sherry issue is given in Chapter 5;
www.findarticles.com/cf_0/mOWXI/2368/53412434/pl/article.htmI (15.03.2001);
183Hofmeyr "Port and Sherry still under debate - EU deal possible" Farmers Weekly (1999-02-12) 38-
39; Dispatch online EU: only Spain can produce "Sherry" at
www.dispatch.co.za/1998/09/21/southafrica/SHERRY.HTM (15.03.2001).
184www.findarticles.com/cf_0/mOWXI/2368/53412434/pl/article.html(15.03.2001 ).
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Davos, Switzerland.l'" The Davos text, however, was not approved by EU Foreign
Ministers at a meeting in February, mainly because several countries, led by Spain,
were dissatisfied with provisions relatinqto Port and Sherry appellations. Intense
diplomacy, and some small amendments to the Davos text, finally secured approval
by the EU heads of states and governments in Berlin at the end of March 1999. 186
In July 1999, the Council of the European Union, on behalf of the Community,
decided to approve the TDCA between the EU and South Africa provisionally. South
Africa gave its approval of the TDCA according to § 231 of its 1996 Constitution.l'"
The Port and Sherry issue reoccurred hours before the signing of the Agreement in
October 1999, as Portugal and Spain tried to veto the signing of the TDCA. They
insisted on a complete phasing out of the words for South African products and
argued that South Africa was trying to rediscuss the terms of the agreement, namely
185 See the compromise packaqe on Port and Sherry infra Chapter 3.1.9.2 and Appendix X of the
. TDCA at www.europa.eu.inUeur.leXlen/treaties/daUec_cons_treaty _en.pdf (21.02.2001); DTI TDCA
(1999) 9; www.findarticiescom/cf_0/mOWXI/1999_Feb_3/53711311.jhtml (15.03.2001); Bertelsmann-
Scott "The EU, SA and the FTAn SAYII (2000) 116.
186 Davies Forging a new relationship with the EU (2000) 8; EU COM Development and Cooperation
Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of South Africa has been approved
yesterday by the EU heads of State and Governments (1999) 1 at
www.oneworld.org/owe/news/rapid/9195_en.htm (09.03.2001).
187 The European Communities Council Decision of 29 July 1999 concerning the provisional
application of the TDCA between the-European Community and its Member States, of the one part,
and the Republic of South Africa, of the other part (1999) L 311/1 ;
In the EU the procedure for the conclusion of an agreement is provided for in Article 300 ECT.
According to this procedure, an agreement has to be approved by the Council of the EU and the
assent of the European Parliament has to be obtained. Since the fifteen EU Member States are also
contracting parties, they have to ratify the agreement according to their respective constitutional
requirements.
Interview with Thembinkosi Ngeleza, Assistant Director: European Union Desk, Trade negotiations
sub-division, International Trade and Economic Division at the DTI of the RSA (02 June 2001): In
South African law, the rules governing the conclusion and implementation of treaties are determined
by § 231 (1) of the 1996 Constitution. According to § 231(1) the negotiating and signing of all
international agreements is the responsibility of the national executive. The main actors in the
negotiating process on behalf of the South African executive were Minister of Trade and Industry,
Trevor Manuel, followed by Alec Erwin as well as the ambassador to the EU Neill van Heerden,
followed by Elias Links.
§ 231 (2) of the Constitution stipulates that an international agreement binds the Republic in principle
only after having been approved by resolution, both in the National Assembly and the National Council
of Provinces. Furthermore § 231 (4) of the Constitution stipulates that any international agreement
becomes law in the Republic when it is enacted into law by national legislation; but a self-executing
provision of an agreement that has been approved by Parliament is law in the Republic unless it is
inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament. The TDCA does not contain such self-
executing provision and therefore requires an Act of Parliament to become law.
The TDCA was ratified by the Parliament in November 1999 and was published as a legislation in the
Government Notice No 20763 of 30 December 1999. See DTI The EU/SA Trade, Development and
Cooperation Agreement at www.dti.gov.za/review.asp?iSDivID=84&iEvent ID 161 (01.06.2001).
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regarding the use of the "Port" and Sherry" geographical denornlnatlons.!" South
Africa, however, pointed out that the EU has no more right than South Africa on some
types of denominations and that those issues might need more time for arriving at a
cornprcmlse.l'" Portugal's and Spain's bid failed, however, and the TDCA between
South Africa and the EU was signed in Pretoria on 11 October 1999.190
After the signing ceremony South Africa's Chief Director for Foreign Trade relations,
Bahle Sibisi, pointed out that, although South Africa and the EU had signed the deal,
negotiations would continue on the contentious Wine and Spirits Agreement. In the
opinion of South Africa's Ambassador to the EU, Elias Links, South Africa went only
so far as to agree to dialogue on the issue.l'"
The negotiations on the Wine and Spirits Agreement could not proceed any further.
Greece and Italy argued that their two national liquors "Ouzo" and "Grappa" should
also be covered in the pact after South Africa had agreed earlier to phase out the use
of "Port" and "Sherry" on its spirits, as demanded by Portugal and Spain. Otherwise,
they contended, the Italian and the Greek parliament would not ratify the wine and
spirits aqreernent.l'" As a reaction to those demands several EU governments
publicly criticised Rome and Athens for making an issue over the brand names,
because Ouzo is not even manufactured in South Africa and only 30 000 bottles of
Grappa are produced in South Africa each year.193 The South African Trade Minister,
Alec Erwin, would not bow to the demands by Greece and Italy and called the whole
dispute "blzarre.l'" Consequently, although the Wine and Spirits Agreement was
supposed to be finalised before the entry into force of the overall agreement, no
solution could be reached on the dispute over names. Therefore the overall
188 Bertelsmann-Scott The EU-SA Agreement~Chronology (2000) 135.
189 European Information Centre EU/SA: Last-Minute Pressure on EU SA Trade Pact, Signing
Ceremony Approaches at www.findarticies.com/cf_0/mOWXI/1999_oct_9/56196133/html (15.03.2001).
190 EU COM Agreement in the Form of an exchange of letters (1999) L 311/2.
191 Mayo "EU-SA Trade pact clinched, wine dispute lingers" The Namibian (1999-10-12) 1.
192 The Namibian SA says it wont be bullied by EU over liquor names at
www.namibian.com.na/Netstories/2000/February/Marketplace/bullied.html(15.03.2001); European
Information Service Wines and Spirits Agreement Deadlock Threatens Again EU-SA Free Trade Pact
at www.findarticies.com/cf_0/mOWXI/1999_oct-30/57098298/p1/article.html(15.03.2001).
193 Black "South Africa and EU end trade row" Daily Mail & Guardian (2000-02-18) 1.
194 www.namibian.com.na/Netstories/2000/February/Marketplace/bullied.html( 15.03.2001 )
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agreement between the EU- and South Africa provisionally entered into force on
1 January 2000, excluding its provisions on wines and spirits.195
After weeks of further intensive negotiations over the Wine and Spirits Agreement,
South Africa agreed to phase out the names "grappa" and "ouzo" within five years.
However, it was agreed that, after a period of twelve years, new denominations to be
used in South Africa instead of the old ones would be agreed on jointly.196 Moreover,
South Africa, in return, demanded that the EU-South Africa agreement clearly state
that final sayan the geographical denominations rests with the WTO under the
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property.l'"
As a.result of the South African agreement to refrain from using the demanded terms
on its export market after five years and on its domestic market after twelve years,
the two parties were close to reaching the final implementation of the Wine and
Spirits Agreement into the overall agreement in September 2000.198But once again
the planned conclusion of the Wine and Spirits Agreement was delayed by
outstanding procedural issues. EU officials accused South Africa of refusing "to adopt
the texts as they stand" and that they therefore had to continue the negotiations
before concluding the agreement. The director for bilateral trade. at the South African
Department of Trade, Tshediso Matona, said that South Africa, however, wanted to
see major changes and clarifications before it would sign the aqreernent.l'"
. Since this last disagreement, the parties have not been able to conclude a deal on
the wine and spirits issue. According to the South African National Department of
195 www.eusa.org_za\EU-SATrade&EconomicCoop\FreeTradeAgreement.htm. 8 (14.08.2000);
Bertelsmann-Scott The EU-SA Agreern.ent-Chronology (2000) 135; EU COM Partners in Progress
(1999) 39; DTI Statement by the Minister of Trade and Industry, Alec Erwin, on the TDCA between
South Africa and the European Union at www.dti.gov.za/review.asp?uSDivID=1&iEvent_ID=74
196 Black "SA and EU" Daily Mail & Guardian (2000-02-18) 2; International Centre for Trade and
Lasting Development News from the regions: EU-S. Africa Deal; Asia at
www.ictsd.org.html.weekly/story4.29-02-00.htm (15.03.2001); Hofmeyr "Port and Sherry still under
debate" Farmer's Weekly (1999-02-12) 39.
197 www.ictsd.org.html.weekly/story4.29-02-00.htm (15.03.2001).
198 EU COM European Commission welcomes completion of the negotiations on the wine and spirits
agreement between the EU and South Africa at
www.europa.eu.inUcomm/trade/whats_new/index_en.htm (12.03.2001).
199 The Namibian EU-SA free trade agreement goes back to drawing board at
www.namibian.com.na/Netstories/2000/July/Marketplace/00928E5E61.html( 15.03.200 1).
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Agriculture, the EU and South Africa still differ on negotiating the final quotas of the
Wine and Spirits Agreement and further talks are expected during June 2001.200
2.12 The expiry of the Lomé Convention and the conclusion of the Cotonou
Agreement
Although the EU and South Africa could reach agreement on the TDCA and on the
separate agreements besides the wine and spirits agreement,201 one may not neglect
to view this agreement from the global perspective of the future EU-ACP cooperation.
This cooperation was governed by the Lomé Convention from 1975 until February
2000 and was succeeded by the Cotonou Agreement in February 2000. The entry
into force of the TDCA in January 2000 and the expiry of the Lomé Convention one
month later raises the questions of how the Lomé Convention had been intended to
benefit the ACP countries, why it had not done so and why the new Cotonou
Agreement had therefore come about.
The trade and development aid provisions of the Lomé accord undoubtedly
represented its most important aspects. The Convention provided for duty-free
access to the EU for almost all products of the ACP countries, without any reciprocal
access being required. The main exceptions to qualifying for this preferential
treatment were agricultural products that constitute direct competition for EU products
that are protected by the Common Agricultural Policy. The Convention also governed
the granting of development aid to the ACP countries from the European
Development Fund (EDF) funded by individual contributions from the EU Member
States, as well as low-interest loans from the European Investment Bank.202
From the point of view of both Graumans and Links, however, it cannot be denied
that political stability and/or economic conditions in a number of ACP states have not
200 Interview with Ben van Wyk, Director: Economy and Policy Analysis at the South African National
Department of Agriculture (2001-03-23).
201 See the previous Chapters 2.10 and 2.11.
202 Links The EU and Southern Africa (1998) 59.
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improved markedly since 1975, despite the well-intentioned aims of the Convention
and the generous benefits it affords. The four Lomé Conventions did not lead to an
increase in ACP exports to the European Union. In fact, ACP exports to the
European market have declined and many ACP economies have remained
dependent on commodity exports.203 Even the EU, as early as in November 1996,
admitted in its Green Paper that the principle of partnership under the Lomé
Convention had only been put into practice partly. Aid dependency, coping with
short-term needs, and dialogue on economic and social policies proved difficult to put
into practice with countries with little institutional capacity, with the result that
partnership was limited to day-ta-day resource manaoement.F" As far as financial
cooperation is concerned, the EU's tendency to take the initiative away from its
weaker partners, together with the fact that some financial resources were granted
automatically, have not encouraged ACP governments to display the genuine
political commitment expected ofthem.205
Stated briefly, what is widely accepted in Europe, and this also reflects my opinion, is
that the Convention has failed to achieve its objectives.206 Influenced by these rather
disappointing results, the European Commission came to consider a non-reciprocal
trade relationship between the EU and the ACP countries to be incompatible with
WTO rules, and argued that they would not be able to arrange another ten-year
waiver for the Conventlon.j'"
Thus, the EU was eager to commence a new trade relationship with the ACP on a
reciprocal basis.208
At the joint ministerial conference in Brussels on 2 and 3 February 2000, the ACP
states and the EU member states succeeded in reaching agreement on the future
203 Graumans "SADC / EU Cooperation" FOG Occasional Paper No 11 (1997) 8; Links The EU and
Southern Africa (1998) 60; The exception, however, is the undoubted successes of, for example,
Botswana, Mauritius and Namibia.
204EU COM Green Paper (1996) IV.
205 EU COM Green Paper (1996) V; see Chapter 2.12 for further explanation of the negative aspects
of Lomé.
206 Links The EU and Southern Africa (1998) 59-60.
207 Maasdorp "Study on the impact of introducing reciprocity into trade relations between the EU and
the SADC region" lGD Occasional Paper No 21 (1999) 16.
20B Maasdorp "Study on the impact of introducing reciprocity into trade relations between the EU and
the SADC" lGD Occasional PaperNo 21 (1999)16.
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terms of cooperation between them, to replace the Lomé Convention.209 According to
Part ~ne, Title I, Chapter 1, Article 1 of the new ACP-EC partnership "Cotonou
Agreement" concluded in Brussels and signed in Cotonou in June 2000 for a period
of twenty years (2000-2020), contains a completely reformed aid package to support
development and poverty reduction policies, plans for new economic partnerships to
harness regional growth and a political commitment to promote good governance and
stability.21o
According to previous custom, the new partnership agreement between ACP states
and the Community, along with its five-year financial protocol, will be revised every
five years. The financial protocol regulates the European Development Fund (EDF),
which is financed from EU member state contrtbutions.ê"
The first protocol of the new agreement (9th EDF 2000-2005) amounts to Euro 13.5
billion. In addition, Euro 9.5 billion of uncommitted funds from previous EDFs will
supplement the new fund. A seven-year deadline has been set for its disbursal. The
9th EDF will be boosted further by a pledge of up to Euro 1.7 billion in loans from the
European Investment Bank's own resources.ê"
The new agreement and the changes that it implements are based on five interlinking
central pillars, which will govern cooperation between the EU and the ACP states.213
The five central pillars of the Cotonou Agreement are:214
• An enhanced political dimension,
209 Morrissey "Post Lomé _ new partnership agreed" The Courier No 179 (2000) 5.
210 Cotonou Agreement (2000) 8; International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development ACP,
EU sign Cotonou Agreement on Trade, Aid and Sustainable Development To Replace Lomé at
www.ictsd.com/html/weekly/story1.27.06-00.htm (09.03.2001);
www.europa.eu.intlcomm/developmentlcotonou/index_en.htm.
211 Morrissey "Post Lomé _ new partnership agreed" The Courier No 179 (2000) 5;
www.ictsd.com/html/weekly/storyt.27.06-00.htm (09.03.2001);
www.europa.eu.intlcomm/developmentlcotonou/index_en.htm.
212 Morrissey "Post Lomé" The Courier No 179 (2000) 5; www.ictsd.com/html/weekly/story1.27.06-
OO.htm(09.03.2001); www.europa.eu.intlcomm/developmentlcotonou/index_en.htm.
213 EU COM The Cotonou Agreement at
www.europa.eu.intlcomm/developmentlcotonou/index_en.htm (09.03.2001).
214 www.europa.eu.intlcomm/developmentlcotonou/index_en.htm (09.03.2001);
www.ictsd.com/html/weekly/story1.27.06-00.htm (09.03.2001).
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• Increased participation,
• Poverty reduction as an overarching objective,
• Reinforced economic and trade relationships,
• Improved financial cooperation.
With regard to South Africa, the qualifications concerning South Africa's participation
in the Cotonou Agreement are set out in Protocol 3, Article 1 of the Cotonou
Agreement According to Protocol 3, Article 1 (2) of the Cotonou Agreement, the
TDCA between the EU and South Africa is to take precedence over the provisions of
the Cotonou Agreement. According to Article 7 of the Cotonou Agreement, Protocol
3 is open to revision. It is adjoined to the new accord saying that its political and
development strategies will be 'broadly applicable' to South Africa, as at present, but
not to trade nor development funds. South Africa, however, is expected to be
involved in the negotiations on future regional economic partnerships (REPAs).215
These REPAs will replace existing non-reciprocal trade preferences that will follow an
eight-year transition period lasting from 2000 to 2008. An application for a waiver
from the WTO for this period has already been filed in Geneva. The REPAs would be
entered into with different ACP regions or countries. Essentially, they would be free
trade area arrangements, but with added benefits for the ACP countries, and would
include provisions for economic cooperation. In principle, ACP partners in the
REPAs will retain their current preferential access to European markets but will have
to reciprocate by progressively opening up their own markets to European imports on
a preferential basis. ACP least developed countries could retain current non-
reciprocal trade preferences, should they choose not to join free trade area
arrangements with the EU. Formal negotiations on the REPAs should begin by
September 2002 at the latest. Regional bodies can select to form REPAs with the
EU entirely by choice. Until these are in place, the EU intends to provide support for
regional integration and to offer technical support to conduct the negotiations to the
ACP countries. In 2004, the situation of ACP countries that are not in a position to
enter into a REPA, will be assessed and alternatives will be sought. According to the
EU, the new trading arrangements will enter into force by January 2008 at the latest.
215 See Appendix 7.
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Trade liberalisation will begin in 2008, with a long transitional period, for instance, of
twelve years.216
When the EU and South Africa were concluding the TOCA in 1999, the EU and the
ACP countries thus, during the same period of time, were concluding an agreement
that provides for the establishment of free trade area agreements.
2.13 Conclusion
Although it took 43 months and 21 rounds of negotiations to conclude the TOCA, the
negotiations illustrated quite clearly how difficult it could be to reach agreements in
the future between two countries with different levels of development.
The South African positioning in the course of the negotiations over the TOCA has
been seen as ambiguous: on the one hand it took the "poor man'; line with its
application to become a member of the Lomé Convention and tried to convince the
EU that it forms part of a poor region in desperate need of development aid. On the
other hand South Africa expected to be seen as a hopeful, economically strong
country worthy of attracting large amounts of direct European investment.
Furthermore, South Africa always tried to uphold the importance of the regional
dimension in the negotiations, thereby indicating its will to act as the leading
economical and political power in Southern Africa.
The EU's position had the eventual integration of the global economy as its objective.
Its rejection of Soulh Africa's request to enter the Lomé Convention and its Green
Paper of November 1996 clearly illustrated the EU' s position that aid dependency
and coping with short-term needs is day-ta-day resource management rather than
effective development aid.217 Thus the EU was eager to commence a new trade
relationship with South Africa on a reciprocal basis, as an example for future .
cooperation with the ACP countries. The Cotonou Agreement, which replaced the
Lomé Convention, provides for increased participation and improved financial
cooperation, as well as economic and trade relationships between the EU and ACP
216 EU COM Partnership for the new millennium (2000) 4-5.
217 EU COM Green Paper (1996) IV.
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countries and could be a first step to future cooperation between the EU and other
ACP countries on the basis of individual bilateral agreements.
Nevertheless, the negotiations with South Africa clearly demonstrated that Europe is
far from following a common purpose and that individual countries' special interests
still play an important role. Concessions from the EU remain hard to win, particularly
in the agricultural sector. This is especially so because the EU is currently
undergoing a series of radical reforms with regard to its financing, farm and regional
spending (Agenda 2000). In addition, the integration of the Eastern European
Countries entering the Union is a huge and difficult task.
Therefore one has to bear in mind that the focus in future could be more on these
problems than on accommodating the interests of African countries.
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3. The Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement
The Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TOeA) between the RSA and
the EU provisionally entered into force on 1 January 2000. To examine the results of
twenty-one rounds of negotiation, this chapter will present the components of the
agreement.
The TDCA covers a wide range of issues in a comprehensive field of cooperation and
consists of several components. These are:218
3.1 The components of the Agreement
3.1.1 Political Dialogue
One of the major stumbling blocks to the conclusion of the agreement was the non-
execution provision. The non-execution clause allows either party to discontinue of
218 Bertelsmann-Scott "The EU, SA and the FTA" SAYII (2000) 113; EU COM Partners in Progress
(1999) 5; DTI TDCA (1999) 2; Trade & Industry and Foreign Affairs Portfolio Committees, Economic
Affairs Select Committee SA-EU Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (1999) 4-10;
www.southafricahouse.com/tradeeu-sa.htm (09.03.2001).
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the agreement. The EU wanted to include this provision' in the agreement in form of a
clause that would allow the discontinuation of the agreement if South Africa should
violate the rule of law and good governance or the respect for democratic principles
and fundamental human rights as laid down in the Universal Declaration on Human
Rights.219 The EU traditionally includes the first three conditions in any agreement it
concludes. This has led to the collapse of a number of trade talks involving the EU.
Most recently, the EU failed to reach an agreement with Australia, as these clauses
were found unacceptable. The inclusion of a "good governance" clause, however, is
a new stipulation which is probably aimed at future agreements with the AGP
countries. It is a clause that was included for the first time in Lomé IV to promote
democracy and accountability in developing countries.22o
SA, however, took exception to the inclusion of this clause, as it feared that this
would lead to the unilateral definition of these concepts by the EU.221 In addition, it
feared that the EU was setting a precedent for the Lomé negotiations that could
impact negatively on its partners in the region at the time.222 Although all four clauses
were later included, Article 3 TOGA allows for consultation before suspension in the
event of the violation of these principles by either of the two parties.223
The political dialogue will take place at ministerial and other levels. On general
matters of foreign policy, particularly with a view to promoting peace and long-term
stability in Southern Africa, the political dialogue could be extended to include all
countries in the SAOG region.224
219 Bertelsmann-Scott "The EU, SA and the FTA" SAYII (2000) 114; OTI TOCA (1999) 2; EU COM
TOeA between the EU and RSA (1999) 2-4; these principles engage either party to behave according
to the law as it stands, and to govern in a way that is in line with the principles of democratic rights,
such as the freedom of the people and the right to vote.
220 EU COM "La Convention de Lomé IV" Le Courder No 155 (1996) 9; Bertelsmann-Scott "The EU,
SA and the FTA" SAYII (2000) 114; Bertelsmann-Scott, Mills & Gibb The EU-SA Agreement (2000)
26.
221 OTI TOCA (1999) 2.
222 Bertelsmann-Scott "The EU, SA and the FTA" SAYII (2000) 114.
223 EU COM TOCA between the EU and RSA (1999) 3;
www.europa.eu.inUeur.lexien/treaties/daUec_cons_treaty_en.pdf (21.02.2001); Bertelsmann-Scott
"The EU, SA and the FTA" SA YII (2000) 114; OTI TOCA (1999) 2.
224 www.eusa.org.za\EU-SATrade&EconomicCoop\FreeTradeAgreement.htm. 6 (14.08.2000).
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3.1.2 Provisions for a Free Trade Area
3.1.2.1 General Features
In June 1997, SA called for a free trade area with asymmetrical coverage of all trade
and sectors and special protocols to cover sensitive products. It also called for
development and financial measures to support further regional integration and to
facilitate the adjustment process in Southern Africa.225
The agreement concluded between South Africa and the EU lays out in detail the
steps to be taken with regard to the removal of tariffs on mutual trade in order to
establish a free trade area. The following general aspects in respect of the
establishment of a free trade area were agreed upon:
• Coverage of the Free Trade Area, Asymmetry and Differentiation
According to Article 5 TDCA, 94,9% of EU imports from South Africa will effectively
enter into the market free of duty by the end of the ten-year period. The respective
figures on the South African side are 86,3% and twelve years.226
In addition to South Africa liberalising 86.5% of EU industrial imports and 81% of
agricultural imports, 2.9% will be partially liberalised. On the EU side an additional
·13% of agricultural imports will be liberalised partially, 61.4% of agricultural imports
and 99, 98% of industrial imports being subject to full liberalisation. The parties have
agreed that these exemptions will be reviewed during the course of the
Agreement.227
225 See Chapter 2.4; A Free Trade Area can be defined as a group of two or more countries that have
eliminated tariff and all or most non-tariff measures affecting trade among themselves.
226 Goodison "Marginalisation or Integration?" lGD Occasional Paper No 22 (1999) 26; Trade &
Industry and Foreign Affairs Portfolio Committees, Economic Affairs Select CommitteeSA-EU Trade,
Development and Cooperation Agreement (1999) 4; www.southafricahouse.com/tradeeu-sa.htm
(09.03.2001 ).
227 EU COMTDCA between the E~ and RSA (1999) 5;
www.europa.eu.inUeur.lexlen/treaties/daUec_cons_treaty_en.pdf (21.02.2001); Bertelsmann - Scott
"The EU, SA and the FTA" SA YII (2000) 114; Trade & Industry and Foreign Affairs Portfolio
Committees, Economic Affairs Select Committee SA-EU Trade, Development and Cooperation
Agreement (1999) 4; www.southafricahouse.com/tradeeu-sa.htm (09.03.2001); DTI TOeA (1999) 3;
Van Heerden Implications for South African Business in: Bertelsmann-Scott, Mills, Sidiropoulos (ed)
The EU-SA Agreement: South Africa, Southern Africa and the European Union (2000) 97; Lowe Main
Parameters of the EU _ SA Partnership in: Bertelsmann-Scott, Mills, Sidiropoulos (ed) The EU-SA
Agreement: South Africa, Southern Africa and the European Union (2000) 41; see Appendix 4;
Percentages are based on value of 1994-1996 average trade, the period before the start of the mutual
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• Protection for sensitive sectors
During the TOGA negotiations both the EU and South Africa have sought to protect
those sectors which are considered vulnerable to the introduction of free trade. 228
In the case of the EU this has resulted in the exclusion of a large range of agricultural
products from the tariff reduction commitments or the negotiation of tariff quota
restrictions. ·In the case of South Africa this has resulted in the deferment of tariff
elimination commitments in the vehicle and motor component sectors, which
constitutes the largest single component of South Africa's manufacturing sector.229
To a certain extent South Africa has also sought to either exclude regionally sensitive
products from tariff elimination commitments or "backlaad" these comrnltrnents.ê"
This is of special interest for Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho and Swaziland, all of which
tariff elimination. They therefore do not illustrate the growth potential of current non-traded goods that
will generally be subject to free trade upon enforcement of the Agreement.
228 See Appendix 5 and for the negotiating process, see Chapter 2; EU COM Partners in Progress
(1999) 8; Bertelsmann-Scott "The EU, SA and the FTA" SAYII (2000) 114; Davies Forging a new
relationship with the EU (2000) 10; www.europa.eu.inVeur.lexlen/treaties/daVec_cons_treaty_en.pdf
(21.02.2001); EU COM TOCA between the EU and RSA (1999) 40.
229 Goodison "Marginalisation or Integration?" lGD Occasional Paper No 22 (1999) 48.
230 Backlaading means that tariffs are only eliminated towards the end of the transition period.
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are in the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) with South Africa. South Africa's
membership of the SACU means that all duty reductions agreed upon in a FTA
between the EU and South Africa also apply to Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and
Swaziland. This is so because the SACU agreement provides for South African law
and customs regulations to be the pivot around which the SACU operates, and for
the members of the SACU to implement the South African tariff as a common
external tariff.231 Furthermore, in Article 3 of the SACU agreement the Member States
agreed not to impose any duties on goods which had been imported from outside the
common customs area, when re-exported to another Member State. This would face
companies in the BLNS countries with increased competition for some of their
product lines.232 Therefore, in order to address BLNS concerns, certain products of
specific interest to the BLNS countries have also been excluded from the
agreement. 233
• Support for regional integration
Although the principle of asymmetry means that the weaker partner, in this case
South Africa, will have more time to implement less onerous obligations than the
stronger partner, the reciprocal obligations imposed on South Africa under the FTA
will require the duty-free admission of a range of industrial and agricultural EU
products. The FTA will necessarily result in greater competition. Products from the
BLNS states will have to compete with European agricultural and manufactured
products, which, once liberalised, will arrive duty-free in the SACU area and
consequently cost substantially less than before. Certain sectors of their economies
are therefore likely to suffer from adjustment costs, especially if one considers the
generally superior standard of quality of European products.P' The BLNS is-
231 BlumbergIWentzel ''Trade relations with Southern Africa" DSSA Paper No 29 (1994) 2.
232 According to Goodison "Marginalisation or Integration?" lGD Occasional Paper No 21 (1999) 49,
these are the following products: Meat products (Namibia, Botswana and Swaziland), Dairy products
(Namibia), Flour (Namibia and Botswana), Flour-based products (Namibia, Botswana), Beer
(Namibia), Confectionery (Swaziland), Sugar-based pre-mixes (Swaziland), Canned fruit and jam
(Swaziland), Asparagus (Lesotho), Glacé cherries (Swaziland), Polyester material (Botswana) Bath
towels (Botswana) Umbrellas (Lesotho), Glass fibre pipes (Botswana), Cars (Botswana), Refrigeration
equipment (Swaziland), Televisions (Lesotho).
233 Compare Appendix 5; EU COM Partners in Progress (1999) 9.
234 Davies Forging a new relationship with the EU (2000) 10-11.
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especially worried about the system of producer and export subsidies that the EU
upholds for a great part of its agricultural products.235
The problems that could occur are perhaps best illustrated through the experience of
the Namibian beef sector, a sector which, like sugar in Swaziland, forms the
backbone of the national economy. In the case of Namibia, the opportunities for the
development of commercial cattle production in the northern communal areas (where
half the Namibian population live) were undermined by a dramatic increase in highly
subsidised EU beef exports to South Africa. This increase in subsidised EU beef
exports occurred in direct response to the lifting of quantitative controls on imports
into South Africa, and increases in the level of export refunds paid by the EU on beef
exports to South Africa. These increased export refunds allowed EU exporters to
vault the remaining barrier of protective tariffs, with EU beef exports accounting for
10% of the overall South African beef market and up to 70% of certain components
of the Namibian market. The economic impact of the EU beef exports exceeded R
600 million in losses for the South African cattle-raising sector.236
For this reason, the EU and South Africa have committed themselves to designing
the FTA in a way which will support the process of regional economic integration
currently under way in the Southern African region.237 South Africa did not succeed in
eliminating EU export subsidies completely, but there are some important
breakthroughs. Firstly, the EU has committed itself not to pay export refunds on
cheese exported to SA under the tariff quota of 5000 ton. Secondly, the EU is willing
to eliminate export refunds on products South Africa might want to offer for front-
loading during the implementation period.238 Refunds will be eliminated in full once
tariff liberalisation starts.239 This is an important aspect of the agreement, as most of
235 The system of EU producer and export subsidies/refunds means that producers and exporters in
the EU receive money from the budget of the EU, in order to offer their products on the domestic and
the foreign market at lower prices on the world market. This gives them an advantage over the
producers and exporters of other countries. Graumanns "Redefining relations between SA and the EU"
FOG Occasional Paper No 10 (1997) 25.
236 Goodison "Marginalisation or Integration?" lGD Occasional Paper No 22 (1999) 60.
237 EU COM Partners in Progress (1999) 8.
238 Front-loading means that tariffs would begin to be phased.down at the beginning of the
implementation period.
2390TI TOCA (1999) 5; Trade & Industry and Foreign Affairs Portfolio Committees, Economic Affairs
Select Committee SA-EU Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (1999) 6;
www.southafricahouse.com/tradeeu-sa.htm (09.03.2001).
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the EU agricultural products will not be competitive on the domestic market without
refunds. Should the EU be unwilling or unable to eliminate export refunds, South
Africa can simply retract its offer of front-loading. Furthermore, a number of sensitive
products like beef and sugar are excluded from the free trade area and the EU has
committed itself to provide funds to compensate the member countries of SACU for
the adjustment costs that they might suffer as a result of the agreement.240
3.1.2.2 Industrial Sector
Under the agreement, traded goods are divided into industrial and agricultural
products. The industrial sector accounts for around 86% of total South African
exports to the EU.241While the EU's average tariff levels for industrial products is
low, the removal of tariffs will nevertheless give South Africa's exporters a relative
advantage over some of their competitors (non-EU Member States)242 in the EU
market. The EU will eliminate its industrial tariffs, either immediately, or within three
years after the entry into force of the agreement. This includes most of the sensitive
products relating to textiles and clothing (only about 20% of South Africa's textile
exports to the EU will be phased out over a longer period).243According to Article 11
TDCA, tariffs on auto components were reduced to 50% of the MFN rates applied by
the EU at enforcement of the agreement.244 Other products, like ferro-chromium, with
tariff-elimination starting in the 4th year, will continue to have a global duty-free quota.
Only six lines of aluminium will remain on the reserve list. The products on the
reserve list will nevertheless be subject to reviews.245
240 EU COM Partners in Progress (1999) 30; See Appendix 5 for the list of excluded products;
Bertelsmann-Scott ''The EU, SA and the FTA" SAYIA (1999) 114.
241 Bertelsmann-Scott "The EU, SA and the FTA" SAYIA (1999) 114; Van Heerden Implications for
South Africa (2000) 97; Trade & Industry and Foreign Affairs Portfolio Committees, Economic Affairs
Select Committee SA-EU Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (1999) 5;
www.southafricahouse.com/tradeeu-sa.htm (09.03.2001).
242 According to Stevens & Kennan Trade between South Africa and Europe (1995) 15, "competitors"
are defined as non-EU Member States.
243 DTI TDCA (1999) 3; see Appendix 6; Trade & Industry and Foreign Affairs Portfolio Committees,
Economic Affairs Select Committee SA-EU Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (1999)
5; www.southafricahouse.com/tradeeu-sa.htm (09.03.2001).
244 The MFN rate is the rate applicable to all other contracting parties of the WTO. It prevents
discrimination.
245 DTI TDCA (1999) 4; EU COM Partners in Progress (1999) 9; Pallangyo The impact of the EU - SA
Agreement on SADC in: Bertelsmann-Scott, Mills, Sidiropoulos (ed) The EU-SA Agreement: South
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As indicated; the transitional period for the phasing out of tariffs by South Africa is
twelve years, to allow for adjustment by cornpanles.F" Sensitive products, like
automobiles and parts, will remain on the reserve list without any tariff elimination or
reduction schedules at this point.247 This will be reviewed in the light of the outcome
of the mid-term review of the Motor Industry Development Programme.248
With regard to other sensitive products, South Africa persuaded the EU to moderate
its initial expectations.P" This will enable South Africa to have a longer time period for
the phasing out of tariffs. In the case of clothing and textiles, there is a commitment to
reduce the tariffs applicable to imports from the EU according to Article 12 TOGA.
Depending on the segment of the market, the tariffs will vary between 5% and 20%
Africa, Southern Africa and the European Union (2000) 73-74; Davies Forging a new relationship with
the EU (2000) 10; see Appendix 5.
246 See Chapter 3.1.2.1; EU COM TDCA between the EU and RSA (1999) 5;
Www.europa.eu.inUeur.lex/en/treaties/daUec_cons_treaty_en.pdf (21.02.2001); Bertelsmann-Scott
"The EU, SA and the FTA" SAYII (2000) 114.
247 See Appendix 5; EU COM Partners in Progress (1999) 9; Davies Forging a new relationship with
the EU (2000) 10; Trade & Industry and Foreign Affairs Portfolio Committees, Economic Affairs Select
Committee SA-EU Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (1999) 5;
www.southafricahouse.com/tradeeu-sa.htm (09.03.2001).
248 DTI TDCA (1999) 4; Trade & Industry and Foreign Affairs Portfolio Committees, Economic Affairs·
Select Committee SA-EU Trade, Development. and Cooperation Agreement (1999) 5;
www.southafricahouse.com/tradeeu-sa.htm (09.03.2001).
249 Obeng & Mc Gowan "EU-SA Free Trade Arrangements" South African Journal of International
Affairs (1999) 103; Lowe Main Parameters (2000) 41.
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by the end of the 8th year. Between the 8th year and the end of the transition period,
EU products will enjoy a preference over the MFN rate of approximately 40%. 250
The Agreement therefore takes into account the changes in these industries as a
result of competition with European producers.
3.1.2.3 Agricultural sector
The agricultural sector has been a very contentious issue right from the beginning of
the negotiations. Obviously, South Africa pushed for improved market access in order
to be able to better exploit its comparative advantages in this field of economy. Given
the labour intensiveness and growth potential of the South African farming sector, as
well as the large consumer market within the EU, with more than 370 million
inhabitants, a better share could result in some relief for South Africa's labour
market. Nevertheless, the EU faces a strong farming lobby and, so far, has effectively
protected the sector with its Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).
According to Article 33 ECT, the CAP was originally introduced to promote
productivity, to promote a reasonable degree of self-sufficiency within the
Community, to stabilize markets, to assure the availability of supplies and to ensure
that supplies reach consumers at reasonable prices. This should be achieved by a
structural policy directed towards increasing productivity, rather than by measures of
market policy.
In practice, Community institutions found it to be virtually impossible to stabilize
markets at a world market price level because this would have led to a considerable
decrease of earnings in less efficient undertakings- of certain Member States.
Therefore the CAP concept of Community preference was introduced. It provides for
an "intervention" or support price at which the Community guarantees to purchase
the agricultural output from farmers, and a "threshold price" (that is higher than the
internal support price) below which no imports are allowed. In order to isolate the EU
market from international competition a "variable levy" equal to the margin between
250 EU COM roes between the EU and RSA (1999),7-8;
www.europa.eu.inUeur.lex/en/treaties/daUec_cons_treaty_en.pdf (21.02.2001); EU COM Partners in
Progress (1999) 10; see Appendix 6; Trade & Industry and Foreign Affairs Portfolio Committees,
Economic Affairs Select Committee SA-EU Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (1999)
5; www.southafricahouse.com/tradeeu-sa.htm (09.03.2001).
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the threshold price and the lowest representative offer price on world' markets is
imposed on imports. Moreover, an "export restitution" amounting to the difference
between the average world price and the internal EU price is granted to European
exporters.P'
Taking into consideration the EU's CAP concept of Community Preference and the
fact that the agricultural sector has generally been excluded by the EU in other free
trade agreements, it is a unique- event that South Africa achieved a number of
concessions from the EU in this field.252
3.1.2.3.1 Liberalisation of agricultural imports
Though the EU excluded about 46% of agricultural imports from the FTA with South
Africa in its negotiating mandate, it has finally agreed to liberalise 61.4% of
agricultural imports from South Africa.253 In addition, it granted South Africa tariff
quotas for certain agricultural products at preferential tariff rates - ranging from zero
to 50% of the MFN-rates in terms of Article 14 TDCA. As indicated above, these
quotas make up 13% of agricultural trade with the EU.254 South Africa for its part
agreed to liberalise 81% of agricultural imports from the EU.255 According to Article
15 TDCA certain sensitive products - sensitive also in a regional context - were
placed on a review list, liberalisation of which would be considered at a later stage.
251, Hoekman I Kostecki The Political Economy of the World Trading System (1995) 197.
252 Bertelsmann-Scott "The EU, SA and the FTA" SAYII (2000) 115; Trade & Industry and Foreign
Affairs Portfolio Committees, Economic Affairs Select Committee SA-EU Trade, Development and
Cooperation Agreement (1999) 5; www.southafricahouse.com/tradeeu-sa.htm (09.03.2001).
253 Sée Appendix 4 for the coverage of the FTA and appendix 5 for the main products excluded at EU
and SA side. For a detailed list of the liberalised products, see EU COM TDCA between the EU and
RSA (1999) 8-11 and at www.europa.eu.intleur.lexlen/treaties/datlec_cons_treaty_en.pdf
(21.02.2001 );Trade & Industry and Foreign Affairs Portfolio Committees, Economic Affairs Select
Committee SA-EU Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (1999) 6;
www.southafricahouse.com/tradeeu-sa.htm (09.03.2001).
254 EU COM TDCA between the EU and RSA (1999),8;
www.europa.eu.intleur.lexlen/treaties/datlec_cons_treaty_en.pdf (21.02.2001); wWw.eusa.org.za\EU-
SA Trade&Economic Coop\Free Trade Agreement.htm, 6 (14.08.2000); Bertelsmann-Scott "The EU,
SA and the FTA" SAYII (2000) 115; EU COM Partners in Progress (1999) 10; Links Negotiating a
long-term relationship in: Bertelsmann-Scott, Mills, Sidiropoulos (ed) The EU-SA Agreement: South
Africa, Southern Africa and the European Union (2000) 34; Van Heerden Implications for South Africa
97.
255 See Appendix 4 for the coverage of the FTA and appendix 5 for the main products excluded at EU
and SA side. See for a detailed list of the liberalised products EU COM TDCA between the EU and
RSA (1999) 8-11 and at www.europa.eu.intleur.lexlen/treaties/datlec_cons_treaty_en.pdf
(21.02.2001 ).
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South Africa will therefore be pressing continuously for a review of this list in the light
of changing circumstances on the EU and world markets.256
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3.1.2.3.2 Agricultural safeguard clause
While the EU's CAP is still a matter of concern, the agreement (with regard to
agricultural policies) provides for consultation and compensatory adjustments for any
changes which may affect the balance of concesslons.F" According to Articles 16
and 24 TDCA the agricultural policies provision is supplemented by an Agricultural
safeguard clause.. This clause seeks to deal more expeditiously with the particular
problems that can arise in the agricultural sector. It stipulates that, should there be
proof that increased imports of agricultural products originating in one party are
causing harm or threatening to cause harm to the markets of the other party, the
Cooperation Council shall immediately consider the matter to find an appropriate
solution.258 Furthermore it gives the affected party the right to take provisional
256 EU COM TOCA between the EU and RSA (1999) 10-11;
www.europa.eu.inUeur.lexlen/treaties/daUec_cons_treaty_en.pdf (21.02.2001); OTI TOCA (1999) 5;
Seé Appendix 4 and 5.
2570TI TOCA (1999) 4; Congress of South African Trade Union (COSATU) Shaping South Africa's
Future Trade Relations with the European Union: COSA TU'S Concerns in: Bertelsmann-Scott, Mills,
Sidiropoulos (ed)The EU-SA Agreement: South Africa, Southern Africa and the European Union
(2000) 122; Trade & Industry and Foreign Affairs Portfolio Committees, Economic Affairs Select
Committee SA-EU Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (1999) 6;
www.southafricahouse.com/tradeeu-sa.htm (09.03.2001).
258 According to Article 97 TOCA the Cooperation Council is the institution, which will ensure the
functioning and the implementation of the Agreement and the dialogue between the parties. For
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measures necessary to limit or redress the disturbance if a decision of the
Cooperation Council is pending and where exceptional circumstances require
immediate action. However, it stipulates that in taking such provisional measures, the
affected party has to take into account the interests of both parties.259
Thus the agricultural safeguard clause gives South Africa the right to challenge the
EU should there be the proof that increased imports from the EU are threatening the
South African domestic market. However, at present it is unclear how the
Cooperation Council will function and if the Cooperation Council will take SACU
interests into consideration. Opening up the Cooperation Council to BLNS
participation would appear to be wholly consistent with the general positions of
principle expressed by both South Africa and the EU.
3.1.3 Trade related issues
In addition to tariff dismantling, the TDCA also covers a wide variety of trade related
issues. During the negotiations, South Africa took the view that provisions on trade-
related issues in the bilateral agreement with the EU should not go beyond the
current multilateral conventions agreed on in bodies like the WTO or the World
Intellectual Property Rights Organisation.26o However, the WTO and World
Intellectual Property Rights Organisation have not as yet reached worldwide
agreement on some of the issues that the EU proposed for inclusion in the TDCA.
Pretoria managed to avoid making any commitments ahead of global agreement, and
committed itself only to a number of minor concessions that were essential to the
proper functioning of the trade agreement.261
further responsibilities of the Cooperation Council, see EU COM TOCA between the EU and RSA
(1999) 35; www.europa.eu.intleur.lexlen/treaties/datlec_cons_treaty_en.pdf (21.02.2001
259 EU COM TOCA between the EU and RSA (1999) 11 and 13;
www.europa.eu.intleur.lexlen/treaties/datlec_cons_treaty_en.pdf (21.02.2001); OTI TOCA (1999) 4;
115; Trade & Industry and Foreign Affairs Portfolio Committees, Economic Affairs Select Committee
SA-EU Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (1999) 6;
www.southafricahouse.com/tradeeu-sa.htm (09.03.2001).
26°0TI TOCA (1999) 5; Trade & Industry and Foreign Affairs Portfolio Committees, Economic Affairs
Select Committee SA-EU Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (1999) 6;
www.southafricahouse.com/tradeeu-sa.htm (09.03.2001).
261 Bertelsmann-Scott "The EU, SA and the FTA" SAY" (2000) 115.
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3.1.3.1 Customs Unions and FTAs
Future Customs Unions or FTAs that either party should enter into could have
adverse effects on the SA-EU FTA.262 For this scenario Article 22 (2) TOCA
accordingly provides for consultation between the two parties on the effects that
domestic interests might suffer. Whether this consultation within the Cooperation
Council is enough to ensure that account can be taken of the mutual interests of the
Community and South Africa will soon be tested, as the EU is preparing for
expansion towards Eastern Europe and South Africa is concluding an FTA with its
neighbours in Southern Africa.263
3.1.3.2 Antidumping and Countervailing measures
Article 23 TOCA states that both parties may use antidumping duties and
countervailing measures in accordance with GATT rules.264
The meaning of dumping signifies the sale of products for export at a price below
home market price. WTO contracting parties are allowed to unilaterally utilize
antidumping duties to offset the margin of dumping of dumped goods, provided that it
can be shown that such dumping by a company causes harm or threatens to cause
"material injury" to competing domestic industries. The overall approach is that the
importing country must show a harmful impact on the total industry producing the
"like product" in the importing country. If injury is established, the importing country
may charge extra import duty on the particular product in order to bring it to the
"normal value" or to remove the injury to its domestic industry.265
With regard to the present case, the matter has a specific impact on the EU-SA trade
regime. Allowing a unilateral response to durnpinq in the context of trade relations
between large and small economies tends to give an advantage to the former_266In
the situation between the EU and South Africa, the EU accounts for almost 40% of
262 Bertelsmann-Scott "The EU, SA and the FTA" SAYII (2000) 115.
263 DTI TDCA (1999) 5; Trade & Industry and Foreign Affairs Portfolio Committees, Economic Affairs
Select Committee SA-EU Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (1999) 7;
www.southafricahouse.com/tradeeu-sa.htm (09.03.2001).
264 EU COM Partners in Progress (1999) 20; EU COM TDCA between the EU and RSA (1999) 13;
www.europa.eu.intleur.lexlen/treaties/datlec_cons_treaty_en.pdf (21.02.2001).
265 Article VI GATT 1994: "less than normal value" as quoted by Jackson The World Trading System
(1998) 256 and 408.
266 Jackson The World Trading System (1998) 273.
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South Africa's exports, whereas South Africa is the destination for only 1.3% of the
Community's exports.267 Thus, the EU can more easily apply antidumping duties to
South African products without the worry of retaliation or symmetrical application by
its counterpart. Any application of duties from the South African side would only have
a very small effect on the European economy.268
In view of this effect, the general prohibition appears to have been more beneficial for
South Africa. However, with regard to South Africa as the smaller economy, the EU
has not granted immunity to South Africa in this issue. Instead, the contracting parties
constituted in Article 23 (1) TOCA that "nothing in this Agreement" shall prevent either
Party from taking antidumping or countervailing measures in accordance with GATT
provisions. Nevertheless, Article 23 (2) TOCA also provides for the parties to
consider alternatives before imposing definitive antidumping and countervailing
measures. Consequently, there remains an important margin for the relevant firms to
put options for undertaking on price, volume and/or a combination of these, rather
than to face prohibitive duties.269
3.1.3.3 Safeguard measures
In order to protect infant lndustries'"? in both South Africa and the SACU countries,
South Africa insisted on comprehensive provisions covering regular, regional and
, transitional (measures of limited duration) safeguard rneasures.i" According to
Articles 24 and 26 TOCA, the regular safeguard provides for measures to be taken in
267 EU COM Parlners in Progress (1999) 7.
268 Compare the example USA-Canada by Jackson The World Trading System (1998) 273.
2690TI TOGA (1999) 5.
270 The "infant industry" argument is a commonly stated "exception" to liberal trade theory. This
argument proposes the use of import barriers to enable a new or young industry to become
established and viable. The barriers to imports give some shelter against foreign competition, until the
industry is strong enough to meet that competition. However, there are several problems with this
argument. The main problem is the problem of identifying which industries should receive the benefit
of "infant" treatment and there is often a tendency to argue for perpetual infancy status. For further
discussion, see Jackson The World Trading System (1998) 24.
271 Bertelsmann-Scott "The EU, SA and the FTA" SAYII (2000) 115; EU COM Parlners in Progress
(1999) 18; Trade & Industry and Foreign Affairs Portfolio Committees, Economic Affairs Select
Committee SA-EU Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (1999) 7;
www.southafricahouse.com/tra~eeu-sa.htm (09.03.2001).
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the case of import surges, which threaten or cause injury to domestic producers.F" In
addition, only South Africa will be entitled by Article 24 (3) TOCA to take exceptional
measures to protect infant industries or sectors if any product is being imported in
such quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause serious
deterioration in the economic situation of a Member State of the SACU. However,
South Africa is obliged to examine alternative solutions before taking safeguard
measures. Furthermore Article 25 TOCA stipulates that exceptional measures of
limited duration (transitional safeguard measures) may be taken by South Africa in
the form of an increase or reintroduction of customs duties concerning infant
industries or sectors facing serious difficulties caused by increased imports
originating in the European Community as a result of the reduction of duties
envisaged by the agreement. 273
The comprehensive safeguard provision is important to ensure that South Africa and
other SACU members can temporarily protect themselves or slow down the pace of
liberalisation if the impact proves to be more than South Africa or the respective
SACU members' can handle.274 However, it is unclear at present how the
Cooperation Council will handle the cooperation between the two parties. Since the
EU-SA TOCA will apply to the whole territory of SACU, and not simply to South
Africa, there is a strong case for the BLNS government to be represented in the
Cooperation Council.275
3.1.3.4 Used goods
Trade in used goods is of great importance in the EU and in South Africa. Especially
in South Africa, where 13% of the population (about 5.4 million people) live under
"first world" conditions and 53% of the population (about 22 million people), at the
2720TI TOGA (1999) 6; EU COM TOGA between the EU and RSA (1999) 13-14;
www.europa.eu.inUeur.lexlen/treaties/daUec_cons_treaty_ en. pdf (21.02.2001 ).
273 Bertelsmann-Scott "The EU, SA and the FTA" SAYII (2000) 116; EU COM Partners in Progress
(1999) 19; COSATU Shaping SA's future trade relations (2000) 122; Trade & Industry and Foreign
Affairs Portfolio Committees, Economic Affairs Select Committee SA-EU Trade, Development and
Cooperation Agreement (1999) 7; www.southafricahouse.com/tradeeu-sa.htm (09.03.2001).
274 Links Long-term relationship (2000) 35; Bertelsmann-Scott "The EU, SA and the FTA" SAYII (2000)
116; EU COM Partners in Progress (1999) 19; Trade & Industry and Foreign Affairs Portfolio
Committees, Economic Affairs Select Committee SA-EU Trade, Development and Cooperation
Agreement (1999) 7; www.southafricahouse.com/tradeeu-sa.htm (09.03.2001).
275 -
See Ghapter 3.1.2.3.2.
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other extreme, live under "third world" conditions, many people are in need of
affordable used goods.276Goods such as automobiles and textiles, for example, are
repeatedly traded by second-hand dealers and private persons over a long period of
time, after once having been sold as new products. The trade iri used goods could
therefore provide many trading opportunities for the domestic market and has great
importance for traders and consumers. With regard to consumers, used goods such
as cars, due to their age, often are in a condition that is not as good and safe as new
products. They therefore constitute a danger with regard to the environment as well
as the health and safety of the consumer.
The TOGA had to give consideration to the importance of trade in used goods, to
avoid disruption of this market through the importation of used goods, and to protect
consumers. The exception clause in Article 27 TOGA provides for the protection of
domestic producers and consumers with regard to the importation of used goods
through the restriction of trade in used goods.277 Such restrictions, however, do not
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination where the same
conduions or a disguised restriction on trade between the parties prevail.
3.1.3.5 Competition Policy
Most industrialized countries have introduced competition rules into their national
legislation in order to avoid restrictive agreements and business practices and to
prevent large enterprises abusing their economic dominance. Such practices are not
of national concern only, but can also defeat the underlying purposes of the world
trading system. Nevertheless, there is no international agreement so far on
competition policy within the context of the WT0_278 South Africa and the EU,
however, managed to agree bilaterally on certain competition rules in order to
prevent abuses by companies enjoying dominant market positions in either the EU or
South Africa. This is meant to ensure free and fair competition between companies in
both the EU and South Africa.
276 Compare Chapter 2.2.4.1.
277 Interview with Philip Snyman, Acting Director: Import and Export Control at the DTI of the RSA (07
June 2001): the extent to which the trade in used goods is restricted underlies an internal government
document.
278 The EU has general agreements with third countries in this area, e.g. with the USA.
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Nevertheless, the EU and South Africa had different points of view on the competition
policy. Whereas the EU had longstanding rules in this respect and pushed for
competition rules that would meet European standards, South Africa sought to
ensure that the provisions did not go beyond those of South Africa's new competition
policy and law.279
The compromise that was reached (Articles 35-39 TOCA) provides for a transitional
implementation period of three years. Furthermore, the definition of incompatible
restrictive business practices is in line with the respective provisions in both the
South African Competition Law and the EC Treaty.28o According to Article 38 (4)
TOCA there are provisions for consultation between the European Commission,
which has the power to veto all mergers and acquisitions in the EU, and the South
African competition authorities. Both sides have committed themselves to
"considerations of comity" and to endeavour to find a mutually acceptable solution
whenever an investigation or any other action with important implications for the
interests of either party is intended or takes place. In addition, the EU has promised,
in Article 39 TOCA, to, provide South Africa with technical assistance including the
exchange of experts, the organisation of 'seminars and training activities in the
restructuring of its competition law and policy.281
3.1.3.6 Public Aid
The TOCA does not apply the rules on competition policy to private business only,
but also to state aid. The reason for this is that public subsidies are considered to be
fraught with potentially damaging effects on free competition on the common
market.282 Article 41 TOCA therefore stipulates that respective state measures are
279 See Competition Act No. 89 of 1998; Trade & Industry and Foreign Affairs Portfolio Committees,
Economic Affairs Select Committee SA-EU Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (1999)
7; www.southafricahouse.com/tradeeu-sa.htm (09.03.2001).
280 See Competition Act No. 89 of 1998 and the Articles 81 and 82 ECT; Trade & Industry and Foreign
Affairs Portfolio Committees, Economic Affairs Select Committee SA-EU Trade, Development and
Cooperation Agreement (1999) 7; www.southafricahouse.com/tradeeu-sa.htm (09.03.2001): The
agreement reached, however, does not regulate the provision of state aid, nor deals with services and
government procurement as was proposed by the EU.
281 EU COM Partners in Progress (1999) 18;
www.europa.eu.intleur.lexlen/treaties/datlec_cons_treaty_en.pdf (21.02.2001); EU COM TDCA
between the EU and RSA (1999) 18.
282 See Article 87 (1) ECT.
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prohibited under this particular article unless they "support a specific public policy
objective of either Party."
In practice South Africa's specific transitional requirements and the enlargement of
the EU to Eastern Europe might require extensive public aid in the future. Article 41
TOCA should stipulate which measures are prohibited, but in my view, the broad
language of this provision will inevitably relate to disagree_ments concerning the
determination of public policy objectives qualifying for an exception to the general
prohibition of public support. To avoid such disagreements, the TOCA further
stipulates that it is in both parties' interest to ensure that public aid is granted in a fair
and transparent manner.283 The provision takes into account the facilitating role of
state support and involvement in the restructuring of the South African industry and
. economy.f" It thus provides for consultation between the parties to find "a mutually
satisfactory solution" to situations where public aid distorts fair competition in terms of
Article 42 TOCA. 285
It is not clear what kind of "mutually satisfactory solution" is required, though. The
bottom line seems to be the WTO law, because Article 44 TOCA specifically declares
that the GATT/WTO Agreements "shall apply to public aid or subsidies". Concerning
the "fair and transparent manner", the provision also does not provide any further
definition>. Thus, all in all, one has to admit that there is a lack of clear-cut
arrangements, which makes the public aid section a very loose piece of legislation.
The respective provisions therefore require the Cooperation Council to assign a
particular meaning to issues on which the negotiators could not agree, thereby
possibly postponing conflict to the future.
283 EU COM Partners in Progress (1999) 20;
www.europa.eu.intleur.lexlen/treaties/datlec_cons_treaty_en.pdf (21.02.2001); EU COM TOCA
between the EU and RSA (1999) 19.
284 Trade & Industry and Foreign Affairs Portfolio Committees, Economic Affairs Select Committee SA-
EU Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (1999) 7; www.southafricahouse.com/tradeeu-
sa.htm (09.03.2001).
285 DTI TOCA (1999) 6-7.
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3.1.3.7 Dispute Settlement
The effective resolution of trade disputes is vital for the smooth functioning of the
trading system. Unlike many other dispute settlement mechanisms in Public
International Law, the WTO procedures are structured in clearly defined stages with a
timetable to be followed and, if necessary, a compulsory panel ruling that can be-
appealed once. However, the WTO Dispute Settlement Bodies only have jurisdiction
over disputes arising under an agreement covered by the WTO.286Free Trade Areas,
by contrast, are trade regimes on their own. 287 It follows in the present case that the
Dispute Settlement Bodies have no jurisdiction over disputes arising between South
Africa and the EU concerning their respective rights and obligations under the TDCA.
Accordingly, Article 104 TDCA sets out clear rules for the trade chapter, in order to
ensure that there are no unnecessary delays in the resolution of disputes. Article 104
TDCA stipulates that each party may refer to the Cooperation Council any dispute
relating to the application or interpretation of the TDCA. The Cooperation Council
may settle any dispute by means of a decision and each party shall be bound by this
decision. In the case that the dispute can not be settled by a decision of the
Cooperation Council, either party may notify the other of the appointment of an
arbitrator. The other party must then appoint a second arbitrator within two months of
the appointment of the first arbitrator. According to Article 104 (5) TDCA, the
Cooperation Council then has to appoint a third arbitrator within six months, and in
trade and trade-related issues within 60 days. The arbitrator's decision shall be taken
by majority vote within twelve months. In trade and trade-related issues the
arbitrators shall aim to issue their report to the parties within six months and, in
urgent cases, including those involving perishable goods, within three months. Its
majority ruling is binding_288
It appears that, in practice, the proceedings in the Cooperation Council are primarily
focusing on consultation and mediation between the parties and will only lead to a
decision if the Cooperation Council comes to a unanimous decision. Contentious
cases will most likely be referred to the arbitration panel. The timetable under Article
286 Article 1 DSU; Haekman/Kastecki From GATT ta WTO (1995) 44-50.
287 Haekman/Kastecki From GATTta WTO (1995) 46.
288 www.eurapa.eu.intleur.lexlen/treaties/datlec_cans_treaty_en.pdf (21.02.2001); EU COM TOeA
between the EU and RSA (1999) 36-37.
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104 TOGA is tight and will lead to the prompt settlement of conflicts. This is essential
in trade relations and therefore an important feature of the TDGA.
3.1.4 Economic Cooperation
Under Title IV TDGA, the EU and South Africa agree to cooperate on a wide range of
economic and industrial matters, to their mutual advantage and in the interest of the
Southern African region as a whole.289 This will focus on:
• Diversifying and strengthening their economic links;
• Promoting lasting development in both parties' economies;
• Supporting patterns of regional economic cooperation;
• Promoting economic cooperation between small and medium-sized
enterprises; and
• Protecting and improving the environment.
Cooperation in the areas of industry, investment promotion, information and
communication technology will be promoted by the Agreement.290
At this stage, however, it is too early to say how the cooperation in this area will work
in detail. Since the TDGA is a "pilot project" for both the EU and South Africa, many
of the agreed provisions in this area at this stage have to be regarded rather as an
aim of the two parties than as a detailed obligation which will definitely be realized
within a fixed period of time. But although this provision also expresses "only" an aim,
it unilaterally takes the needs in South Africa and the Southern African region into
consideration. In how far the economic cooperation in the various fields will be
realized remains to be seen in the future.
289 EU COM TOCA between the EU and RSA (1999) 21-27; EU COM Partners in Progress (1999) 21-
22; Bertelsmann-Scott "The EU, SA and the FTA" SAYII (2000)116; Goodison "Marginalisation or
Integration?" lGD Occasional Paper No 22 (1999) 28.
290 DTI TOCA (1999) 7; Trade & Industry and Foreign Affairs Portfolio Committees, Economic Affairs
Select Committee SA-EU Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (1999) 8;
www.southafricahouse.com/tradeeu-sa.htm (09.03.2001).
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3.1.4.1 Industry
According to -Article 51 TOCA, the parties aimed to facilitate restructuring and
modernization of South African industry while fostering its competitiveness and
growth. The Agreement made provision for for encouraging cooperation between
European and South African economic operators (companies, professionals;
organized labour etc.), stimulating and diversifying output for the domestic and export
markets for and promoting the use of South Africa' s human resources through
facilitation of access to credit and investment finance and support to industrial
innovation, technology transfer, training, research and technological development.F"
This aspect is especially important for South Africa, because the weaker party in an
FTA predominantly gains more from the transfer of technology and development, and
less from tariff liberalisation.292
3.1.4.2 Investment promotion and protection
Article 52 TOCA provides that both sides will aim to establish a climate which favours
and promotes mutually beneficial investments, both domestic and foreign, especially
through improved conditions for investment protection, investment promotion, the
transfer of capital and the exchange of investment opportunities. The aim of
cooperation shall be to facilitate and encourage the conclusion, where appropriate
between the Member States and South Africa, of agreements for the promotion and
protection of investments and to avoid double taxation. Furthermore, Article 52 TOCA
states that the two parties shall exchange information on investment opportunities,
work towards harmonised procedures and administrative practices in the field of
investment and support the promotion and encouragement of investments in South
Africa and the Southern African region.293
291 Compare the Science and Technology Agreement in Chapter 2.7; EU COM TOCA between the EU
and RSA (1999) 22; www.europa.eu.inUeur.lexlen/treaties/daUec_cons_treaty_en.pdf (21.02.2001).
292 Bertelsmann-Scott "The EU, SA and the FTA" SAYII (2000) 116.
293 EU COM TOCA between the EU and RSA (1999) 22;
www.europa.eu.inUeur.lexlen/treaties/daUec_cons_treaty_en.pdf (21.02.2001); EU COM Partners in
Progress (1999) 21.
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3.1.4.3 Information society
The EU and South Africa will cooperate in the area of information and communication
technology. According to Article 55 TOGA this will include support for the
development of satellite technology in the Southern African region, a dialogue on
different aspects of the information society, including regulatory aspects and
communications policy, and the dissemination of new information and communication
technologies. There are also provisions for the promotion and implementation of joint
research in the information technology sector.294
3.1.4.4 Other aspects of economic cooperation
Furthermore the TOGA provides for economic cooperation in the fields of energy,
mining, tourism, agriculture, fisheries, consumer policy and services, including
financial services. In all those fields cooperation is to be aimed at the promotion of
integrated and durable development in South Africa. Access of South Africans to
affordable and reliable sources of the various fields and services is to be improved
and cooperation between countries in the Southern African region to be supported.i'"
How these aims will be realized in practice is also not laid down in the agreement
between the EU and South Africa and remains to be seen in the future.
3.1.5 Development Cooperation
The Agreement had to acknowledge the difference between the two partners in terms
of their respective levels of development, and the need for South Africa to undergo a
. series of structural reforms to make its economy more competitive. From the start the
EU and South Africa were prepared to insert a strong developmental dimension into
the Agreement. It found its way into the TOGA in Title V. 296
294 EU COM TOCA between the EU and RSA (1999) 23-24;
www.europa.eu.inUeur.lexlen/treaties/daUec_cons_treaty_en.pdf (21.02.2001); EU COM Partners in
Progress (1999) 21.
295 EU COM TOCA between the EU and RSA (1999) 21-27;
www.europa.eu.inUeur.lexlen/treaties/daUec_cons_treaty_en.pdf (21.02.2001); EU COM Partners in
Progress (1999) 22; OTI TOCA (1999) 7.
296 Lowe Main Parameters (2000) 41.
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3.1.5.1 General aims
Article 65 TOCA stipulates that development cooperation between the EU and South
Africa shall be conducted in a context of policy dialogue and partnership, and shall
support the policies and reforms carried out by the national authorities. In particular, it
shall contribute to South Africa' s economic development and to its insertion into the
world economy and to consolidate the foundations laid for a democratic society.
Within this context, priority shall be given to providing support to the adjustment
efforts occasioned in the region by the establishment of the free trade area under the
agreement and to operations that help the fight against poverty. In contrast to other
areas of the agreement, Article 68 TOCA gives some means and methods for
realizing the developmental concern. It stipulates that particular studies, technical
assistance, supplies and works and also evaluation and monitoring of audits and
missions shall support the development cooperation. Furthermore, Community
financing may cover government budget expenditures to support reforms in South
Africa, as well as investment and equipment.297
3.1.5.2 Differentiation and Asymmetry
The developmental concern further found its way into the trade part of the TOGA,
through the twin concepts of differentiation and asymmetry.29B As indicated,
differentiation reflects the difference in the coverage of free trade between the two
sides by the end of the transition period and asymmetry has to do with the timing of
the tariff reduction schedules.299 According to Articles 5-7 TOCA, South Africa will
grant duty-free status to 86 % of its imports from the EU, whereas the EU will accept
95% of South African exports duty-free and tariff cuts will take place much earlier on
the EU side than on the South African side.30o
297 EU COM TOCA between the EU and RSA (1999) 21-27;
www.europa.eu.intleur.lex/en/treaties/datlec_cons_treaty _en.pdf (21.02.2001).
298 Lowe Main Parameters (2000) 41.
299 For further explanation, see Chapter 2.1.2.
300 EU COM TOCA between the EU and RSA (1999) 5;
www.europa.eu.intleur.lex/en/treaties/datlec_cons_treaty_en.pdf (21.02.2001); Lowe Main Parameters
(2000) 41.
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3.1.5.3 The European Programme for Reconstruction and Development
Furthermore, the aim of development cooperation shall be realized through continued
financial assistance for development activities at a substantial level for the duration of
the Agreement. As the Agreement is open-ended in character, this paves the way for
long-term development cooperation between the two sides.301
The EU currently implements a large-scale development programme in South Africa
under the EPRD. As indicated above, the programme, with an average annual
budget of 127.5 million €, is the largest single development programme in South
Africa and one of the biggest implemented by the EU in any part of the world.302
Further development assistance is provided through the multi-annual loan
programme for South Africa (currently at about 150 million € a year), which is
managed by the EIB.303 The aim of the EPRD is to assist the Government of South
Africa in tackling the wide range of socia-economic problems resulting from the
apartheid era. EPRD projects are thus designed in close cooperation with the South
African Government and the implementation of each project shall be carried out
hand-in-hand with the relevant authorities.304
According to Article 66 TDCA and Article 2 of the Council Regulation 2259 / 96 the
axes of the EPRD approach 1995-1999 were the foliowing:305
3.1.5.3.1 Basic social services
The main objective was to improve the standard of living of the poor in historically
disadvantaged communities. Particular emphasis was placed on primary basic and
adult education and training, primary health care, HIV/AIDS and reproductive health,
water and sanitation and housing.
301 EU COM Partners in Progress (1999) 14.
302 See Chapter 2.6 and Appendix 2 and Appendix 3; EU Council Verordnung Nr. 2259/96 (1996) 1;
Lowe Main Parameters (2000) 41; EU COM Partners in Progress (1999) 14.
303 EU COM Partners in Progress (1999) 14; Lowe Main Parameters (2000) 42.
304 EU COM Partners in Progress (1999) 14; EU COM Europëlsches Programm fOr Wiederaufbau und
Entwicklung in SOdafrika (Ratsverordnung 2259/96) Jahresbericht 1998 (2000) 3.
305 EU COM TOeA between the EU and RSA (1999) 27-28;
www.europa.eu.intleur.lexlen/treaties/datlec_cons_treaty_en.pdf (21.02.2001); EU COM EPWE
Jahresbericht 1998 (2000) 3; For the following points, see Appendix 2 and Appendix 3.
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3.1.5.3.2 Private Sector Development
Support was mainly targeted at private enterprises and addressed the gender issue
by giving particular attention to the needs of women, who playa key role in many of
the informal business activities. Attention was also given to financial intermediaries
such as banks and Non-Governmental-Organisations (NGOs) by encouraging them
to offer their services to the disadvantaged population.
3.1.5.3.3 Good governance, democratisation and human rights
Assistance in this area focused on restructuring and reorienting the public services
and on capacity-building in national and provincial departments, local governments
and professional associations. Cooperation also aimed at attaining a qualitative
change in legal practice (restructuring of the judiciary system, training of judges), so
that confidence in the legal system could prevail.
3.1.5.3.4 Regional cooperation
The main objective was to incorporate South Africa within the regional programmes
of the Community being implemented through the SAOC. These support programmes
of the Community for the SAOC included infrastructure and services, food, agriculture
and finance, as well as trade and investment.
3.1.6 Cooperation in social, cultural and other areas
Although the emphasis of the Agreement lies in the fields of trade and economic and
financial cooperation between the EU and South Africa, Title VI TOCA further covers
cooperation in the fields of the environment, cultural contacts, information and the
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media, as well as social cooperation, human resource development, health, data
protection and the fight against drugs and money laundering.306
Concerning social cooperation, the EU and South Africa will - according to Article 86
(1) TDCA - engage in a dialogue which will include questions relating to the social
problems of post-apartheid society, poverty alleviation, unemployment, gender
equality, violations against women, children's rights, labour relations, public health,
safety at work and populatlon.?"
According to Article 86 (2) TDCA, the parties recognise their responsibility with
regard to children's rights, labour relations, public health, safety at work and ability to
guarantee basic social rights, which specifically aim at the freedom of association of
workers, the right to collective bargaining, the abolition of forced labour, the
elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation and the
effective abolition of child labour. The EU and South Africa confirm that pertinent
standards of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) will be the point of reference
for the development of these rights.308
Cooperation in the area of Science and Technology is covered by the Science and
Technology Agreement signed between the EU and South Africa in December
1996.309
3.1.7 Institutional provisions
The institutional provisions of the TDCA (Article 97) provide for the establishment of
the Cooperation Council to ensure that the Agreement operates effectively and that
the objectives of the Agreement are pursued in the best possible way.310 The
Agreement will also facilitate regular contact between the Parliaments of both sides,
306 EU COM TOCA between the EUand RSA (1999) 31-34;
www.europa.eu.intleur.lex/en/treaties/datlec_cons_treaty_en.pdf (21.02.2001); www.eusa.org.za\EU-
SA Trade&Economic. Coop\Free Trade Agreement.htm, 6 (14.08.2000).
307 www.europa.eu.intleur-lex/de/lif/datl1999/de299A120402.htm (29.05.2000), 32; EU COM
Partners in Progress (1999) 23.
308 EU COM Partners in Progress (1999) 23; the ILO sets the international standards under which
people should work. It deals with issues such as labour relations, public-health, safety at work and
ability to guarantee basic social rights, which specifically aim at the freedom of association of workers,
the right to collective bargaining, the abolition of forced labour, the elimination of discrimination in
respect of employment and occupation and the effective abolition of child labour.
309 See Chapter 2.7.
310 For the task of the Cooperation Council, see Chapter 3.1.3.7.
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as well as between the Economic and Social Committee of the European Community
(ECOSOC) and the South African counterpart, the National Economic Development
and Labour Council (NEDLAC). These contacts will provide a forum for various areas
of dialogue and cooperation covered by the Agreement.311
3.1.8 Protocol on the Rules of Origin
The EU-SA TDCA, like any preferential trade arrangement, contains detailed rules of
origin, in Protocol 1. These rules prevent the deflection of trade and thereby protect
the integrity of the Agreement.312 It prescribes what would count as local content and
therefore has the same function as a "passport" for a person.313 The application of
the rules of origin will ensure that trade preferences included in the deal are only
applied to European and South African products and it will therefore determine to
what extent economic operators will be able to make use of the tariff preferences in
the Apreement.I"
3.1.8.1 South African or EU origin
In order to determine which products can be considered as originating either in the
EU, or South Africa, Protocol 1, Articles 4 and 5 TDCA firstly provide that products.
are defined as of South African or EU origin when they are "wholly obtained" in either
the EU or South Africa. Examples in Protocol 1, Article 4 (1) a) TDCA include
311 www.eusa.org.za\EU-SATrade&EconomicCoop\FreeTrade.Agreement.htm. 6 -7 (14.08.2000);
EU COM TOCA between the EU and RSA (1999) 35; ,
www.europa.eu.inUeur.lexlen/treaties/daUec cons treaty en.pdf (21.02.2001);
www.europa.eu.inUeur-lexlde/lif/daU1999/de-299A120402.htm (29.05.2000); Smalberger Lessons
learnt by South Africa during the negotiations in: Bertelsmann-Scott, Mills, Sidiropoulos (ed) The EU-
SA Agreement: South Africa, Southern Africa and the European Union (2000) 50.
312 DTI TOCA (1999) 7; Trade & Industry and Foreign Affairs Portfolio Committees, Economic Affairs
Select Committee SA-EU Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (1999) 8;
www.southafricahouse.com/tradeeu-sa.htm (09.03.2001).
313 EU COM Partners in Progress (1999) 11; Trade & Industry and Foreign Affairs Portfolio
Committees, Economic Affairs Select Committee SA-EU Trade, Development and Cooperation
Agreement (1999) 8; www.southafricahouse.com/tradeeu-sa.htm (09.03.2001).
314 EU COM Partners in Progress (1999) 11; Smalberger Lessons learnt by SA (2000) 50; Trade &
Industry and Foreign Affairs Portfolio Committees, Economic Affairs Select Committee SA-EU Trade,
Development and Cooperation Agreement (1999) 8; www.southafricahouse.com/tradeeu-sa.htm
(09.03.2001 ).
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agricultural products or products from the sea that originate in either of the two
regions or waters.315.
Secondly, products are considered as originating in the EU or South Africa when they
are not "wholly obtained", but have been "sufficiently worked or processed": To be
"sufficiently worked or processed" according to Protocol 1, Article 5 TOCA, the
materials used must undergo a "change of tariff heading (CTH)" or "sufficient value"
must be added to the product in the EU or South Africa.316 A CTH criterion is
equivalent in effect to the value-added criterion, as. CTH will require
adding value through processing of a product. The difference is that under a CTH the
value added may be high or low for a given product. Conversely, a value-added
criterion mayor may not leadto the same result as a CTH test.317 A general problem
with the rules of origin is therefore that there can be wide variance in their economic
effects. In order to avoid this, the agreement, in Protocol 1, Article 6 TOCA, provides
certain criteria for determining whether a product has been "sufficiently worked or
processed". These criteria refer to the use of specific materials, specific processing
and the percentage of value. With regard to the latter aspect, up to 15% of the value
of the final product may be imported from other countries.I"
3~1.8.2 Cumulation of origin
In order to make the application of the rules of origin easier and more flexible, the
TOCA also provides for cumulation of origin, enabling the EU and South Africa to use
material originating in other countries without violating the rules of origin.319
In terms of bilateral trade, the TOCA, according to Protocol 1 Article 3 (1) TOCA,
allows for "partial or diagonal cumulation". This means that imported material has to
meet the rules of origin applicable to that specific intermediate product, but will be
315 EU COM TOCA between the EU and RSA (1999) 51;
www.europa.eu.intleur.lexlen/treaties/datlec_cons_treaty_en.pdf (21.02.2001);
316 EU COM TOCA between the EU and RSA (1999) 52;
www.europa.eu.intleur.lexlen/treaties/datlec_cons_treaty _en. pdf (21.02.2001 );
317 Hoekman/Kostecki From GATT to WTO (1995) 102.
318 EU COM TOCA between the EU and RSA (1999) 52-53;
www.europa.eu.intleur.lexlen/treaties/datlec_cons_treaty_en.pdf (21.02.2001).
319 Trade & Industry and Foreign Affairs Portfolio Committees, Economic Affairs Select Committee SA-
EU Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (1999) 8; www.southafricahouse.com/tradeeu-
sa.htm (09.03.2001); OTI TOCA (1999) 7.
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considered as material originating in the importing country when incorporated into a
product obtained there.
With regard to SACU, Protocol 1 Article 3 (4) TOCA applies "full cumulation" to the
BLNS countries. This means that materials originating in BLNS that are incorporated
into South African exports are regarded as originating in South Africa, irrespective of
the amount of the value added in whatever part of the SACU territory. Processing
carried out in the BLNS countries is not regarded as conferring origin. As a result, for
example, South African shoe manufacturers can use materials from the BLNS
countries and still give their products a "Made in South Africa" label.
As far as cumulation within the context of the Lomé Convention is concerned,
Protocol 1, Article 3 (5) TOCA stipulates that goods using material from other ACP
countries are also defined as originating in South Africa - and are therefore eligible
for preferential access to the EU market - provided that the value added in South
Africa exceeds the value of ACP materials. If this is not achieved, the ACP State
accounting for the highest value of originating materials used will be considered as
product origin. This means that ACP countries, including BLNS, will be able to
cumulate with materials which have acquired originating status in South Africa. 320
There has been some criticism that the TOCA does not make provision for
cumulation in the case of South 'African inputs being used in the production of the
BLNS produced goods destined for export to the EU. This means, for example, that a
men's suit manufacturer in a BLNS country can use mixed fibre cloth purchased from
a German manufacturer for the production of men's suits for duty-free export to the
EU, but can not use mixed fibre cloth manufactured in South Africa, without losing the
duty-free access granted under the trade provisions of the Lomé Convention.321
Indeed, only full cumulation in both directions would have acknowledged the true
nature of SACU as a single customs territory. However, the TOCA is open to revision
and the rules of origin as they stand only represent a temporary solution. In order to
promote regional economic integration, the formal enlargement of the rules of origin
320 Tekere "Implications of SA-EU TOCA on Southern Africa: a view from Zimbabwe" lGD Occasional
Paper No 24 (2000) 76; Trade & Industry and Foreign Affairs Portfolio Committees, Economic Affairs
Select Committee SA-EU Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (1999) 8;
www.southafricahouse.com/tradeeu-sa.htm (09.03.2001).
321 Goodison "Marginalisation or Integration?" lGD Occasional Paper No 22 (1999) 80.
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(full cumulation in both directions) to the BLNS therefore has to be seen as a logical
step in the future.322
As a positive aspect of the rules of origin, it is to be acknowledged that the rules
governing the documentary evidence of origin (Protocol 1, Articles 14-29 TOGA) are
designed in a user-friendly manner, despite their highly technical nature, so that the
ability of economic operators to make use of the new market access opportunities are
not unduly charged with complicated paper work. This makes the application of the
rules of origin easier and should lead to an increase in the trade between the parties.
3.1.8.3 List rules
The agreement further contains "List rules" in Appendix 2 of Protocol 1 TOCA. These
are specific rules for specific products. They describe the working or processing to be
carried out on non-originating materials in order that the final product can obtain
originating status.323South Africa's view was that some of these rules did not reflect
the level of productive capacity in South Africa. This matter is still under consideration
by the EU.324
3.1.8.4' Value tolerance rule
As in the case of cumulation of origin, Protocol 1 Article 5 TOCA allows a certain
percentage of the final product to be imported from other countries, notwithstanding
the conditions set out in the list rule_325This value tolerance rule allows for products
to be considered as originating in South Africa even if the origin rules have not been
respected for some of the materials used. According to Article 5 (2) a) of the Protocol,
322 Solignac Lecomte The impact on Lomé (2000) 63.
323 EU COM TDCA between the EU and RSA (1999) 64-65;
www.europa.eu.intleur .lex/en/treaties/datlec _cons _treaty _en .pdf (21.02.2001 );
www.europa.eu.intleur-lex/de/lif/datl1999/de_299A1204_02.htm, (29.05.2000); Trade & Industry and
Foreign Affairs Portfolio Committees, Economic Affairs Select Committee SA-EU Trade, Development
and Cooperation Agreement (1999) 8; www.southafricahouse.com/tradeeu-sa.htm (09.03.2001).
324 These products are: cream yoghurt, tea, peanut butter, fruit juices, beverages; DTI TDCA (1999) 8;
Trade & Industry and Foreign Affairs Portfolio Committees, Economic Affairs Select Committee SA-EU
Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (1999) 8; www.southafricahouse.com/tradeeu-
sa.htrn (09.03.2001).
325 EU COM TDCA between the EU and RSA (1999) 52;
www.europa.eu.intleur.lex/en/treaties/datlec_cons_treaty_en.pdf (21.02.2001); DTI TDCA (1999) 8.
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the Agreement makes provision for a general tolerance of 15% with the exception of
textiles, fishery products, tobacco products and alcohol, for which the maximum is
10%.326
3.1;8.5 Fishery products
An exception to the standard rules of origin will become applicable as soon as the EU
starts applying trade preferences to South African fishery products. According to
Protocol 1 Article 4 (2) TOGA, the exception relates to South African fishing vessels,
where fish caught by these boats will be considered to be of South African origin if at
least half of the leadership (the master and the officers) and of the crew on board are
South African, EU or AGP nationals.327
3.1.9 Sectoral agreements
In its Appendix the TOGA further contains sectoral agreements on Fishing and on
Wine and Spirits. According to Article 107 TOGA, both agreements are part of the
overall agreement.
3.1.9.1 The Fishing Agreement
The fishing agreement proved to be a major obstacle to concluding a deal. The
Spanish government was seeking access to South Africa's fishing waters without any
326EU COM Partners in Progress (1999) 12; EU COM TOCA between the EU and RSA (1999) 52;
www.europa.eu.int/eur.lexlen/treaties/dat/ec_cons_treaty _en.pdf (21.02.2001); OTI TOCA (1999) 8;
under the standard rules applied by the EU to other preferential partners, a value tolerance of up to
10 % of the value of the final product is allowed, with the exception of the textiles sector.
3270TI TOCA (1999) 8; Trade & Industry and Foreign Affairs Portfolio Committees, Economic Affairs
Select Committee SA-EU Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (1999) 9;
www.southafricahouse.com/tradeeu-sa.htm (09.03.2001); EU COM Partners in Progress (1999) 12;
EU COM TOCA between the EU and RSA (1999) 51-52; OTI TOCA (1999) 8; http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lexide/lif/dat/1999/de_299A1204_02.htm, looked up on the 29.05.2000; this is more favourable than
other agreements that have a 75 % nationality requirement for the crew and a 100 % nationality
requirement for masters and officers.
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restrictions.328 Furthermore, the EU made a linkage between the Fishing Agreement
and market access concessions, as well as the overall agreement. 329
South Africa, in contrast, was willing to grant access to its fishing resources only if it
would be to the benefit of both parties. Under these terms South Africa would grant
Spain access to fish in its waters, but would insist on Spain docking the fish at South
African harbours for processing before being exported to Spain. This would lead to
the transfer of technology and employment opportunities for South Africans. In
addition, South Africa would have greater control over how much Spain would fish.
Currently South Africa does not have the necessary patrolling vessels or legislation in
place to prevent over-fishing.33o
In a political effort to conclude the talks, an agreement regarding the future fisheries
cooperation was reached in December 1998. This agreement included a declaration
that both parties would endeavour to negotiate and conclude a cooperation
agreement in the fishing sector no later than the end of 2000. Until then the EU will
hold back on tariff concessions for South African fish exports. South Africa, in turn,
will abolish its tariffs on fisheries products only as quid pro quo for the elimination of
duties of the corresponding tariff positions by the Cornmunity.f" Finally, in Article 62
TDCA, both parties determined that it is in their reciprocal interest to use one
another's fishing resources and that they are both committed to reaching a long-term
fishing agreement as soon as possible.332 This has not been achieved yet and the
matter is therefore still under consideration .:
3.1.9.2 The Wine and Spirits Agreement
As indicated above, the separate cooperation agreement on wine and spirits proved
to be one of the major stumbling blocks in coming to an agreement towards the end
328 Bertelsmann-Scott "The EU, SA and the FTA" SA YII (2000) 117; Davies Forging a new relationship
with the EU (2000) 8; Trade & Industry and Foreign Affairs Portfolio Committees, Economic Affairs
Select Committee SA-EU Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (1999) 9;
www.southafricahouse.com/tradeeu-sa.htm (09.03.2001).
329 DTI TDCA (1999) 9.
330 Bertelsmann-Scott "The EU, SA and the FTA" SAYII (2000) 117.
331 Bertelsmann-Scott "The EU, SA and the FTA" SAYII (2000) 117; DTI TDCA (1999) 9.
332 EU COM TDCA between the EU and RSA (1999) 26;
www.europa.eu.intleur.lex/en/treaties/datlec_cons_treaty_en.pdf (21.02.2001); Trade & Industry and
Foreign Affairs Portfolio Committees, Economic Affairs Select Committee SA-EU Trade, Development
and Cooperation Agreement (1999) 9; www.southafricahouse.com/tradeeu-sa.htm (09.03.2001).
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of the negotiations. Intense diplomacy finally secured approval from the EU heads of
government at the end of March 1999.333 The compromise reached regarding Port
and Sherry contains the following main elements, according to appendix 10 TDCA:334
• South Africa reconfirms that the names "Port" and "Sherry" are not and will not
be used for its exports to the EU.
• South Africa will phase out the use of the "Port" and "Sherry" names on all
export markets within five years, except in the case of non-SACU SADC
countries, where an eight-year phase-out period would apply.
• For the purpose of the Wines and Spirits Agreement, the South African
domestic market is defined to cover SACU.335
• South African products may be marketed as Port and Sherry on the South
African domestic market during the twelve-year transition period covered by
this agreement. Beyond that period the denominations of these products on
the South African domestic market will have to be jointly agreed between
South Africa and the EU.
• From entry into force of the agreement, the EU will provide a duty-free quota
for wines covering the current level of trade of 32 million litres of South African
exports to the EU, with allowance for the future growth of this quota.336 .
• As an additional effort to the main objectives agreed on for the Development
programme for South Africa to be funded by the EU, the EU will provide
assistance of fifteen million € for the restructuring of the South Africa wines
and spirits sector and for the strengthening of marketing and distribution of
South Africa wines and spirits products.
333 See Chapter 2.11; Trade & Industry and Foreign Affairs Portfolio Committees, Economic Affairs
Select Committee SA-EU Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (1999) 10;
www.southafricahouse.com/tradeeu-sa.htm (09.03.2001).
334 EU COM TDCA between the EU and RSA (1999) 48;
www.europa.eu .inUeur.lex/en/treaties/daUec_cons_treaty _en.pdf (21.02.2001); Bertelsmann-Scott
"The EU, SA and the FTA" SAY/! (2000) 116-117; http://europa.eu.inUeur
lex/de/lif/daU1999/de_299A 1204_02.htm, (29.05.2000); Trade & Industry and Foreign Affairs Portfolio
Committees, Economic Affairs Select Committee SA-EU Trade, Development and Cooperation
Agreement (1999) 10; www.southafricahouse.com/tradeeu-sa.htm (09.03.2001).
335 According to Article 19 (1) of the SACU Agreement (see appendix 1) the BLNS countries could
have used their veto right against this. They did not do so.
336 See Chapter 2.11 : The wine and spirits agreement has not been concluded yet and the EU does
not provide yet assistance of fifteen million € for the South African wine and spirits industry. However,
the duty free access of wine is a fact. France made an attempt to go its own way and find a
compromise with South Africa on this issue. They did not succeed.
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3.2 Evaluation of the TOeA
Negotiations between the EU and South Africa for the TOeA were very complicated.
During several negotiating rounds, South Africa was close to announcing that it was
not prepared to continue negotiations for a free trade agreement on the EU basis.
Pressure was building up behind the South African negotiators to take a tough line
with the EU and parliamentarians and public opinion were highly critical of the EU
limitations on South Africa exports. However, the EU and its Member States had to
get themselves in order to meet the 1999 Maastricht condltlons.f" which meant
further tightening of economies. Therefore protectionist sentiment among the EU had
hardened.338 For these reasons, there are different opinions about the concluded
deal between the two parties, which makes an evaluation of it necessary.
In the opinion of Goodison,339 the free trade aqreement between the two parties is
anything but "free", because many sensitive sectors have been excluded from the
deal. He argues that exports of these sensitive products certainly would not disrupt
EU markets in the commodities concerned. In his eyes exports from South Africa are
not large enough in most of the sensitive products to have any market impact at all
and therefore the exclusion of products from the deal is a political maneouvre more
than an economic one. In Goodison's opinion the disappointing impact of the
proposed FTA suggests that any positive trade effects on neighbouring regional
economies arising as a result of increased growth in South Africa stimulated by the
EU-SA TOeA, are likely to be marginal. 340
Obeng and Mc Gowan argue that the TOeA suggests disproportionate gains for the
EU and is more a new kind of European colonialism. In their opinion the EU ignores
the realities of its skewed trade flows with South Africa, the fact that South Africa is
already excluded from preferential trade arrangements with other countries at
337 These are the criteria that every Member State had to fulfill in order to participate in the monetary
union for the new European common currency, the Euro. The criteria are listed in Article 104 ECT.
With the exception of four Member States, the Euro will be introduced in the other eleven Member
States on the 1st of January 2002.
338 Louw "EU trade" Southern Africa Report (1997-01-17) 10-11.
339 Goodison The EU's trade and development policy (1997) 54.
340 Goodison "Marginalisation or Integration?" lGD Occasional Paper No 22 (1999) 36-37.
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comparable levels of development, and that the South African economy is currently
undergoing fundamental restructuring. They think that the outcome of the four-year
ordeal is disappointing and the final deal is distant from South Africa's initial
negotiating position.341 In their opinion, the phasing out of the terms "Sherry" and
"Port" demonstrates the selfish nature of EU's free trade relations with South Africa.
Moreover, the South African Minister of Trade and Industry said in an interview in
April 1999 that South Africa "is not prepared to concede on the exclusive geographic
denominations of the terms Port and Sherry.,,342Obeng and Mc Gowan argue that
this conduct is inconsistent with the EU's own commitment to assist South Africa
during its difficult socio-economic transition, and that it is questionable whether the
principles of reciprocity and asymmetry are being "equitably" applied to South
Africa.343 The EU's phasing out of the terms "Port" and "Sherry", its exclusion of .
South African products that are competitive in European markets, as well as its
demand for fishing quotas from South Africa, are likely to have detrimental effects on
the fragile South African economy. Moreover, they criticize the fact that the
adjustment cost for South African industry will be higher than for Europe, which could
have a negative impact on the whole Southern African region. 344
Van Heerden criticizes the fact that the issue of non-tariff barriers is not directly
addressed in the Agreement.345' From his point of view, the Agreement makes
provision to challenge companies that enjoy a dominant market position, ostensibly to
promote competition and investment. In his opinion, the nature of the South African
economy would suggest that EU companies operating in South Africa would be in a
relatively strong position to challenge mergers and take-overs in South Africa, whilst
it is feared that South African companies will be less successful in this area when
their interests are threatened in the EU. Furthermore, he mentions that there is
serious concern about the capacity of South African customs and related authorities
341 Obeng & Mc Gowan "The EU-SA FTAn SAJII (1999) 104.
342 Erwin "Interview with Alec Erwin" Global dialogue (08/1999) 20.
343 Obeng & Mc Gowan "The EU-SA FTA" SAJII (1999) 105.
344 Obeng & Mc Gowan "The EU-SA FTAn SAJII (1999) 110.
345 Jackson The World Trading System (1998) 154-155: Non-tariff barriers can be described as valid
domestic policies that have been implemented in a way that implicitly restrict international trade.
·Implicit discrimination against imports is often found in the context of so-called product standards, i.e.:
a nation that uses metric measures for tools and small fasteners might require all such products to be
marked in metric measures. A valid domestic consumer protection policy might support such
requirement, but it might also be introduced because troublesome import competition stems from
products that are measured in other units, such as inches or feet.
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to police the Agreement, which could be used by third parties to gain preferential
access to South African markets.346
It has to be admitted that the EU apparently dominated the negotiations to establish
the FTA. The EU's mandate predetermined the negotiations on both Lomé and the
FTA to a large extent. I, however, do not 'agree with the criticism cited above and
think that South Africa managed to achieve some major negotiating victories, driving
the EU well beyond the boundaries of its mandate, which culminated in the TOCA
being anything but unfair or unfree.
As far as the political importance is concerned, the agreement is a good indicator of
how relations between the EU and poorer countries from the southern hemisphere
are likely to develop and it clearly illustrates the situation in which the EU and South
Africa find themselves on the international stage at the moment. With regard to South
Africa, the agreement elevates the existing relationship to a higher level and provides
South Africa with a formalised relationship with the world's biggest trading bloc. This
places South Africa in a special and privileged relationship with the EU when
compared to many other countries and confirms South Africa's position as a credible
player on the global stage. With regard to further trade relations between the EU and
ACP countries in the future, the political significance of the TOCA and of South
Africa's accession to the ACP group of States should also not be underestimated.
Just as the EU is playing an increasingly prominent role in the international
community via its Common Foreign and Security Policy, so South Africa has become
a significant influence on some aspects of the agenda facing the international
community, such as promoting development in developing countries.
In terms of commercial opportunities it is to be acknowledged that the TOCA provides
significant market access for South Africa into the huge European market, with an
open-ended time frame and a provision for review after five years. On the industrial
side the tariff liberalisation provides close to 100% duty-free access for South African
products after the ten-year transition period. On the agricultural front, the TOCA is the
first agreement to include the EU's agricultural sector. For this reason, South Africa
succeeded in obtaining greater liberalisation than many thought possible, given the
346 Van Heerden Implications for South Africa (2000) 96.
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sensitivity of the EU in this area. This is also significant in that transfers of technology
can take place with countries that are on the cutting edge of new technologies. In this
respect, one should also remain aware of the reciprocal nature of the agreement.
Furthermore, it should be remembered that the agreement contains safeguard and
regional safeguard clauses, which can be deployed, should a displacement take
place due to an influx of products from the EU. Concerning the Common Agricultural
Policy, which remained untouched in the agreement, the TDCA itself provides for
considerable safeguards against any negative CAP effects on the agreed
concessions. Built-in review clauses will also ensure that the effects of tariff
liberalisation work to the benefit of both parties.
In terms of the developmental character of the agreement, the TDCA confirms that
the EU will continue to assist South Africa in important areas of developmental
assistance. The Science and Technology Agreement allows South Africa to build,
develop and further improve its scientific and technological capacities. This
underlines that the agreement between the EU and South Africa is about much more
than trade. The developmental character of the agreement becomes clear in the
clause of political dialogue between the two parties and the good-governance clause.
Furthermore, social and cultural cooperation is another aspect of the agreement that
promotes a better understanding of the different societies.
With regard to the whole Southern African region, the EU had to take account of the
fact that the agreement, although bilateral in nature, would have a significant impact
on the region. On the one hand the interests of other SACU countries have been well
catered for in the agreement, through several complementary provisions: a special
mention in the safeguard clause, the exclusion on the South African side of sensitive
products like beef and sugar and the possibility of special assistance to the BLNS
.states under the cooperation programme with South Africa.
On the other hand it is rather doubtful whether these measures are sufficient to
promote regional economic cooperation in the SACU. One shortcoming, for example,
is the composition of the Cooperation Council. At present the BLNS governments are
not represented in it. However, since the EU-SA FTA will have an impact on the
whole Southern African region, a strong case exists for opening up the Cooperation
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Council to BLNS participation. This would appear to be wholly consistent with the
general positions of principle expressed by both South Africa and the EU.347
Furthermore, the issue of extending regional cumulation, so as to allow BLNS and
other Southern African regional producers to make more effective use of South
African inputs in the goods they produce for export to the EU under the trade
provisions of the Lomé Convention, was completely dropped from the EU-SA
TDCA.348 This, however is a very important issue for BLNS countries, because it
could provide a vehicle for the BLNS exports to the EU market.349 Therefore there is
a need to address this issue constructively in the future talks between the parties.
The TDCA, to a large extent, marks the end of an era of tariff protection in bilateral
trade and it provides for many new opportunities, despite some critical aspects.
However, one has to bear in mind that the agreement only provides a legal
framework for the bilateral trade relations between the EU and South Africa and that
the outcomes of the TDCA are not predetermined. In how far the objectives of the
TDCA can be realized, depends on the performance of South Africa's economy
itself.35o The EU-SA TDCA coul"d mark the beginning of a "win-win" relationship only if
the South African economy manages to become globally competitive.
347 Goodison "Marginalisation or Integration?" lGD Occasional Paper No 22 (1999) 65.
348 Lowe Main Parameters (2000) 44.
349 Goodison "Marginalisation or Integration?" lGD Occasional Paper No 22 (1999) 80.
350 Wakeford The EU-SA Agreement: Opportunities and challenges for Business in: Bertelsmann-
Scott, Mills, Sidiropoulos (ed)The EU-SA Agreement-South Africa, Southern Africa and the European
Union (2000) 99-104: giving several examples of which topics need to be addressed.
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4. The status of international agreements and of the GATT I WTO provisions
and the consequences for the TOeA
Since 1947 international trade relations have been governed largely by the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).351 This international agreement has now
been subsumed in the form of GATT 1994 into the new World Trade Organization
(WTO), which came into being on 1 January 1995.352
Since the TOCA between the EU and South Africa had to satisfy international rules,
the provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) trade regime
were of major importance. The EU, in particular, repeatedly emphasised its
determination that every accord had to be in line with the rules of the World Trade
Organisation (WTO) if both parties wanted to ensure that the outcome of negotiations
would not be challenged by third parties, with the risk of being forced into
renegotiation or the granting of compensations to outsiders.353 However, apart from
article 300 (7) ECT, which provides that international agreements are binding on the
institutions and on the Member States, the EC Treaty does not contain any provision
that indicates whether, or how, an international agreement like the GATT/WTO
penetrates the Community's legal order. 354
Therefore, the status of international agreements, in general, and of the GATT/WTO,
in particular, in the legal order of the European Community and of South Africa, has
to be analysed to evaluate how far the TOCA between the EU and South Africa has
been influenced by these rules. Since South Africa and the EU agreed to establish a
Free Trade Area between them,355 there will, furthermore, be an attempt to
351 Jackson The World Trade Organization - Constitution and Jurisprudence (1998) 17.
352 Jackson WTO - Constitution and Jurisprudence (1998) 1.
353 EU COM Speech of Philip Lowe at the Conference of the South African Institute of International
Affairs 2-3 September 1999: Assessing the EU - SA Agreement - Main parameters of the EU-SA
partnership (1999) at www.europa.eu.in/comm/dg08/speeches.htm (15.03.2001); Graumans "The
European Union - South Africa' negotiations" Netherlands Institute for Southern Africa Occasional
Paper No 1 (1998) 10; www.niza.nl/uk/publications/016/niza-papernol-1998.htm (09.03.2001).
354 Bourgeois The European Court of Justice and the World Trade Organisation: Problems and
Challenges in: WeilIer (ed) The EU, the WTO and the NAFTA - towards a common law of international
trade (2000) 77.
355 See Chapter 3.1.2.1.
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determine the extent to which the TDCA is in line with the GATTI WTO provisions
dealing with preferential trade agreements.
4.1 The status of international agreements and the GATT I WTO provisions
4.1.1 International agreements in EU law
4.1.1.1 The Haegeman case
The Haegeman judgement may serve to illustrate that the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) regards the relationship between international law and Community law as
monist. 356 The Haegeman Case357 concerned a reference for a preliminary ruling by
a Brussels court. In the proceedings before this tribunal the Belgian company R. & V.
Haegeman, which imported Greek wine, sought repayment of countervailing duties
imposed on it by the Belgian customs authorities on the basis of Council Regulation
816/70 "laying down additional provisions for the common organisation of the market
in wine". Before the adoption of this regulation, imports of Greek wine into Benelux
territory had not been subject to any customs duties or quantitative restrictions.
Haegeman contended that the imposition of those charges was unlawful and
356 Case 181/73 R. & V.Haegemann v. Belgium Stale (1974) E.C.R. 449;
www.curia.eu.intlcommon/recdoc/indexazlen/c1 htm (document no. 61973J0181; 21.02.2001);
Bourgeois The ECJ and the WTO (2000) 90 and 93; Hilpold Die EU im GATT/WTO SYSTEM (1999)
183: In a monist state, the legal system is considered to include treaties to which the state has an
obligation. Thus the monist theory proceeds from the assumption that a national legal system includes
international agreements which bind the State, without the need for transformation of such treaties into
domestic law. Such treaties are "directly applied", or "self executing". In a dualist State, treaties are
part of a legal system separate from that of the domestic law. Here an "act of transformation" is
needed for the treaty rule to operate in the domestic legal system, that is, there must be an action by
that State which transforms the treaty norm into domestic law.
Although the ECJ regards the relationship between international law and Community law as monist,
the relationship between international law and the law of an individual Member State of the EU may
not automatically be regarded as monist. Among the Member States there are three different
approaches. In a first category (e.g. Belgium, France, Netherlands) an international agreement
entered into by the State that has been duly approved by the state and has entered into force in the
international plane automatically becomes part of the law of the state, without any separate act of
transformation being required. In a second category (e.g. Germany and Italy) an international
agreement of itself has no effect in the internal legal system and requires a legislative act in order to
produce an effect. Once such an act is passed, the international agreement is applicable as such. In a
third category (e.g. Denmark and the UK) the effect of an international agreement is dependent upon a
process of transformation: an international agreement, as such, has no effect, and the effect is
produced only by national rules which purport to incorporate the international agreement.
357 Case 181/73 E.C.R. (1974) 449,472-473; www.curia.eu.intlcommon/recdoc/indexazlen/c1htm
(document no. 61973J0181; 21.02.2001)
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infringed the (then) Association Agreement between the EC and Greece, which
accorded equal treatment.358
The Belgian judge argued that the ECJ did not have direct jurisdiction under Article
234 ECT to rule on the interpretation of an international agreement such as the
Association Agreement with Greece. In his view, the ECJ's jurisdiction could only
arise where interpretation was relevant to the question of the validity of an act of a
Community institution, or to the question of the interpretation to be given to such an
act.
The Court, however, did not agree. It stated that the 1961 Association Agreement
was an act of one of the institutions of the Community, since it was concluded by the
Council under Articles 300 and 310 ECT. In the ECJ's opinion the provisions of the
agreement formed "an integral part of Community" law and the Court, accordingly,
had jurisdiction to deliver preliminary rulings concerning the interpretation of that
agreement.359 The judgement thus entailed that, just as Community law is integrated
into the legal systems of the Member States, international agreements concluded by
the Community enter the Community legal order as such - without an act of
transformation. Thus the relationship between international law and Community law
is monist. 360
4.1.1.2 The Kupferberg case
The ECJ reconfirmed and clarified its opinion in the Kupferberg case.361 In this case
the Hauptzollamt Mainz levied a monopoly equalisation duty against Kupferberg
when he cleared a consignment of port wines from Portugal through customs.
Following the German law on the monopoly in spirits, such a monopoly equalisation
duty is levied on imported spirits and spirit products. Port wines are regarded as
358 Case 181/73 E.C.R. (1974) 449,472-473; www.curia.eu.intlcommon/recdoc/indexazlen/c1htm
(document no. 61973J0181; 21.02.2001).
359 Case 181/73 E.C.R. (1974) 449, 459-460 (paragraphs 2-6);
www.curia.eu.intlcommon/recdoc/indexazlen/c1htm (document no. 61973J0181; 21.02.2001); Hilpold
Die EU im GATT/WTO System (1999) 171: this qualification by the ECJ was not made for GATT /WTO
provisions.
360 Kuilwijk The European Court of Justice and the GATT Dilemma: Public Interest versus Individual
Rights (1996) 84; for further discussion on whether the ECJ is following a dualist or a monist
approach, see Bourgeois The ECJ and the WTO (2000) 93-94.
361 Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v. C.A. Kupferberg & Co (1982) E.C.R. 3641;
www.curia.eu.intlcommon/recdoc/indexazlen/c1htm (document no. 61981J0104; 21.02.2001).
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liquor wines and, due to an alcohol content of more than 14% by volume, are
considered to be spirit products. Kupferberg contested the imposition of the duty and
asked the ECJ to declare the German monopoly equalisation duty unlawful, alleging
that it violated Article 86 ECT and Article 21 (1) of the FTA between the EC and
Portugal.
The ECJ ruled that Article 21 (1) of the Agreement was directly applicable. It held that
agreements concluded under Article 300 ECT are binding upon both the Community
and the Member States. The ECJ deemed it incumbent upon the Community
institutions, as well as upon the Member States, to ensure compliance with the
obligations arising from such agreements. Member State obligations emanating from
agreements concluded by the Community institutions create rights and obligations to
the Community itself "which has assumed responsibility for the due performance of
the agreement.,,362 In other words, the EC must rely on the Member States to assure
the fulfillment of its obligations towards the third State. Accordingly, the ECJ once
again described the provisions of such an agreement as an "integral part of the
Community legal system.,,363
4.1.1.3 The Demirel case
The ECJ had a further opportunity to consider the relation between community and
state law in the Demire! Case.364 In this case the request for a preliminary ruling by
the ECJ was made by a German court in which Mrs Demirel, a Turkish national,
challenged her expulsion from Germany. The expulsion was ordered on the grounds
that her visa, which was only valid for a visit, had expired. Mrs Demirel wanted to
remain in Germany with her husband who resided in Germany. She relied on the
Association Agreement between the EC and Turkey.365
In the opinion of the German court the matter involved an interpretation of this
Association Agreement and the court therefore made a request for a preliminary
362 Case 104/81 E.C.R. (1982) 3641,3662 (paragraph 13);
www.curia.eu.intlcommon/recdoc/indexazlen/c1htm (document no. 61981J01 04; 21.02.2001).
363 Ibid.
364 Case 12/86 Meryem Demirel v. Stadt Schwëbisch GmDnd (1987) E.C.R. 3719;
www.curia.eu.intlcommon/recdoc/indexazlen/c1htm (document no. 61986J0012; 21.02.2001).
365 Case 12/86 E.C.R. (1987) 3719,3750 (paragraph 6);
www.curia.eu.intlcommon/recdoc/indexazlen/c1 htm (document no. 61986J0012; 21.02.2001).
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ruling by the ECJ. Before the ECJ, the German Government and the United Kingdom
challenged the jurisdiction of the ECJ to interpret the Association Agreement. In the
case of a mixed agreement,366 they argued, the ECJ's jurisdiction does not cover an
area which falls under the exclusive competence of the Member States, such as the
free movement of workers from third states. With reference to the Haegeman
judgement, the ECJ, however, simply declined to decide the issue, stating that those
provisions came within the Community's extensive and special competence to
conclude and interpret Association Agreements. 367Concerning the question of the
exclusive competence of the Member States in those issues, the ECJ pointed out
that "Article 310 ECT must necessarily empower the Community to guarantee
commitments towards non-member countries in all the fields covered by the Treaty.
Since freedom of movement of workers is, by virtue of Article 39 ECT, one of the
fields covered by that Treaty, it follows that commitments regarding freedom of
movement fall within the powers conferred on the Community by Article 310 ECT.,,368
4.1.1.4 The Sevince case
In the Sevince case the question arose whether the ECJ also had jurisdiction over
decisions adopted by the Association Council under the same mixed agreement with
Turkey.369 The background of this case was as follows. In 1979 Mr Sevince, a
Turkish national, was granted a residence permit in The Netherlands, on the ground
that he had married a Turkish national resident. When he applied for an extension of
his residence permit, the Staatssecretaris van Justitie rejected the application
because he and his wife had separated. Therefore the circumstances on the basis of
which the residence permit had been issued no longer existed. Mr Sevinces
application for review and his appeal were dismissed in 1986. Meanwhile he had
obtained an employment certificate and again applied for a residence permit, arguing
that he had now been employed in The Netherlands for a number of years. He
366 Bourgeois The ECJ and the WTO (2000) 83: a mixed agreement is an agreement that comes
within the competence of the Community, as well as within the competence of the EC Member States.
367 Case 12/86 E.C.R. (1987) 3719,3750 (paragraph 7);
www.curia.eu.inUcommon/recdoc/indexazien/c1htm (document no. 61986J0012; 21.02.2001).
368 Case 12/86 E.C.R. (1987) 3719,3751 (paragraph 9);
www.curia.eu.inUcommon/recdoc/indexazien/c1htm (document no. 61986J0012; 21.02.2001).
369 Case 192/89 S.z. Sevince v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie (1990) E.C.R. 1-3461;
www.curia.eu.inUcommon/recdoc/indexazien/c1htm (document no. 61989J0192; 21.02.2001).
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thereby relied on provisions of Decisions 2/76 and 1/80 of the EC-Turkey Association
Council. Those decisions give a Turkish Worker free access to any employment of
his choice, after a certain period of legal employment in a Member State of the EC.370
The Dutch court decided to refer the case to the ECJ, considering the fact that the
dispute involved interpretation of the provisions of Decisions 2/76 and 1/80 of the EC-
Turkey Association Council.
In its judgement the ECJ referred to previous rulings, including Haegeman and
Demirel, and held that, because of their close link to the agreement to which they
gave effect, such decisions form an integral part of the Community legal system. In
the view of the ECJ, it also had jurisdiction to make interpretations of those
declslons.?" Furthermore the ECJ also referred to the above-quoted passage in
Kupferberg concerning the requirement of uniform application.372
4.1.1.5 Conclusion
Though the EC Treaty provisions do not offer much guidance on the status of
international agreements in the EC legal system and though the institutional
provisions are silent on the question of how an international agreement binding on
the EC becomes part of the EC law,373the attitude of the ECJ in resolving those
issues gave an answer.
In the Haegeman judgement, the ECJ decided that the provisions of the Association
Agreement form an integral part of the Community legal system.374 Therefore
international agreements concluded by the Community are integrated into the
Community legal system and no particular act of transformation is required.
In the Kupferberg case, the ECJ reaffirmed its monist view of the relation between
international agreements and Community law. Furthermore it made clear that the
370 Case 192/89 E.C.R. (1990) 1-3461,1-3500 (paragraph 7);
www.curia.eu.inUcommon/recdoc/indexazlen/c1htm (document no. 61989J0192; 21.02.2001).
371 Case 192/89 E.C.R. (1990) 1-3461, 1-3500 (paragraphs 9 and 10);
www.curia.eu.inUcommon/recdoc/indexazlen/c1htm (document no. 61989J0192; 21.02.2001).
372 See Chapter 4.1.1.2.
373 Bourgeois The ECJ and the WTO (2000) 77.
374 Case 181/73 E.C.R. (1974) 449, 459-460 (paragraphs 2-6);
www.curia.eu.inUcommon/recdoc/indexazlen/c1htm (document no. 61973J0181; 21.02.2001).
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Member States that fulfill their obligations are responsible for the fulfillment not only
in relation to the other party, but above all in relation to the Community.375
The Demirel judgement dealt with an area which falls within the exclusive
competence of the Member States. In the opinion of the ECJ, Article 310 ECT,
however, was a legally sufficient basis for the Community to conclude association
agreements with other parties and to guarantee commitments towards them.376
In the Sevince case, the ECJ referred to previous rulings, including Haegemann and
Demirel, and held that decisions of the EC-Turkey Association Council also form an
integral part of the Community legal system. Therefore the ECJ held that it also had
jurisdiction to interpret those decisions.377
From these cases it appears that the ECJ is mainly concerned with the uniform
application of the law deriving from international agreements concluded by the
Community. The common policy of the Community, as reflected in its international
agreements, requires that these agreements have the same penetrating force in all
Member States. An international agreement concluded by the European Community
constitutes an obligation for the Community as well as for the Member States. For the
Community this is an obligation under international law and for the Member States it
is an obligation under Community law. 378Therefore, the scope of this Community
obligation evidently is a question of Community law, which is to be answered by the
ECJ in accordance with Community law, and not by national Courts according to their
own domestic law.379
4.1.2 The GATT I WTO provisions in EU law
Concerning the status of GATTIWTO provisions in EU law, distinction has to be
made between the GATT 1947 Agreement and the GATT 1994 Agreement.
375 Case 104/81 E.C.R. (1982) 3641,3662 (paragraph 13);
www.curia.eu.inUcommonlrecdoc/indexazlen/c1htm (document no. 61981J0104; 21.02.2001).
376 Case 12/86 E.C.R. (1987) 3719, 3750 (paragraph 7);
www.curia.eu.inUcommon/recdoc/indexazlen/c1 htm (document no. 61986J0012; 21.02.2001).
377 Case 192/89 E.C.R. (1990) 1-3461,1-3500 (paragraphs 9 and 10);
www.curia.eu.intlcommon/recdoc/indexazlen/c1htm (document no. 61989J0192; 21.02.2001).
378 Kuilwijk The ECJ and the GATT Dilemma (1996) 90.
379 Kuilwijk The ECJ and the GATT Dilemma (1996) 90; Eeckhout "The domestic legal status of the
WTO" The Common Market Law Review (1997) 22. Eeckhout comes to the same conclusion, but in
respect of the status of the WTO agreement.
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GATT 1947 was concluded before the establishment of the European Community
(EC) in 1957 and all its Member States were contracting parties to it.38o The EC,
however, has never become a contracting party to the GATT 1947 and it therefore is
not binding on the European Community by virtue of Article 300 ECT.381 But, since
the Member States were contracting parties to the GATT 1947, it had to be respected
by the Community under Article 307 ECT.382 The GATT 1947 Agreement, however,
was replaced by the GATT 1994 Agreement in April 1994, establishing the World
Trade Organization, 383 which came into effect on 1 January 1995.384
In connection with the agreement between the EU and South Africa, the status of
GATT 1947 in the Community legal system thus did not have any influence on the
conclusion of the TDCA in October 1999. However, the status of both agreements,
GATT 1994 and 1947, needs to be examined, in order to give a complete overview of
the GATT status in the Community legal system, in the following.
4.1.2.1 The International Fruit Company case
Since the Member States were contracting parties to GATT 1947, but not the EC
itself, questions arose about whether the European Community could also be bound
by an international agreement entered into by the Member States and whether the
provisions of GATT 1947 were applicable in the EC legal system.
380 Concerning the "Membership": Jackson WTO - Constitution and Jurisprudence (1998) 59: He
states that GATT, in theory, was not an organisation and therefore did not have "members". The
terminology used to emphasize this theory in the agreement was "contracting party". Following
Jackson we can fairly speak of "membership" in light of the evolution of GATT into a de facto
organisation.
381 Bourgeois The ECJ and the WTO (2000) 71.
382 Kuijlwik The ECJ and the GA TT Dilemma (1996) 91.
383 Petersmann The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System - International law, International
Organizations and Dispute Settlement (1997) 3; Jackson/Davey/Sykes Jr. Legal problems of
international economic relations - cases, materials and text on the national and international regulation
of transnational economic relations (1995) 289; Jackson The World Trading System (1998) 48;
Although the WTO is not, formally and legally speaking, a successor agreement to the GATT 1947 in
the sense of the international law of treaties, the WTO multilateral system as such can be considered
the successor to the former GATT system. Wider coverage and genuine thrust for universal
participation, however, make the WTO system clearly distinct from the old GATT system.
384 Jackson The WTO _ Constitution and Jurisprudence (1998) 133 and 170: Both the Republic of
South Africa and the European Communities are members of the WTO; WTO World Trade
Organization - Trading into the Future (1998) 4; Cottier GATT-Uruguay Round (1995) V;
www.dti.gov.za/review .asp ?iSDivID=86&iEvent_1 D=105.
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In the Third International Fruit Company case the ECJ was confronted with this
question for the first time.385 The facts of this case were as follows:
In 1970 an increase in the domestic apple production of several Member States led
the Commission to take protective measures in order to limit imports to a level that
the Community could reasonably absorb. The International Fruit Company of The
Netherlands, an importer of apples from a non-Member State, requested the
appropriate Dutch authority, the Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit, to issue them
with the necessary certificates. Upon rejection, the International Fruit Company
challenged the denial of import certificates and the underlying Council regulations. In
doing so, the importer relied on Article XI GATT, which prohibits the institution or
maintenance of quantitative restrictions, except under certain circumstances and
upon observance of certain formalities.386
In its judgement, the ECJ first stated that the European Community as such became
a party to GATT by way of succession and that, for this reason, the GATT provisions
became legally binding on the Community. According to the Court, it is clear that the
incompatibility of a Community measure with a provision of international law can only
affect the validity of such a measure if the Community is also bound by that provision.
Although the Community had not existed when GATT was created in 1948 and never
formally acceded to GATT, Article 307 ECT indicated the Member States' clear
intention that the Community be bound by the GATT obligations.387 Furthermore, in
the view of the ECJ, the other GATT contracting parties recognized the European
Community role in representing the Member States in GATT affairs. This was brought
about by the fact that, since the enactment of the EC Treaty and, in particular, since
the establishment of the common external tariff, the transfer of powers in the relations
between the Member States and the Community has been made concrete within the
GATT framework.388 The Court concluded its judgement by stating that it "therefore
appears that, in so far as under the EEC Treaty the Community has assumed the
powers previously exercised by Member States in the area governed by the General
385 Case 21/72 International Fruit Company and Others v. Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit (1972)
E.C.R. 1219; www.curia.eu.inUcommon/recdoc/indexazlen/c1 htm (document no. 61972J0021;
21.02.2001 ).
386 Case 21/72 E.C.R. (1972) 1219-1226; www.curia.eu.inUcommon/recdoc/indexazlen/c1htm
(document no. 61972J0021; 21.02.2001).
387 Case 21/72 E.C.R. (1972) 1219, 1226 (paragraph 7);
www.curia.eu.inUcommon/recdoc/indexazlen/c1htm (document no. 61972J0021; 21.02.2001).
388 Case 21/72 E.C.R. (1972) 1219,1227 (paragraph 14-16);
www.curia.eu.inUcommon/recdoc/indexazlen/c1htm (document no. 61972J0021; 21.02.2001).
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Agreement, the provisions of that agreement have the effect of binding the
Community.,,389
4.1.2.2 The Nederlandse Spoorwegen case
The ECJ reconfirmed its International Fruit ruling in the Nederlandse Spoorwegen
case.390 In this case, the ECJ was faced with a Community interpretative note to a
Regulation that had the effect of increasing the tariff on certain machines in the
Netherlands' customs law. This allegedly violated the tariff concessions agreed to by
the Community under Article II GATT. Pursuant to Article II GATT, customs duties
should not be levied at rates in excess of those bound under GATT. The ECJ was
thus faced with the question of whether a Dutch court was required to apply certain
GATT provisions, even though it might thereby come into conflict with Community
law.391
The ECJ stated that, as regards the fulfillment of commitments under GATT, the
Community has replaced the Member States and it is now generally recognized that
the Community has succeeded to the rights and obligations of the Member States.392
The ECJ accordingly regarded GATT 1947 as part of Community law, which is a
legally binding agreement for the Community itself.393 For this reason, the Dutch
Court could apply the GATT provisions without coming into conflict with Community
law.
389 Case 21/72 E.C.R. (1972) 1219, 1227 (paragraph 17-18);
www.curia.eu.inUcommonlrecdoc/indexaz/en/c1htm (document no. 61972J0021; 21.02.2001).
390 Case 38/75 Douaneagent der N.V. Nederlandse Spoorwegen v. Inspecteur der invoerrechten en
accijnzen (1975) E.C.R. 1439; www.curia.eu.inUcommon/recdoc/indexaz/en/c1htm (document no.
61975J0038; 21.02.2001).
391 Case 38/75 E.C.R. (1975) 1439; www.curia.eu.inUcommon/recdoc/indexaz/en/c1htm (document
no. 61975J0038; 21.02.2001).
392 Case 38/75 E.C.R. (1975) 1439,1450 (paragraph 16);
www.curia.eu.inUcommon/recdoc/indexaz/en/c1htm (document no. 61975J0038; 21.02.2001).
393 Compare Chapter 4.1.2. GATT 1947 was not binding on the EC by virtue of Article 300 ECT, but it
was regarded as a legally binding agreement for the EC after this case; Case 38/75 E.C.R. (1975)
1439,1450 (paragraph 21); www.curia.eu.inUcommon/recdoc/indexaz/en/c1htm (document no.
61975J0038; 21.02.2001).
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4.1.2.3 The SlOT case and the SPIISIAMI case
The ECJ's decision on the legally binding character of GATT for the European
Community was reaffirmed in the judgements on the SlOT case394 and the SPIISIAMI
case.395 The cases may be briefly summarized as follows:
In the SlOT case, an Italian company in charge of an oil pipeline between Trieste and
the Austrian border was charged by the Italian customs authorities to pay a "port
charge" and a "revenue charge" for the transition of oil through an oil pipe-line via
Italy, in part to Germany and in part to Austria. SlOT challenged the imposition of
these duties on the ground that this was in various respects incompatible with
Community law and with GATT law, particularly Article V GATT on the freedom of
transit.396
In the SPIISIAMI case, two Italian importers, SPI and SIAMI, contested the levying of
a duty for administrative services on various goods imported by them from third
states which were also parties to GATT. The Court was asked to investigate whether
the Italian duty for administrative services was incompatible with Article II (1) (b)
GATT-bound concesslons.ë"
In both SlOT and SPIlSIAMI, Advocate General Reischl relied on the International
Fruit case and argued that it had already been established in the case-law relating to
GATT that the Community is bound by GATT because it has assumed the powers.
previously exercised by the Member States within the sphere of application of GATT.
He furthermore argued that the Community has, as regards the fulfillment of
l
commitments arising from GATT, replaced the Member States. Furthermore he
stated, "it is reasonable to regard GATT as binding on the Community, just as if it
394 Case 266/81 Societa Italiana per IÓ/eodoffo Transalpino (SlOT) v. Ministero delle Finanze,
Ministero della Marina Mercantile, Circoscrizione doganale di Trieste and Ente Autonomo del Porto di
Trieste (1983) E.C.R. 731; www.curia.eu.inUcommon/recdoc/indexazlen/c1htm (document no.
61981J0266; 21.02.2001).,
395 Joined cases 267-269/81 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Societe Petrolifera Italiana
SpA (SPI) ad SpA Michelin Italiana (SAMI) (1983) E.C.R. 801;
www.curia.eu.inUcommonlrecdoc/indexazlen/c1 htm (document no. 61981 J0267; 21.02.2001).
396 Case 266/81 E.C.R. (1983) 731; www.curia.eu.inUcommon/recdoc/indexazlen/c1htm (document
no. 61981J0266; 21.02.2001).
397 Joined Cases 267-269/81 E.C.R. (1983) 801; www.curia.eu.inUcommon/recdoc/indexazlen/c1htm
(document no. 61981J0267; 21.02.2001).
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were an agreement concluded by the Community." In his opinion, GATT is an integral
part of the Community legal order.398
The ECJ did not explicitly consider GATT an integral part of the Community legal
order. Nevertheless, it reaffirmed that the GATT provisions, like the provisions of all
other agreements, are binding on the Community and must be uniformly applied
throughout the Community. In the ECJ's view, any difference in the interpretation and
application of provisions binding the Community would jeopardise the unity of
commercial policy and create distortions in trade within the Community.399
4.1.2.4 The WTO Agreement
In April 1994, the ministers of more than a hundred governments signed the Final Act
embodying the results of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations
achieved after seven and a half years of negotiation. As already mentioned above,400
GATT 1947 was replaced by the GATT 1994 Agreement establishing the World
Trade Orqanization''" which came into effect on 1 January 1995.402
The new General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1994), the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights, including Trade in Counterfeit Goods (TRIPs), the
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) and the Trade Policy Review Mechanism,
and all their associated legal instruments, are the main parts of the Agreement
establishing the WTO.403 The WTO is the only international body dealing with the
rules of trade between nations and provides the common institutional framework for
398 Case 266/81 E.C.R. (1983) 731,789; www.curia.eu.intlcommon/recdoc/indexaz/en/c1htm
(document no. 61981J0266; 21.02.2001).
399 Joined Cases 267-269/81 E.C.R. (1983) 801,828 (paragraph 14);
www.curia.eu.intlcommonlrecdoc/indexaz/en/c1htm (document no. 61981J0267; 21.02.2001).
400 See Chapter 4.1.2.
401 WTO Agreement establishing the WTO (1994); Petersmann The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement
System (1997) 3; Jackson et al. Legal problems of international economic relations-cases (1995) 289;
Jackson The World Trading System (1998) 48.
402 WTO Agreement establishing the WTO (1994); Jackson The WTO _ Constitution and
Jurisprudence (1998) 133 and 170: Both the Republic of South Africa and the European Communities,
are members of the WTO; WTO World Trade Organization - Trading into the Future (1998) 4; Cottier
GATT-Uruguay Round (1995) V; www.dti.gov.za/review.asp?iSDivID=86&iEvent_ID=105.
403 WTO WTO - Trading into the Future (1998) 4; WTO The agreements, overview: a navigational
guide at www.wto.org/English/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm1_e.htm (21.02.2001); WTO The
agreements at www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e//tif_eagrmO_e.htm; Jackson WTO-
Constitution and Jurisprudence (1998) 36.
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the conduct of trade relations among its Mernbers.f?" The WTO has 140 Members at
present. 405
Since GATT 1947 was replaced by GATT 1994, the status of GATT 1994 in the
Community legal system needs to be examined further.
4.1.2.4.1 WTO Membership of the European Community plus its Member States
and its consequences
The process of negotiation and conclusion of the WTO Agreements on the part of the
European Community was marked by the question of which entity should negotiate
and sign the agreements, the European Community or its fifteen Member States, or
both. For practical reasons, it was the European Community, which took part in the
Uruguay negotiations on behalf of its Members. However, the European Community,
as well as the fifteen Member States, signed the agreements and thus became full
Members of the WTO.406 The Member States ratified the agreements according to
their national laws.
The fact that the EC Member States are WTO Members alongside the EC makes it
difficult to determine where the demarcation line between Community competence
and Member States competence should be drawn and is in itself bound to raise
issues in relation to the position of the ECJ on WTO law. As far as GATT 1947 was
concerned, the ECJ could take the view that, as a result of the substitution of the EC
for the Member States in relation to commitments under GATT, it had the final word
on the interpretation of GATT provisions, even in relation to the compatibility of
Member States legislation with GATT.407 This argument is no longer possible. In line
with Article XI GATT, both the EC and the Member States signed the final act and
404 WTO WTO - Trading into the Future (1998) 4; Jackson From GATT to the World Trade
Organization in: Cottier (ed) GATT-Uruguay Round (1995) 35; WTO What is the World Trade
Oganization at www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact1_e.htm (21.02.2001); for further
information of the WTO's institutional structure, see Jackson WTO - Constitution and Jurisprudence
(1998) 66-67.
405 WTO WTO - Trading into the Future (1998) 69, counting 132 members; for a updated list of all
Members, see WTO The organisation, Members and Observers at
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_elorg6_e.htm (21.02.2001).
406 Bourgeois The ECJ and the WTO (2000) 73; see the list of the members of the WTO at
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_elorg6_e.htm (21.02.2001); WTO WTO - Trading Into The
Future (1998) 69.
407 Compare Case 269/81 E.C.R. (1983) 801, 828 (paragraphs 15 and 17); Bourgeois The ECJ and
the WTO (2000) 73.
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therefore share competence. This issue of competence arises especially in relation to
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs). In its Opinion 1/94 on the EC
competence to conclude the GATS and the TRIPs Agreements, the ECJ rejected the
European Commission view that the EC had exclusive competence to conclude
these agreements. The ECJ also rejected the view of the Member States that a
number of clauses of the TRIPs Agreement fall within the exclusive competence of
Member States. The ECJ was of the opinion that the EC and its Member States are
"jointly competent to conclude the TRIPs Agreement''.408 This "joint competence"
gives rise to much criticism in the literature409 and, in my opinion, may cause a
lingering handicap in the WTO for both the EC and its Member States.410
With regard to the question of applicability, GATT 1994 is different from GATT 1947.
The WTO Agreement has been accepted by the Council under Article 300 (7) ECT.
For this reason it is binding on the Community and the Member States and is, on that
basis, an integral part of the Community legal system without the need for
transformation. The Community is responsible to ensure that the laws, regulations
and administrative procedures of the Community and its Member States are in
conformity with all the Agreements on Trade in Goods, including GATT 1994. By
virtue of the fact that these agreements are binding on the Community and its
Member States under Article 300 (7) ECT, the provisions of these agreements form
an integral part of the Community legal system. They are therefore part of the legal
rules under which the Court of Justice exercises control over the actions of the
Member States and the Community institutions. Obligations arising from international
agreements binding on the Community are "obligations under the Treaty".411 Non-
408 Opinion 1/94 E.C.R. (1983) 1-5267 (paragraphs 1-20);
www.curia.eu.inUcommonlrecdoc/indexazlen/c1htm (document no. 61994V0001; 21.02.2001).
409 In the view of Bourgeois The EGJ and the WTO (2000) 86, Opinion 1/94 signifies an apparent
break with previous case law in the area of external relations. He thinks it is possible that a WTO panel
or the WTO Appellate Body could be called upon for the uniform interpretation of GATS and TRIPs
provisions, if the EGJ fails to do so. Kuilwijk The ECJ and the GATT Dilemma (1996) 76, Opinion 1/94
confirmed that the EG is largely characterised and paralysed by the differing interests of its different
institutions. In the opinion of Eeckhout "The domestic legal status of the WTO" The Common Market
Law Review (1997) 20, a mixed approach of the WTO's legal status is undesirable, artificial, and
perhaps unworkable. .
410 Nevertheless it is not a main focus of this analysis and therefore will not be examined further.
411 Kuilwijk The EGJ and the GATT Dilemma (1996) 100.
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compliance with these obligations justifies an action by the Commission against a
Member State for violations of Community obligations.
4.1.2.5 Conclusion
Although the Community itself was never a contracting party to GATT 1947 and
although this was not binding on the Community by virtue of Article 300 ECT, it
follows from the ECJ's judgements that the Court also considers GATT an integral
part of Community law.
In the International Fruit case the ECJ stated that the European Community as such
became a party to GATT by way of succession and that, for this reason, the GATT
provisions became legally binding on the Community. Alt~ough the Community had
not existed when GATT was created in 1948 and never formally acceded to GATT,
Article 307 ECT indicated the Member States' clear intention that the Community be
bound by the GATT obligations.412
The ECJ reconfirmed its International Fruit ruling in the Nederlandse Spoorwegen
case. The Court held that, as regards the fulfilment of commitments under GATT, the
Community has replaced the Member States and that it has succeeded to the rights
and obligations of the Member States.413 Accordingly the ECJ regarded GATT 1947
as part of Community law, which is a legally binding agreement for the Community
itself.414
In both SlOT and SPI/SIAMI, the ECJ considered that any difference in the
interpretation and application of provisions binding the Community would jeopardise
the unity of commercial policy and create distortions in trade within the Comrnunity.f "
The ECJ' s judgements concerning the incorporation -,of GATT 1947 into the
.Community legal system make it clear that, in the Court's view, GATT 1947 was
binding on the Community as such and that it actually did form an integral part of
Community law. The factthat the Court did not explicitly mention this in its judgement
412 Case 21/72 E.C.R. (1972) 1219,1226 (paragraph 7);
www.curia.eu.inUcommon/recdoclindexaz/en/c1htm (document no. 61981 J0021; 21.02.2001).
413 Case 38/75 E.C.R. (1975) 1439,1450 (paragraph 16);
www.curia.eu.inUcommon/recdoc/indexaz/en/c1htm (document no. 61975J0038; 21.02.2001).
414 Case 38/75 E.C.R. (1975) 1439, 1450 (paragraph 21);
www.curia.eu.inUcommon/recdoc/indexaz/en/c1htm (document no. 61975J0038; 21.02.2001).
415 Joined Cases 267-269/81 E.C.R. (1983) 801,828 (paragraph 14);-
www.curia.eu.inUcommon/recdoc/indexaz/en/c1htm (document no. 61981 J0267; 21.02.2001).
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did not have any meaning on the Court's attitude towards GATT.416 After its first
judgement in 1972 the Court reconfirmed its monist view of the relationship between
GATT law and Community law in the cases that followed.417
Although the direct application of GATT 1994 is technically different from the direct
application of GATT 1947, there is no real difference in practice. GATT 1994 is one of
the integral parts of the WTO Agreement.418 In contrast to GATT 1947, GATT 1994
was concluded by the Council under Article 300 ECT and therefore is binding on the
Community and on the Member States. Consequently, its provision forms an integral
part of the Community legal system without the need for transformation.
4.1.3 The GATT I WTO provisions in South African law
With regard to the GATTIWTO provisions in South African law, South Africa was one
of twenty-three founder members of GATT and has participated in the various rounds
of negotiations. South Africa, however, was not a typical member of GATT. Its
apartheid policies resulted in political and economic isolation. By the early 90s, South
Africa was left with a complex, unstable, unpredictable system of protection, which
bore no relationship to a programme of industrial development, let alone export-
oriented lndustrlatlzatlon.t"
In the Uruguay Round, South Africa came under pressure from its major trading
partners to fall in line with the GATT phtlosophy.f" and to make a substantial move
to open its markets. Although the Uruguay Round was signed by the previous
Government, its principles were embraced by the ANC-led Government elected in
April 1994, which has confirmed South Africa's commitment to liberalization. Thus
416 Hilpold Die EU im GATT/WTO System (1999) 189.
417 Kuilwijk The ECJ and the GATT Dilemma (1996) 101.
_418 Kuilwijk The ECJ and the GA TT Dilemma (1996) 102.
419 Hirsch South Africa and the GATT (1993) 1-2_
420 Referring to Hirsch South Africa and the GA TT (1993) 2, the requirements of the Uruguay Round of
all GAn members can be summarised as follows: 1. A 33% average cut in all industrial tariffs. Both
industrial and agricultural tariff cuts are to be phased into equal annual cuts over five years; 2_A 36%
average cut in all agricultural tariffs, and the diminution of domestic supports and export subsidies, and
guarantees of minimum levels of market access for agricultural products; 3. Agreement to a series of
compulsory codes on export subsidies, trade-related investment measures (TRIMs), and other issues;
4_A commitment to a longer-term programme of liberalizing barriers to the trade of services; 5. An
agreement to bring textiles and clothing into the GAn instead of segregating them in a Multifibre
Agreement.
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South Africa had redressed its international economic relations and had again
become part of the international trading community. 421
In December 1994, South Africa became a member of the WTO and a party to all the
multilateral agreements concluded in the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations
according to the rules of the 1993 Constitution. The procedure for the conclusion of
treaties422 in South Africa has changed radically under the 1993 Constitution.
Previously a treaty entered into by the executive had no effect domestically, unless it
was incorporated into South African law by an Act of Parliament. Under the 1993
Constitution the President is authorized to negotiate and sign international
agreements.423 The Parliament, comprising the National Assembly and the Senate,424
is empowered to agree to the ratification425 of an international agreement signed by
the President, or to the accesslon'[" to such an international aqreernent.?"
Furthermore section 231 (3) of the 1993 Constitution stipulates that an international
agreement in principle binds the Republic only after Parliament agrees to the
ratification of or accession to an international agreement. This international
agreement shall form part of the law of the Republic, provided Parliament expressly
so provides and such agreement is not inconsistent with this Constitution.
421 Blumberg Trade regulation in South Africa (1998) 1; OTI South Africa and its relationship with the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the newly established World Trade Organization
(1995) 9.
422 The Constitution uses the term "international agreement" instead of the more commonly used term
"treaty', but "international agreement" is to be construed as "treaty" within the meaning of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between
International Organizations, which together define a treaty as an international agreement between
states or between states and international organizations in written form and governed by international
law whatever its particular designation. See Ougard International Law - A South African Perspective
(1994) 342.
423 Section 82 (1) (i) of the 1993 Constitution.
424 Section 36 of the 1993 Constitution.
425 The word "ratification" in section 231 of the 1993 Constitution has two meanings. First, it refers to
the international process in terms of which a treaty requiring ratification in addition to a signature to
bring it into force on the international plane is ratified or confirmed by the necessary state authority, i e
Parliament. This may be called international ratification. Secondly, it refers to the international
procedure by which Parliament approves the treaty and thereby incorporates it into municipal law. This
may be called constitutional ratification. The act of ratification therefore serves the dual purpose of
confirming South Africa's consent to be bound on the international plane and of incorporating the
treaty into municipal law. See Ougard International Law - A South African Perspective (1994) 343.
426 A state may become a party to an international agreement in whose negotiation it did not
participate, and which it did not sign, by means of accession, provided that the original parties accept
that such states may accede to the treaty. Multilateral law-making treaties that seek to achieve a large
measure of universality generally include an accession clause. Article XII of the Marrakesh Agreement
establishing the WTO provides for the membership of a state by accession. See Ougard International
Law - A South African Perspective (1994) 267.
427 Section 231 (2) of the 1993 Constitution.
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On 2 December 1994, South Africa deposited a signed instrument of accession to the
Agreement establishing the WTO with the Secretariat of the GATT.428 It thereby
became a member of the WTO and a party to all the multilateral agreements
concluded in the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations.429 On 6 April 1995, the South
African Parliament approved the accession, subsequent to recommendations from
both houses of Parliament,430 in accordance with the Interim Constitution of South
Africa of 1993.431 The South African Parliament did not declare that the Uruguay
Round Agreements form part of the domestic law of South Africa, though, and an act
of transformation is therefore needed for GATT 1994 to operate within the domestic
legal system.~32The GATT/WTO provisions, however, are binding on South Africa.433
The TDCA between the EU and South Africa therefore needs to take account of
these rules, in order to ensure compatibility with the GATT/WTO provisions.434
428 DTI Instrument Of Acceptance (02 December 1994).
429 Interview with Rudolf Brits, Deputy Director: Trade Negotiations Unit, International Trade and
Economic Development Division at the DTI of the RSA (04 June 2001): South Africa as a founding
member of GATT and the WTO became a member of the WTO pursuant to Article XI of the Marrakesh
Agreement establishing the WTO. Countries that are not original founding Members accede to the
WTO pursuant to Article XII of the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO.
430 Parliament of the RSA Announcements, Tablings and Committee Reports-No 21/1995 (23 March
1995) 96; Parliament of the RSA Announcements, Tablings and Committee Reports-No 24/1995 (28
March 1995) 116.
431 RSA Minutes Of Proceedings Of National Assembly - No 18/1995 (06 April 1995) 147-148; RSA
Minutes Of Proceedings Of Senate - No 16/1995 (06 April 1995) 149.
432 GATT was implemented through the Customs and Excise Act and the Board on Tariffs and Trade.
See the following documents for the implementation of GATT into South African law: WTO-Committee
on Antidumping Practices and Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Notification of
laws and regulations under Articles 18.5 and 32.6 of the Agreements - South Africa, Doc. No.
G/ADP/N/1/ZAF/1 and G/SCM/N/1/ZAF/1 - 95/3998 (8 December 1995); WTO-Trade Policy Review
Body Trade Policy Review Republic of South Africa, Report by the Secreteriat, Doc. No. WTITPR/S/34
- 98/1343 (6 April 1998); WTO Committee on Customs Valuation Notifications under Article 22.2 of
the Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994-
South Africa, Doc. No. GNAUN1/ZAF - 96/3422 (30 August 1996).
433 DTI South Africa and its relationship with GA TT and the WTO (1995) 9.
434 Graumans 'The European Union - South Africa negotiations" Netherlands Institute for Southern
Africa Occasional Paper No 1 (1998) 10; www.niza.nl/uk/publications/016/niza-papernol-1998.htm
(09.03.2001 ).
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4.2 Compatibility of the TOCA with the WTO law
A Dispute Settlement Understanding was established within the GATT provisions.
This new WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding is a unified system for all parts of
the GATT/WTO system, including the new subjects of services and intellectual
property,435and is likely to become the most frequently applied multilateral system for
the legal settlement of disputes among governments.436 According to Article II (2) of
the WTO Agreement, the "Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes" in Annex 2 is an "integral part of this Agreement, binding on
all Members".437
For this reason the creation of the WTO had serious impiications for the trade
agreement between the EU and South Africa: every member of the WTO could
counter any perceived negative impact of the agreement on their econornies.f" if it
could be proved that the Trade, Development an Cooperation Agreement between
the EU and South Africa was incompatible with the rules of the WTO.
4.2.1 The Most-Favoured-Nation Obligation
As members of the WTO, the EU and South Africa had to take account of the Most-
Favoured-Nation obligation in their agreement. The Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN)
clause embodied in Article 1 GATT was the cornerstone of the GATT 1947 system,
and equally is the cornerstone of the new WTO multilateral trading system.439 This
article obliges each WTO member to extend most-favoured-nation treatment to all
other states that are party to the agreement. Despite some confusion over the phrase
"most favoured" - which seems to imply specially favourable treatment - MFN is
synonymous with non-discrimination and equal access to the markets of all WTO
rnernbers.t" The concept of reciprocity is likewise associated with the MFN principle
435 Jackson The World Trading System (1998) 124.
436 Petersmann The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System (1997) XV.
437 The Dispute Settlement Understanding is reproduced in Annex D to Petersmann The GA TT/WTO
Dispute Settlement System (1997) 291-318.
438 WTO Training Package (1999) section A, slide 1
439 WTO Training Package (1~99) section A, slide 1; Jackson The World Trading System (1998) 157.
440 WTO WTO - Trading into the future (1998) 5; Jackson et al. Legal problems of international
economic relations (1995) 448; Thomas-Development Bank Southern Africa, The Lomé trade regime
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and forms an integral part of the concept of non-discrirnination.t" Although not
defined, it is clearly stated in Article 28 bis GAIT that negotiations on tariff reductions
should be "on a reciprocal and a mutually advantageous basis."
As shown in Chapter three, the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement
between the EU and South Africa grants preferential access to each other's
markets.442 If the MFN obligation was strictly followed, the GAIT provisions would be
violated by the EU and South Africa because of not granting preferential access to
their markets to other Member States of the WTO. Thus this could cause the WTO to
authorize a responding action under the dispute settlement rules.
The WTO framework, however, provides exceptions to the MFN obligation. These
are:443
• Part IV of the GAIT
• Differentiation for Developing countries (such as the Enabling Clause)
• Waiver of the GAITIWTO obligations
• Regional Trade Arrangements under Article XXIV GAIT.
The extent to which these exceptions apply to the TDCA needs to be determined
here.
4.2.1.1 Part IV of the GATT
In November 1964, a fundamental reform of the GAIT legal framework occurred with
the adoption of Part IV of the GAIT, entitled "Trade and Development", by the
contracting parties. It became effective in June 1966 and provides for special
measures intended to promote the trade and development of developing contracting
and the World Trade Organisation (1999) 5; Jackson The World Trading System (1998) 157: It stands
for an obligation to treat activities of a particular foreign country or its citizens at least as favourably as
it treats the activities of any other country. For example: if nation A has granted MFN treatment to B,
and then grants a low tariff to C on imports from C to A, nation A is obliged to accord the same low
tariff treatment also to B and its citizens.
441 WTO WTO - Trading into the future (1998) 5; Thomas "Lomé and the WTO" lGD Occasional Paper
No 21 (1999) 5; Jackson The World Trading System (1998) 157-158.
442 See Chapter 3.1.2.1.
443 WTO WTO - Trading into the future (1998) 5-6; WTO Training package (1999) section A, slide 4.
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parties.444 Of special importance in Part IV is Article XXXVI (8) GATT, under which
developing countries are relieved of the commitment of reciprocity in concessions.
This means that the developed contracting parties do not expect reciprocity for
commitments made by them in trade negotiations to reduce or remove tariffs and
other barriers to the imports from developing countries. 445
An explanatory note to paragraph 8 states that developing countries should not have
to make contributions which are inconsistent with their individual development,
financial and trade needs.446 Part IV of GATT and this explanatory note in favour of
-
developing countries obviously entail preferences that would otherwise violate the
MFN obligation.
It is doubtful whether Part IV of GATT for developing countries also applies to South
Africa. As shown above.?" South Africa was officially classified by the WTO as a
developed lower middle income country.t" and though this classification is
questionable, its economy, in certain respects, more closely resembles that of a
"developed" than a "developing" country.t"
Therefore a deviation from the MFN obligation in granting non-reciprocal trade
preferences to South Africa could not be justified with reference to Part IV GATT.
Such an exception would be discriminatory against other countries with the same
status as South Africa that do not receive the same preferences. Therefore Part IV of
GATI does not apply to the TDCA.
4.2.1.2 Differentiation
For the EU and South Africa, a second possibility to justify their deviation from the
MFN obligation under GATT provisions is the so-called Enabling Clause.
444 WTO Regionalism and the world trading system (1995) 7.
445 Thomas "Lomé and the WTO" lGD Occasional Paper No 21 (1999) 5.
446 Ibid.
447 See Chapter 2.2.4.1.
448 Eisenberg "SA, Countertrade and GATT" Stell LR Vol.4 No 2 (1993) 143-144; See Chapter
449 See Chapter 2.2.4; EU COM "South Africa" The Courier No 164 (1997) 3; BlumbergIWentzel
"Trade relations with Southern Africa" DaSA Paper No 29 (1994) 7.
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The Enabling Clause is made up from the provisions of the "Agreement on
Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of
Developing Countries".45o Through this clause, a permanent legal basis was created
for preferences in favour of developing countries or among them, making them an
integral part of the GATT system. Paragraph 1 of the Enabling Clause provides that
"notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1 GATT, contracting parties may accord
differential and more favourable treatment to developing countries, without according
such treatment to other contracting parties.,,451The rationale behind this is that equal
treatment for states that are unequal would be unfair.452 Furthermore, Paragraph 2
(a) of the clause authorizes preferential tariff treatment accorded by developed,
contracting parties to products originating in developing countries in accordance with
the GSp.453 Paragraph 2(c) of the Enabling Clause states that the developing
countries may establish regional or global preferential arrangements for the mutual
reduction or elimination of tariffs and, in accordance with criteria and conditions that
may be prescribed by the WTO members, for the mutual reduction or elimination of
non-tariff measures. In terms of paragraph 3 of the clause, differential treatment is
. designed to promote the trade of developing countries without raising barriers to the
trade of other member countries/''"
The Enabling Clause has been added to GATT principally to care for the needs of
.developing countries. Nevertheless, it does not define developing country status, nor
does it specify which countries qualify for such preferences. Under GATT practice,
the system of self-selection applies. This means that it is left to the countries to self-
declare their status, and individual WTO Members can decide whether to treat a
particular trading partner as a developing country.455 Accordingly, it still has to be
determined which countries fall within the category of eligible states.456
450 Jackson The World Trading System (1998) 164; the agreement was adopted by the GATT
contracting parties during conclusion of the Tokyo Round in 1979, but the status of the "Enabling
Clause" is not entirely clear.
451 WTO Training Package (1999) section A slide 13; Thomas "Lomé and the WTO"IGO Occasional
Paper No 21 (1999) 6.
452 Graumans "SADC-EU Cooperation" FGO Occasional Paper No 11 (1997) 28.
453 Under the GSP an industrialized country can offer a lower duty to a developing nation and the other
GATT members can refrain from invoking their MFN right to the same reduced tariff.
454 Thomas "Lomé and the WTO" lGD Occasional Paper No 21 (1999) 6.
455 Hoekman I Kostecki The political economy of the world trading system (1995) 238.
456 Thomas "Lomé and the WTO" lGD Occasional Paper No 21 (1999) 6.
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As a basis for dealing with South Africa the problem with the Enabling Clause is
again South Africa's status as a developed or developing country. Since its status as
a developing country is controversial, the application of the Enabling Clause to the
TDCA is questionable. Moreover, the Enabling Clause also requires uniformity of
treatment for all developing countries. Therefore any improved access of South Africa
to the European markets would have to generally apply to other states. This would
lead to such an increase of imports to the European market that it would be
economically unreasonable. Thus the Enabling Clause can not justify the deviation
within the EU and South Africa from the MFN obligation.
4.2.1.3 Waiver of the WTO/GATT obligations
Another possibility for exemption from the obligations of GATT would have been to
request a waiver, which would have enabled the EU and South Africa to discriminate
against other Member States.457
Under GATT 1947, Article XXV (5) GATT was a legal basis for the exemption of the
Lomé Convention from Article 1 GATT. It sets out the condition that a two-thirds
majority must approve the decision for a waiver.
Under the WTO, disciplines on waivers were tiqhtened and are now dealt with in
Article IX WTO (which was not in force when the waiver for the Lomé Convention
was obtained) and the "Understanding in Respect of Waivers and Obligations under
the GATT 1994".
Any waiver in effect at the entry into force of the WTO was agreed to expire by
January 1997, unless extended by the WTO Ministerial Conference by a three-
quarters majority.458 This compares with the two-thirds requirement under GATT
1947. Waivers under the WTO must have an expiry date, which was not required
under GATT 1947, and must be reviewed annually to ascertain if the "exceptional
circumstances" requiring a waiver continue to exist.459
Hence, under the WTO regime, these changes substantially strengthened the
discipline over the use of waivers. Taking into consideration the difficulties in
457 Jackson The World Trading System (1998) 164.
458 Graumans "The European Union - South Africa negotiations" Netherlands Institute for Southern
Africa Occasional Paper No 1 (1998) 10; www.niza.nl/uk/publications/016/niza-papernol-1998.htm
(09.03.2001 ).
459 Hoekman/Kostecki The political economy of the world trading system (1995) 167.
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obtaining a waiver and the possible impacts of the TOeA on neiqhbourinq African
and European States, it is doubtful that the EU and South Africa could have obtained
the required majority.46o WTO members who could be adversely affected by such a
waiver would probably have voted against it. A waiver therefore does not offer the EU
and South Africa a possibility to be excused from the GATTIWTO obligations.
4.2.1.4 Regional trade arrangements under Article XXIV GATT
Regional trade arrangements provide the third exception to MFN treatment as
defined by Article 1 of GATT 1994. The WTO regime provides three approaches to
establish a regional trade arranqernent.i" Article XXIV GATT provides an approach
that is more suited for trade arrangements among developed countries and among
advanced developing countries and it provides for the examination of regional trade
arrangements by WTO members. This examination serves two purposes: to ensure
the transparency of regional trade arrangements and to .evaluate whether the
agreement concerned is consistent with WTO rules.462 In this case it could justify a
departure from the MFN obligation.
Article XXIV envisages three types of regional arrangements. These are customs
unions, free trade areas and "interim agreements" leading to a customs union or a
free trade area.463The rules of Article XXIV GATT aim to ensure that regional trade
arrangements facilitate trade between the constituent territories, while minimizing any
adverse effects on their trade with WTO members that are not parties to such
agreements.464 This means that members of a customs union and free trade areas
460 Davies "Promoting regional Integration in Southern Africa" African Security Review (1996) 9.
Davies further argues that South Africa would have had to present itself as a developed country
making concessions to developing countries, in order to secure a waiver for a bilateral agreement from
the WTO under Article XXV GAn. In Davies' opinion this completely contradicts the stance it is taking
in negotiations with major trading blocs, where the advantages of it being seen as a developing
country are apparent.
461 These are: Article XXIV GAn, Paragraph 4 (a) of the Enabling Clause and Part IV GAn, Article V
GATS.
462 WTO Artic/e XX/Vof GATT 1994 (1) at www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis
/eol/e/wto08/wt08_56.htm (21.02.2001)
463 Jackson Thé World Trading System (1998) 165; www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis
/eolie/wto08/wt08_56.htm (21.02.2001). .
464 www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis/eol/e/wto08/wt08_56.htm (21.02.2001); Jackson The WTO-
Constitution and Jurisprudence (1998) 54 and 56, criticizes the fact that Article XXIV GAn is not
adequate for the developing international economic practices today and gives examples of it. In his
view Article XXIV GAn is an ambiguous and potentially broad exception, which appears to be
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may reduce their tariffs among each other without extending such concessions to the
remaining WTO members.
4.2.1.4.1 Requirements of a Free Trade Area and a Customs Union
In order to invoke the rights set out above, the trade group concerned must satisfy
the technical requirements, either of a free trade area or a customs union.
A free trade area (defined in Article XXIV, paragraph 8(b)) is an area formed by
reciprocal multilateral agreements whereby two or more nations agree to limit or
eliminate import tariffs and duties between them. Each individual country within the
free trade area, however, continues to charge its regular duties on products coming
from outside the assoclatton.f"
A customs union (defined in Article XXIV, paragraph 8(a)) is an association of nations
with duty-free treatment for imports from members and a common level of external
tariffs for imports from non-members. In a customs union the members are obliged to
replace their own individual duties with a uniform tariff applicable to the entire
region.466
As already stated above,467Article 5 TOCA stipulates that the EU and South Africa
agreed to establish a free trade area and not a common external tariff, after a
transitional period. Consequently, their agreement can be described as an "interim
agreement" leading to a free trade area.
If both the EU and South Africa satisfy all the technical requirements of an interim
agreement leading to a free trade area, a deviation from the MFN obligations would
be justified.
inadequate to prevent potential abuses; Hoekman/Kostecki The political economy of the world trading
system (1995) 218-219. The authors mention Article XXIV as a loophole and state that GATT's
experience in testing FTA's against Article XXIV GATT has not been very encouraging. In their opinion---------
various aspects of the rules and of the application of GATT have proved unsatisfactory.
465 www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis/eol/e/wto08/wt08_56.htm (21.02.2001); Jackson et al. Legal
problems of international economic relations (1995) 471; Thomas "Lomé and the WTO" lGD
Occasional Paper No 21 (1999) 9.
466 www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis/eol/e/wto08/wt08_56.htm (21.02.2001); Jackson et al. Legal
problems of international economic relations (1995) 471; Thomas "Lomé and the WTO" lGD
Occasional Paper No 21 (1999) 9.
467 See Chapter 3.1.2.
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4.2.1.4.1.1 "Substantially all trade"
Although Article XXIV GATT stipulates that a free trade area must be reciprocal in
nature, it does not prevent asymmetry from being built into the relationship while it is
still an "interim agreement", provided that a plan and a schedule are filed with the
WTO.468 Once a fully-fledged Article XXIV GATT free trade area has been
established, it can no longer be asymmetrical and it has to be fully reciprocal.469
However, although reciprocity must be granted in full, .the MFN departures are
allowed for a free trade area that is defined to require 'liberalization on "substantially
all trade" involved."? The matter concerning the stage at which trade barriers are
eliminated on "substantially all trade", however" has never been settled.471 No
accepted definition exists of the percentage of trade to be covered by a WTO-
consistent agreement - the quantitative criteria - nor common criteria against which
the exclusion of a particular sector from the agreement could be assessed - the
qualitative criteria.472
Concerning the qualitative criteria, opinions vary on whether a whole sector, like the
agricultural sector, could be excluded from an agreement. At present, an exclusion of
a major sector is widely unaccepteo.f" Concerning the quantitative criteria, there is a
possible range from 51% to 99%. Extreme cases of 51% are widely found to be
unacceptable'V" and the European Union once urged 80% of all trade as a
benchrnark.f" The outcome of in-depth discussions on this issue is that this rule
should also be qualitatively understood: no major sector of economic activity is
allowed to be excluded completely from a free trade agreement.476
468 www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis/eol/e/wto08/wt08_56.htm (21.02.2001); Thomas "Lomé and
the WTO" lGD Occasional PaperNo 21 (1999) 8; see also Article XXIV (Sc) GATT.
469 Thomas "Lomé and the WTO" lGD Occasional Paper No 21 1999) 8.
470 Jackson The World Trading System (1998) 166; Graumans "The European Union - South Africa
negotiations" Netherlands Institute for Southern Africa Occasional Paper No 1 (1998) 10;
www.niza.nl/uklpublications/016/niza-papernol-1998.htm (09.03.2001).
471 Jackson et al. Legal problems of international economic relations (1995) 475.
472 WTO·Article XXIV of GATT 1994 (2) at www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis
/eol/e/wto08/wt08_57.htm (21.02.2001).
473 Hilpold Die EU im GATTIWTO System (1999) 21; www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis
/eol/e/wto08/wt08_57.htm (21.02.2001).
474 Hilpold Die EU im GATTIWTO System (1999) 21.
475 Jackson et al. Legal problems ofinternational economic relations (1995) 475.
476 WTO Guide to the Uruguay Round Agreements (1999) 44; Bertelsmann-Scott "The EU, SA and the
FTA" SAYII (2000) 269; www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis/eol/e/wto08/wt08_57.htm (21.02.2001).
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Therefore the percentage of trade covered by the agreement is only an indicator and
not the only factor to be taken into account. As long as no whole major sector is
excluded from the agreement and the exceptions do not present a large percentage
of the bilateral trade, it is possible for the EU and South Africa to maintain trade
restrictions on a number of products. Furthermore, Article XXIV (5b ) GATT lays down
the condition that the duties and other regulations of commerce imposed on the trade
of third parties at the formation of the free trade area shall not be higher or more
restrictive than those existing prior to its forrnatlon.f"
With regard to the required liberalization on "substantially all trade", the TOeA
between the EU and South Africa provides, in Article 5 TOeA, that 94,9% of EU
.imports from South Africa will enter the market free of duty by the end of the ten-year
period.478 The respective figures on the South African side are twelve years and
86,3%.479Thus, the free trade agreement provides for free trade in about 90% of all
products after the transitional period and no sector is entirely excluded.480
Furthermore, the TOeA also includes a precise plan and schedule for the tariff
reduction.t'" For this reason, the TOeA fulfils the requirement of being reciprocal for
"substantially all trade" between the EU and South Africa.482
4.2.1.4.1.2 "Within a reasonable length of time"
Since a free trade area takes a long time to be established, interim agreements are
necessary to avoid the economic disturbance caused by a rapid move to free trade
477 www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis/eolle/wto08/wto8_56.htm (21.02.2001).
478 Trade & Industry and Foreign Affairs Portfolio Committees, Economic Affairs Select Committee SA-
EU Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (1999) 4-5; www.southafricahouse.com/tradeeu-
sa.htm (09.03.2001).
479 See Chapter 3.1.2.1 ; Goodison "Marginalisation or Integration?" lGD Occasional Paper No 22
(1999) 26; Trade & Industry and Foreign Affairs Portfolio Committees, Economic Affairs Select
Committee SA-EU Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (1999) 5;
www.southafricahouse.com/tradeeu-sa.htm (09.03.2001).
480 Trade & Industry and Foreign Affairs Portfolio Committees, Economic Affairs Select Committee
SA-EU Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (1999) 5;
www.southafricahouse.com/tradeeu-sa.htm (09.03.2001).
481 See Chapter 3.1.2.
482 Trade & Industry and Foreign Affairs Portfolio Committees, Economic Affairs Select Committee
SA-EU Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (1999) 5;
www.southafricahouse.com/tradeeu-sa.htm (09.03.2001).
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among the members. To prevent these agreements from being used as a pretext for
introducing discriminatory preferences, they are required, according to Article XXIV
(5c) GATT, to include "a plan and.a schedule" for the formation of the free trade area
within "a reasonable length of time." 483
The notion of a "reasonable length of time" has proven so vague as to defy
meaningful enforcernent.F" One agreement provided for a transitional period of
twenty-two years, plus ten years for certain products.f" Another agreement provided
for a preparatory stage of five years, and a transitional stage not exceeding twelve
years.486 The Uruguay Round Understanding on Article XXIV487 sets the period for
establishment at ten years. In cases where the parties to an agreement believe that
ten years would be insufficient, they are to provide a full explanation of the need for a
longer period to the Council for Trade in Goods. The ten-year period can be
extended, given sufficient justification.488
As already mentioned, the TOCA provides for a ten-year period on the EU side and
for a twelve-year period on the South African side to eliminate the tariff barriers on
"substantially all trade" between them.489 This slightly longer period of time for South
Africa is explained by the unique economic situation of the country. Its domestic
economy needs a longer period than the stronger European economy to adapt to the
free trade area and this can therefore be fully justified.49o The free trade area
483 Thomas "Lomé and the WTO" lGD Occasional Paper No 21 (1999) 9;
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/eol/ellwto08/wto8_56htm (21.02.2001); Graumans "The
European Union - South Africa negotiations" Netherlands Institute for Southern Africa Occasional
Paper No 1 (1998) 10; www.niza.nl/uk/publications/016/niza-papernol-1998.htm (09.03.2001).
484 Hilpold Die EU im GATTIWTO System (1999) 22; Jackson The World Trading System (1998) 166.
485 Association of Greece, with the European Economic Community (1963); Jackson et al. Legal
problems of international economic relations (1995) 472.
486 Association of Turkey with the European Economic Community (1966); Jackson et al. Legal
problems of international economic relations (1995) 472.
487 Pescatore/Davey/Lowenfeld Handbook of WTO/GATT Dispute Settlement (1998) vol. 1, 99;
Jackson The World Trading System (1999) 166: The Understanding on Article XXIV GATT was
designed by the negotiators to address some of the problems of interpreting Article XXIV GATT.
Although not changing the actual language of Article XXIV GATT, the Understanding sets forth certain
interpretations and guidelines for handling some of the ambiguities in Article XXIV GATT.
488 For the Understanding on Article XXIV GATT, see Pescatore et al. Handbook of WTO/GA TT (1998)
vol. 1, 99; WTO Guide to the Uruguay Round Agreements (1999) 45; Hoekman/Kostecki The political
economy of the world trading system (1995) 220;
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/eol/ellwto08/wto8_56htm (21.02.2001).
489 See Chapter 3.1.2.1; Goodison "Marginalisation or Integration?" lGD Occasional Paper No 22
(1999) 26.
490 See Chapter 3.1.2.1; Pescatore et al. Handbook of WTO/GATT (1998) vol. 1, 100.
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between the EU and South Africa is thus established according to Article XXIV (5c)
GATT within a "reasonable length of time".
4.2.1.4.1.3 Approval by the contracting parties of the WTO
The free trade agreement between the EU and South Africa had to be approved by
the WTO. The formal procedure for this approval is laid down in Article XXIV (7)
GATT and in the Understanding of Article XXIV under the paragraphs 7 to 11.491
According to Article XXIV (7a) GATT, any contracting party intending to enter into a
free trade area, or an interim agreement leading to the formation of such an area, has
to promptly notify the contracting parties and to make available relevant information
requested by WTO members, and may be subjected to the scrutiny of a working
party to determine the consistency of the agreement with multilateral rules.
Consequent to a working party's report on the consistency of an agreement,
"recommendations" may be made by the Council "as they deem appropriate".492
According to Article XXIV (7b ) GATT, the parties shall not maintain or put into force
an agreement if they are not prepared to modify it in accordance with these
recommendations.
In practice, however, matters have worked out differently. The procedure of Article
XXIV (7) GATT was not always observed and a universal approval for an FTA was
rarely achieved. Of the 70 Article XXIV-type arrangements notified from 1948 to 1990
- some of which provided very loose preferences as interim agreements and set no
date for completion of the free trade area - only four were deemed by consensus to
be compatible with Article XXIV GATT. Nevertheless no formal record of GATT
"disapproval" of such arrangements exists.493 Since most members of GATT are
involved in some form of preferential trading arrangement, members have tended to
491 WTO Artic/e XX/V of GATT 1994 (3) at
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/eol/e/wto08/wto8_58.htm (21.02.2001); Pescatore et al.
Handbook of wrO/GATT(1998) vol. 1, 100.
492 www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/eol/e/wto08/wto8_58.htm (21.02.2001).
493 Jackson The World Trading System (1998) 166, giving a reference to the GATT analytical index;
Jackson The wro - Constitution and Jurisprudence (1998) 54; BlumbergIWentzel "Trade relations
with Southern Africa" DBSA Paper No 29 (1994) 2.
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refrain from forcefully criticising preferential trading arrangements involving other
members of GATT.494
In the case of the TOCA, the EU and South Africa notified the TOCA on the 2nd of
November 2000 and sought the necessary approval. The examination by the WTO
has not started yet.495
4.2.1.4.2 Conclusion
The TOCA between the EU and South Africa substantially liberalizes about 90% of
the trade involved, as provided by Article XXIV GATT. The interim agreement leading
to the formation of the free trade area includes a plan and a schedule for the
formation of such an area within a "reasonable length of time" and the two contracting
parties sought the necessary formal approval of the contracting parties of the WTO.
Thus a deviation by the EU and South Africa from the MFN obligation seems to be
justified under Article XXIV GATT only.496
However, since Article XXIV (4) GATT expressly refers to "constituent territories", one
could interpret Article XXIV GATT to refer only to contiguous regions. Certainly, the
drafters of the provision 'at the time had territories such as the Benelux countries in
mind.497They did not envisage customs unions or free trade areas between two non-
contiguous regions such as the EU and South Africa.498
This argument aside, Article XXIV. has been widely criticised for setting out
inadequate criteria for both customs unions and free trade areas. In Jackson's
opinion, the language of Article XXIV GATT is not adequate for the developing
international economic practices of tOday.499Take, for example, Paragraph 5 (the
GATT exception allows an "interim agreement" - one that leads to a customs union or
a free trade area within a reasonable time - to depart from MFN) which has opened a
494 BlumbergIWentzel "Trade relations with Southern Africa" DBSA paper No 29 (1994)' 7.
495 EU COM Bilateral trade relations at www.europa.eu.inUcomm/trade/biiateral/saf.htm (08.05.2001).
496 Trade & Industry and Foreign Affairs Portfolio Committees, Economic Affairs Select Committee
SA-EU Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (1999) 4;
www.southafricahouse.com/tradeeu-sa.htm(09.03.2001 ).
497 Benelux: Belgium, Netherlands and Luxemburg.
498 Thomas "Lomé and the WTO" lGD Occasional Paper No 21 (1999) 9.
499 Jackson The WTO - Constitution and Jurisprudence (1998) 56.
127
loophole of considerable size, because almost any type of preferential agreement
can be claimed to fall within the exception for interim agreement, and the criterium of
a "reasonable time" is exceedingly imprecise.50o Hoekman and Kostecki further
argue that the GATT experience in testing free trade areas and customs unions
against Article XXIV GATT has not been very encouraging. From their point of view,
this article has been abused by associations claiming to be party to Article XXIV
GATT arrangements and has therefore not achieved its purpose of controlling such
arranqements.?'"
The criteria for trade arrangements are certainly in need of sharper definition and the
context of Article XXIV GATT needs to be expanded to deal with the realities of trade
between non-contiguous regions. Nevertheless there is no standard model for a
trade bloc in the international system and there are no standard models for customs
unions or free trade arrangements ..
Therefore the existing rules have to be applied and the EU and South Africa may well
derogate from the MFN obligation and grant each other favourable trade relations.
4.2.2 Disputes concerning regional interests
However, one also has to bear in mind that the granting of favourable trade relations
only between the EU and South Africa generates suspicion among. neigbouring
countries and other interested third parties that the FTA may have adverse effects on
their trade and thus could lead to serious disputes concerning regional interests.
With regard to third countries, Article XXIV (4) GATT stipulates that it is the purpose
of free trade areas to facilitate the trade between the constituent territories, but not to
raise new barriers for third countries with respect to their trade with such territories.
Furthermore, it is now established, as a result of the Uruguay Round, that the dispute
settlement procedures of GATT 1994 may be invoked by any third party with respect
to any matter arising under Article XXIV GATT, which relates to customs unions, free
trade areas or interim agreements.502 The WTO dispute settlement bodies certainly
500 Jackson The World Trading System (1998) 166.
501 Hoekman/Kostecki The political economy of the world trading system (1998) 218-219.
502 WTO Guide to the Uruguay Round Agreements (1999) 45.
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have no jurisdiction to assess the overall WTO compatibility of any FTA, 503 but they
can still examine any specific measure adopted by WTO members in the context of
their free trade area.504 For this reason, the EU and South Africa remain bound by all
WTO obligations, irrespective of the dispute settlement provision in the TDCA.
With regard to the present case, it needs to be emphasized that all countries in the
Southern African region have strong and longstanding trade relations with both the
EU and South Africa, which is by far the main trading partner of the Southern African
countries.P'" The BLNS countries are closely bound to South Africa as members of
the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and most of the Southern African
countries have entered into formal trade relations with South Africa under the
Southern African Development Community (SA9G) Agreement.
Consequently, Southern African countries, especially, are afraid of negative impacts
on their trade with either party of the TDCA. This fear in these countries raises the
questions of in how far they could be affected by the EU-SA FTA and whether they,
.Iike any other third country, could institute WTO dispute settlement proceedings
against the EU or South Africa.
4.2.2.1 Southern African Customs Union
The Southern African Customs Union (SACU) comprises South Africa and the BLNS
countries: Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland. While its origins are in the
unification of South Africa in 1910, the present SACU Agreement was concluded in
1969.506
The SACU trade framework provides for South African law and customs regulations
to be the pivot around which SACU operates. Articles 2 and 3 of the SACU
Agreement provide for free movement of goods between and among Member States.
,
With regard to third countries, Article 10 of the SACU Agreement provides for the
members of SACU to implement the South African tariff as a common external tariff.
503 This is the responsibility of the WTO Committee on Regional Trade Agreements.
504 Petersmann The GA TT/WTO Dispute Settlement System (1997) 195.
505 For possible implications of the free trade area agreement to the Southern African region, see
Thomas "Lomé and the WTO" lGD Occasional Paper No 21 (1999) 14-15.
506 See the SACU Agreement of December 1969, published in the Government Gazette, vol. 54 No
1212; Graumans "Redefining relations between SA and the EU" FGD Occasional Paper No 10 (1997)
6.
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Thus the common external tariff of SACU is in fact determined by South Africa, which
can promulgate and amend legislation, tariffs and customs regulations unilaterally for
the whole of the customs union. South Africa's obligations in this respect are rather
loosely structured and are far from mandatory, leaving the BLNS countries mainly
dependent on the goodwill of the South African government. 507All customs revenues
collected at ports of entry, as well as excise duties and import surcharges collected
by SACU members, are surrendered to a common revenue pool administered by the
South African Reserve Bank. South Africa then distributes shares from the common
revenue pool to the other four countries according to a revenue share formula (set
out in Article 14 of the SACU Agreement) based on enhancement and stabilization
factors. The importance of the customs union revenue pool for the BLNS countries
becomes obvious when one considers the fact that the EU is currently accounting for
40% of the imports of the SACU,508and that more than 46% of Swaziland's national
budget, more than 50% of Lesotho's budget, 17,1% of Botswana's budget and 24%
of Namibia's derived from the customs revenue pool in the fiscal year of 1994/95.509
507 BlumbergIWentzel "Trade relations with Southern Africa" OSSA Paper No 29 (1994) 3.
508 Goodison "Marginalisation or Integration?" IGO Occasional Paper No 22 (1999) 46.
509 Bertelsmann-Scott "The EU, SA and the FTA" SA YII (2000) 269.
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In the case of the TOCA between South Africa and the EU, this implies that all duty
reductions agreed to in the FTA between the EU and South Africa also apply to the
BLNS countries. The agreed tariff reductions within the TOCA between the EU and
South Africa therefore involve a significant reduction in revenue for the BLNS
countnes.P" because of their dependence on the common fund. This is likely to have
serious budgetary implications for the BLNS countnes.P"
This far-reaching impact of a bilateral trade agreement raises the question whether
the BLNS countries can institute any dispute settlement proceedings against the EU
or South Africa, if the occasion arises. The answer depends, on the one hand, on the
merits of such action and, on the other hand, on the status of the complaining state
as a third party to the TOCA.
In the case of an intra-SACU dispute concerning a change in the common external
tariff of SACU, this cannot be entertained by the WTO because the WTO's
jurisdiction is limited to GAD and GAD-related disputes.F" Article 19(1) of the
SACU Agreement, however, provides that a change in the common external tariff that
is due to a trade agreement with another state has to be approved by all SACU
Members.513 Accordingly, the TOCA between the EU and South Africa, which, in its
provisions for a free trade area, contains concessions on the duties currently in force
in the customs area, has to be approved by the BLNS countries.
However, there is no provision for any kind of sanctions in the case of a
contravention of the SACU Agreement. The institutional framework, especially the
provisions for the resolution of disputes that are set out and provided for in Article 20
of the SACU Agreement, is very weak. Compared to the dispute settlement system
510 According to a study of the Botswana Institute for Development Policy, the pool would be reduced
by 31%. Botswana will be least affected and its total revenue will fall by 5.3%. Namibia will see its total
revenue decline by 8.6%. Swaziland and Lesotho which are highly dependant on SAGU revenue will
be the most affected. Swaziland' s total revenue will decrease by 13.9% while that of Lesotho will
decrease by 12.9%. In monetary terms BLNS countries will suffer revenue declines of between R1.9
billion and R3.5 billion a year. See Mbekeani "Impact of the SA-EU TOGA on the BLNS" lGD
Occasional Paper No 24 (2000) 54-55 ..
511 Mbekeani "Impact of the SA-EU TOGA on the BLNS" lGD Occasional Paper No 24 (2000) 55.
512 Blumberg & Kumar "Southern African Regional Organisations: Recommendations of an institutional
nature on decision-making and dispute resolution" oBSA Paper No 74 (1996) 20.
513 See Appendix 1.
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under the TOCA and the WTO,514 Article 20 (1) of the SACU Agreement only
provides for the establishment of a Customs Union Commission consisting of
representatives .of all the contracting parties, which meets once a year or at the
request of a contracting party. According to Article 20 (2) of the SACU Agreement,
this Commission then tries to elaborate a mutually agreeable solution, which is
reported by the representatives to their respective governments for consideration of
curative measures. Additionally, Article 20 (5) of the SACU Agreement provides for
direct bi- or multilateral consultations in respect of any difficulties not affecting all the
contracting parties. Considering the level of dependency of the BLNS countries on
South Africa, it is very unlikely that they will veto the TOCA between South Africa and
the EU. Thus the BLNS countries, in the case of an intra-SACU dispute, remain
dependent on the provisions of the SACU Agreement, which leaves them to rely
mainly on the goodwill of the South African government.
This feature of SACU has led to major criticism of the current SACU Agreement and
is frequently described as lacking democracy in its operatlons.F"
The EU could serve as an example for the democratization of decision-making within
SACU. Although the fifteen Member States (for practical reasons) did not take part
directly in the negotiations with South Africa, they were represented through the
European Parliament and the Council and therefore could influence the decision-
making process within the European Community. This gave them the right to defend
their position on certain questions and did not leave them dependent on the goodwill
of the Community., However, the Community, as a supra-national body, has the
power to conclude an agreement. But SACU does not have such an institution. Thus
the BLNS countries were not represented in the negotiations between the EU and
South Africa and now practically have to "live" with the outcome of the negotiations.
Therefore there is an urgent need, for creating an institution within SACU and for
'investing it with the necessary powers to democratize decision-making within
514 S Ch 'ee apter 3.1.3.7.
515 McCarthy Regional Integration - Part of the solution or Part of the Problem? in: Ellis (ed) Africa
now: People, Policies & Institutions (1994) 225; See same source for further reading on the possibility
of regional integration in Southern Africa.
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SACU.516 This should eliminate the recurring criticism that the BLNS countries are
marginalized when it comes to determining tariffs.51?
BLNS countries, nevertheless, can not become part of the agreement by their
. .
consent to the TDCA. Instead, they are third parties to the treaty. If a situation should
arise in which it could be established that the EU and/or South Africa have taken
specific measures in violation of WTO rules, any WTO member state (including
Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland) may therefore invoke the WTO dispute
settlement mechanism, when necessary .
.4.2.2.2 Southern African Development Community
The other regional arrangement that South Africa is involved in is the Southern
African Development Community (SADC).
The SADC was originally established as the Southern African Development
Cooperation Conference (SADCC), in Lusaka, in 1980. It initially comprised ten
countries in the region518 and its aim was to oppose and lessen dependence on the
apartheid regime. The SADC redefined its objectives in 1992 to develop a focus on
economic integration in the region, which is to be given effect on the basis of the
equal distribution of costs and benefits. South Africa joined the organization in
August 1994 and has chaired the SADC since August 1996.519
In August 1996, at its annual heads of states meeting, the SADC adopted a trade
protocol. Since intra-regional trade in the SADC is at a very low level (around 5% of
total trade of SADC members), this SADC Trade Protocol was developed to liberalize
intra-regional trade in goods and services within the region on the basis of fair,
mutually equitable and beneficial trade arrangements, complemented by Protocols in
516 Maasdorp Discussion of South Africa and SACU in: Sisulu, Nkosi, Setai, Thomas (ed)
Reconstituting and Democratizing The Southern African Customs Union - Report of the workshop
held in Gabarone, Botswana (1994) 71; McCarthy Discussion of South Africa and SACU in: Sisulu,
Nkosi,· Setai, Thomas (ed) Reconstituting and Democratizing The Southern African Customs Union -
.Report of the workshop held in Gabarone, Botswana (1994) 75.
517 Kumar The Uruguay Round and the Southern African Customs Union in: Sisulu, Nkosi, Setai,
Thomas (ed) Reconstituting and Democratizing The Southern African Customs Union - Report of the
workshop held in Gabarone, Botswana (1994) 52.
518 Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
519 SADC History, Evolution and Current Status at www.sadc.intlenglish/Aboutlbackground.htm
(1'1.09.2001 ).
133
other areas. It aims to ensure efficient production within the SADC to reflect the
current and dynamic comparative advantages of its members. Furthermore, the
SADC's long-term objective is to enhance the economic development, diversification
and industrialization of the region and to ultimately establish a fully integrated FTA
within a period of eight years from its entry into force. The Trade Protocol entered
into force on 25 January 2000 and was launched on 1 September 2000.520 Given the
pace at which the ratification process was proceeding in the subsequent months, the
SADC FTA was not likely to be in place in the SADC before 2008. However,
commendable progress could be made during the course of 2001. At an official
meeting of the SADC Council of Ministers in Malawi, in August 2001, the chairperson
of the SADC Council of Ministers, Mr Hipido Hamutenya, could finally announce that
all Member States had ratified the SADC Trade Protocol and had deposited their
instruments of implementation with the Secretariat.521 Thus, the SADC region, to
date, hopes to attain an FTA by 2008, which is expected to promote intra-regional
trade.
However, one has to bear in mind that intra-regional trade is currently dominated by
South Africa, accounting, according to 1995 and 1996 data, for 63% of total imports
and 70% of total exports. SADC countries, excluding the BLNS, account for 5% of
South Africa's total exports and 2% of its imports.522 In view of South Africa's
extraordinarily strong economic position, it does not need to be emphasized that the
SAOG states fear a negative impact from the preferential access of EU goods to the
South African market. Since all SADC countries are highly dependent on exporting
their goods to the South African market, they 'now, for example, are very concerned
that the TDCA between the EU and South Africa could result in cheaper EU imports,
which would force producers in the SADC region to improve their operation efficiency
or to suffer losses in shares on the South African market.523
Furthermore, the SADC countries are concerned that South Africa will give priority to
the trade relations with Europe over against its strategic and development relations
520 SADC The SADC Free Trade Area at www.sadcreview.com (11.09.2001); SADC SADC Trade
Protocol at www.sadc.inUmark0202.html(11.09.2001 ).
521 SADC Hon. Hemutenye's Council Speech 2001 at
www.sadc.inUenglishlWhatsNew/councilchairperson2001.htm (18.09.2001).
522 Imani Development (International) Ltd. "Study on the impact of introducing reciprocity into the trade
relations between the EU and the SADC region" lGD Occasional Paper No 21 (1999) 53-54.
523 Munetsi Madakufumba, Southern African Research and Development Centre "Discussion on the
introduction of reciprocity in the trade relations between the EU and SADC" lGD Occasional Paper No
21 (1999)41.
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with the rest of Southern Africa. This could complicate long-standing plans for the
creation of an effective, stable regional economic grouping in Southern Africa.524
With regard to the data on South Africa's total import and export figures and the level
of economic integration in the SAOG region, it obviously is not unlikely that the EU-
SA TOGA could have such negative effects on the region.
But in order to avoid such effects on the SAOG countries, the Trade Protocol contains
a provision that has considerable influence on the extent SA_DGcountries could be
affected by the SA-EU TOGA. Article 28 (2) of the Protocol lays down that no state
can offer trade benefits to a third country without immediately extending such benefits
to all other fellow countries in the SAOG.525 Thus, South Africa cannot negotiate
higher tariffs with SAOG countries than with the EU and will have to extend all trade
preferences granted to the EU to its partners in the SAOG as well, to avoid negative
effects on them.
Should it, however, be the case that the EU-SA TOGA has negative implications for
the SAOG region, this does not automatically constitute a violation of WTO rules.
Instead, these effects would be a consequence of the shift in comparative
advantages legitimately resulting from a free trade agreement. Thus, the TOGA and
its v effects cannot successfully be challenged under the WTO dispute settlement
procedure, unless it can be established that the EU and/or South Africa had taken
specific measures, such as quantitative restrictions, that violate WTO rules. Should
an occasion arise in which it could be established that the EU and/or South Africa
had taken specific measures in violation of WTO rules, the SAOG Member States,
like any other third country, could institute WTO dispute settlement proceedings
against the EU or South Africa.
524 Thomas "Lomé and the WTO" lGD Occasional Paper No 21 (1999) p.15; Keet "The EU's proposed
FTA" Development Southern Africa (1996) 560.
525 SAOG SADG Trade Protocol at www.sadc.int/mark0202.html(11.09.01 ).
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5. Intellectual Property Rights
Additional to the GATIIWTO provisions, intellectual property rights comprise another
important field of WTO law that is touched on by the TOGA. Although the protection
of intellectual property rights is guaranteed under the TOGA in Article 46 TOGA, the
EU and South Africa had great difficulty with determining the correct use of
intellectual property rights that involved them during the course of the negotiations.
The use of the names "Port" and "Sherry" by local producers in South Africa and the
EU led to such substantial disagreement between the parties that the conclusion of
the overall agreement was at great risk on several occasions. This issue therefore
deserves closer examination to determine the outcome of the complicated
negotiations on the issue and to evaluate whether it might have an impact on future
trade relations between the EU and other AGP countries.
5.1 Background
Within the WTO, intellectual property rights are defined as the rights given to persons
with regard to the creations of their minds. These rights usually give the creator an
exclusive right over the use of his creation for a certain period of time. Intellectual
property rights are traditionally divided into two branches, namely "industrial property"
and copyright and rights related to copyright. The main purpose of the protection of
copyright and related rights is to encourage and reward creative work such as literary
and artistic work, and uphold the rights of performers and broadcasting organizations.
Industrial property can usefully be divided into two main areas. One area can be
.characterized as the protection of distinctive signs such as trademarks and
geographical indications. Other types of industrial property are protected primarily to
stimulate innovation, design and the creation of technology. In this category fall
inventions, industrial designs and trade secrets. 526 .
The TRIPs agreement forms an integral part of the WTO and therefore applies to all
WTO members, developed and developing countries. It, however, is unique in the
WTO context in that it imposes obligations upon governments to pursue specific,
526 WTO Training Package (1999) section E7-1; WTO WTO - Trading into the future (1998) 25;
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_etripfq_e.htm (15.03.2001); Blakeney Trade Related Aspects Of
Intellectual Property Rights (1996) 10.
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similar policies. This is in stark contrast with the GATS and the GATI, which consist
of agreements not to use specific policies. The TRIPs agreement is an example of
harmonization of policies under GATI auspices. 527
Looking at the issue from a global perspective, one realizes that the intellectual
property rights - copyrights, trademarks, industrial designs, patents, etc. - are largely
held in industrialized countries. Consequently, the developed countries traditionally
are the proponents of intellectual property rights and more readily demand
enforcement of those rights.528Developing countries, however, traditionally opposed
this strongly, in particular arguing that they had much to lose and very little to gain
from these rights, because the extension of intellectual property rights to the
developing countries could mean that they would be paying for many technological
advancements that they had been receiving without payment, with very little in return,
because they did not think they had the capacity to develop new intellectual
property.529 They therefore argued that the enforcement of intellectual property rights
could be detrimental to the welfare of their populations and the development process.
There, however, were interest-groups such as industries using intellectual property in
developing countries who favoured stronger protection of intellectual property. Thus
the developing countries' acceptance of the TRIPs deal in the Uruguay Round
stemmed from a mix of skepticism and a growing perception that intellectual property
rights also had benefits in terms of allowing participation in knowledge-creating
activities, providing consumers with access to new products, and giving industries
better opportunities for obtaining cutting-edge technologies.53o Briefly: because of the
different levels of economic development, intellectual property rights play an
increasingly important part in trade and an especially important role in trade relations
between developed and developing countries.
To evaluate the extent to which the TDCA between the EU and South Africa was
influenced by these rules and to see if this could serve as an example for further
527 www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_etripfq_e.htm (15.03.2001); Hoekman/Kostecki The political
economy of the world trading system (1998) 148; The anti-dumping rules are another example, of
harmonization of policies under GATI auspices.
528 Jackson The World Trading System (1998) 311.
529 Jackson The World Trading System (1998) 310.
530 Hoekman/Kostecki The political economy of the world trading system (1998) 148-149.
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negotiations with other AGP countries, the role of TRIPs in the TOGA, in general, and
the issue of "Port" and "Sherry", in particular, therefore has to be analysed.
5.2 Agreement on Trade-related Intellectual Property Rights and the TOeA
The protection of intellectual property rights is guaranteed under the TOGA in Article
46 TOGA. In terms of Article 46 (1) TOGA the EU and South Africa shall ensure
adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights in conformity with the
highest international standards. The provision provides for the application of the WTO
Agreement on TRIPs from 1 January 1996 and even calls for measures to improve it
where apprcpriate.F" Moreover, the efforts of the EU - as the more industrialized
country - to protect its intellectual property rights are even reflected in the TOGA
itself: in Article 46 (3) TOGA the EU confirms the importance attached to the
obligations arising from certain international documents related to intellectual
property rights. South African and European innovators therefore enjoy protection
from other people using their intellectual property.
5.3 Port and Sherry in the context of TRIPs
The use of the names "Port" and "Sherry" by local producers in South Africa and the
EU led to substantial disagreement between the parties and several times placed the
conclusion of the overall agreement at great risk. The dispute arose from the EU's
demand that the terms be dropped by South Africa on both the domestic and the
export markets. After four years of intensive negotiations the parties finally reached a
compromise on the "Port" and "Sherry" issue.532 As already shown in Chapter 3.1.9.2,
South Africa agreed to phase out the terms on all export markets within five years,
except in the case of SAOG countries, where an eight-year phase-out period would
apply. On the SAGU markets, South Africa will retain the terms for the twelve-year
transitional period. Beyond that period the new designations for these products which
531 www.europa.eu.intleur.lexlen/treaties/datlec_cons_treaty_en.pdf (21.02.2001).
532 See Chapter 2.11.
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are to be used on the South African domestic market will be jointly agreed upon
between the EU and South Africa.533
Although the parties reached this compromise and agreed on the duty-free access of
wine to the European market, they still have not agreed on the complete Wine and
Spirits Agreement, which, inter alia, includes the compromise package on Port and
Sherry. It could therefore not be implemented into the overall agreement yet and still
remains an issue between the parties.534
5.3.1 Article 23 TRIPs
To justify its position on the issue with regard to Port and Sherry, the EU refers to
Article 23 TRIPs. This Article provides that interested parties must have the legal
means to prevent the use of a "geographical indication" which identifies wines or
spirits as originating in a particular geographical area when the wines and spirits do
not in fact originate in that area. This applies even where the true origin of the goods
is indicated on the product or the geographical indication is used in translation or
accompanied by expressions such as "kind", "type", "style", "imitation", or the like.535
Article 23 TRIPs accordingly prohibits any false use of a geographical indication,
even if such is not misleading or does not amount to unfair competition. But before
the EU could refer to Article 23 TRIPs as the legal basis for the phasing out of Port
and Sherry in South Africa, those terms must fall within Article 22 TRIPs of the
definition of a geographical indication.
5.3.2 Article 22 TRIPs
Article 22 TRIPs defines geographical indications
533 Appendix X to the TOGA at www.europa.eu.inUeur.lexlen/treaties/daUec_cons_treaty_en.pdf
(21.02.2001); in connection with the phase-out of the terms Port and Sherry, the parties also agreed
that the EU will provide a duty-free quota for wines covering the current level of trade of 32 million
litres of South African exports to the EU, with allowance for the future growth of this quota.
Furthermore the EU will provide assistance to the value of fifteen million Euro for the restructuring of
the SA wine and spirits industry.
534 Interview witli Ben van Wyk, Director: Economy and Policy Analysis at the South African National
Department of Agriculture (2001-03-23).
535 WTO Overview: the TRIPs Agreement at www.wto.org/english/tratop_eITRIPs_e/inteI2_e.htm
(15.03.2001); Blakeney Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: A concise Guide to the
TRIPs Agreement (1997) 72.
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"as indications which identify a good as originating in the territory of a Member, or a region or
locality in that territory, where given quality, reputation or other characteristic of the good is
essentially attributable to its geographical origin.,,536
The TRIPs agreement has therefore recognised that a geographical indication is a
commercially exploitable intangible right with an inherent economic value. The use of
a false geographical indication by unauthorized parties could be detrimental to
consumers and legitimate producers. The former are deceived and led into believing
that they buy a genuine product with specific qualities and characteristics from a
specific territory, while they in fact get a "worthless" imitation from a totally different
territory than they expected. The latter suffer damage because valuable business is
taken away from them and the established reputation of their products is
damaged.53?
The free use of place names is especially important for vinters, since the quality of
wine is closely related to where the grapes are grown. Common to all those names is
their function of designating existing places, towns, regions or countnes.f" Possibly
the most common example of a geographical indication which falls squarely within
the definition of Article 22 TRIPs is the term "champagne".539 In terms of an
arrangement with France, the french terms "champagne" and "methode
champenoise" may not be applied to wines produced in South Africa. The term
"methode cap classique" was created to describe South African sparkling wines
made by the "champagne method".
It, however, is not quite as clear that the terms Port and Sherry fall within the
definition of geographical indications in terms of Article 22 TRIPs.
EU officials have said that South Africa is cashing in on the reputation of European
names. They claim that the word "Port" is derived from the city "Oporto" in Portugal
and "Sherry" from the city "Jerez" in Spain. Both names therefore identify the specific
536www.wto.org/english/tratop_eITRIPs_e/inteI2_e.htm (15.03.2001).
537World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) What is a geographical indication at
www.wipo.inUabout-ip/en/about_geographical_ind.html(15.03.2001 );
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm6_e.htm (15.03.2001).
538www.wipo.inUabout-ip/en/about_geographical_ind.html(15.03.2001 ).
539For further examples, see Blakeney Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (1996)
69 and www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm6_e.htm (15.03.2001).
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product as one originating in a specific area.540 From the South African point of view,
neither is the name of a region or locality in Spain or in Portugal. Both are simply
corruptions of the names of particular regions in each country.P"
Portuguese Port and Spanish Sherry apparently do not necessarily originate in
Oporto or Jerez. Portuguese Port is not produced anywhere near the town of Oporto,
although it is often aged and blended there. Spanish Sherry is made from grapes in
the vicinity of Jerez, but many Sherry producers occupy premises in towns a small
distance away. Moreover, it is questionable that the names Port and Sherry are
automatically associated internationally with fortified wines of a particular quality
which originate in particular regions of Portugal and Spain, respectively. According to
an official of the Kooperatiewe Wynbouers Vereniging van Suid-Afrika (KWV), South
Africa's largest wine exporter, about 7000 farm workers produce Port and Sherry and
about 13% of its 750 million Rand production is exported.542 This shows that
production of Port and Sherry is not popular in Spain and Portugal only and that the
association of those products with wines of a certain quality from a particular region
cannot be generalized.
Nevertheless, even if it were to be accepted that these names ~allwithin the definition
of geographical indications in terms of Article 22 TRIPs, it could not be said that
South Africa is in breach of the TRIPs agreement if an exception of Article 24 TRIPs
applies.
5.3.3 Article 24 TRIPs
Article 24 TRIPs contains a number of exceptions to the protection of geographical
indications. These exceptions are of particular relevance in respect of additional
protection of geographical indications for wines and spirits.543
Articles 24 (4) and (6) of the TRIPs agreement provide that a member of the TRIPs
agreement shall not be obliged to prohibit the use of the particular geographical
indication if the member has made continuous bona fide use of such an indication for
540 www.findarticlescom/cf_0/mOWXII1999_Feb_3/53711311 .jhtml (15.03.2001).
541 Hofmeyr "Port and Sherry still under debate" Farmers Weekly (1999-02-12) 38.
542 www.dispatch.co.za/1998/09/21/southafrica/SHERRY.HTM (15.03.2001); Honey "EU moots trade-
off to break impasse over port and Sherry" Financial Mail (1999-01-15) 22.
543 www.wto.org/english/tratop_eITRIPs_e/inteI2_e.htm (15.03.2001).
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at least ten years preceding 15 April 1994 or if the particular geographical indication
has in fact become generic in the particular member country and is the customary
name for the particular goods.
South Africa has made continuous and bona fide use of the names "Port" and
"Sherry". According to the Stellenbosch Farmer's Winery, its "Sedgwick's Old Brown
Sherry" label is more than 100 years old and a KWV official has confirmed that South
Africa has been producing Sherry and Port wines for three centurtes.P"
Furthermore, one could argue that "Port" and "Sherry" have become generic in South
Africa and are used as "customary terms". They would be terms that may have their
origin within a certain context, but because of the wide use of the terms outside that
context, they have become common to the domestic language, losing all ties with the
initial origin of the term. The terms no longer function as geographical mdlcatlons.P"
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine an alternative name which could be used for products
which have been called "Port" and "Sherry" ever since they were exported by some
EU Member States to South Africa during the time of colonization. There is also no
misleading or deception of consumers. The South African public harbour no illusions
that the "Sherry" and "Port" sold in South Africa originate in Portugal or Spain.546
Moreover, South Africa's use of the "Sherry" and "Port" names cannot dilute those
names as geographical indications, as they are completely eroded in South Africa
already. They have no meaning as geographical indications as defined in terms of
Article 22 TRIPs. They fall within the public domain as descriptive terms which
cannot be monopolized by any trader, including producers of Spanish Sherry and
Portuguese Port.
Since the exceptions of Articles 24 (4) and (6) TRIPs apply, the names "Port" and
Sherry" do not fall within the definition of geographical indications in terms of Article
22 TRIPs. Following these rules, South Africa could not legally be forced by the EU to
phase out the names "Port" and "Sherry". Apart from this legal perspective, however,
the issue has to be analysed in the context of the TDGA.
544 www.dispatch.co.za/1998/09/21/southafrica/SHERRY.HTM (15.03.2001); Honey "EU moots trade-
off to break impasse" Financial Mail (1999-01-15) 22.
545 www.wipo.inUabout-ip/en/about_geographical_ind.html(15.03.2001 ).
546 Hofmeyr "Port and Sherry still under debate" Farmer's Weekly (1999-02-12) 38.
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5.4 Port and Sherry in the context of the TOeA
The TRIPs agreement only provides a series of minimum standards of intellectual
property protection to which all members of the WTO must conform.P"
Article 1 (1) TRIPs provides that the Agreement defines the minimum standards of
intellectual property protection, in that members are not obliged to implement more
extensive protection in their laws than is required by the TRIPs agreement.
Furthermore the article provides that the protection which is conferred, even if more
extensive than that required by TRIPs, should not contravene the TRIPs provisions.
This article leaves members free to determine the appropriate method of
implementing the provisions of the agreement within their own legal systems.
Concerning EU-South Africa trade relations, the parties determined to apply the rules
of TRIPs in terms of Article 46 (1) TOCA as a part of the TOCA. Although this might
give the impression that it could be preferential for South Africa in the issue
concerning Port and Sherry, Article 1 (1) TRIPs leaves the members free to apply
more extensive protection than required by TRIPs. Consequently South Africa and
the EU could bilaterally go further and even consider Port and Sherry as protected
geographical indications.
However, South Africa indicated that the final sayan the geographical denominations
rests with the WTO under the TRIPs agreement. In the opinion of the South African
Minister of Trade, Alec Erwin, the WTO will find the EU-mandated phase-out of the
geographical indicators unacceptable under global trade rules, and South Africa will
ultimately win the battle over spirits.548 Furthermore, South Africa is not alone in
regard to this issue. Countries like the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and
Hungary are also fighting to export their fortified wines under names as "Port" and
"Sherry" and are likely to be allies to South Africa.54g Moreover, it was agreed, in the
compromise package on Port and Sherry, that new designations to be used (in the
place of "Port" and "Sherry") in South Africa after twelve years would involve joint
aqreement."? The phrasing could be interpreted as providing South Africa with the
547 www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm6_e.htm (15.03.2001); Jackson The World
Trading System (1998) 312.
548 www.ictsd.org.html.weekly/story4.29-02-00.htm (15.03.2001).
549 Honey "EU maats trade-off to break impasse" Financial Mail (1999-01-15); Hofmeyr "Port and
Sherry still under debate" Farmers Weekly (1999-02-12) 38.
550 Annex X to the TOGA at www.europa.eu.intleur.lexlen/treaties/datlec_cons_treaty_en.pdf
(21.02.2001 ).
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possibility of re-negotiating the issue after twelve years and of continuing the use of
the names "Port" and "Sherry".
But all possible international support for South Africa from third countries and the
ambiguity of the compromise package cannot change the fact that South Africa is
bound to its bilateral commitment. This commitment can be interpreted in the light of
the Vienna Convention on the Law _of Treaties. According to the "Pacta sunt
servanda" principle,551 South Africa will be bound by its commitment to jointly agree
on new designations and there is no doubt that this does not allow a return to the old
names.
In other words, the terms "Port" and "Sherry", according to the bilateral commitment,
will be lost to the South African domestic market in twelve years' time.
5.5 Evaluation of the Port and Sherry Compromise
Many people in Europe indeed associate the Iberian Peninsula with the source of
Port and Sherry. Thus the EU's argument with regard to the protection of European
geographical indications for wine and spirits may deserve some support.
Regarding the legal circumstances, however, it seems as if South Africa was in a
very strong position to object to the phasing out of the two traditional South African
brand names. The South African negotiating team nevertheless gave in to European
pressure and therefore did not reach its own goal by the end of the negotiations.
The reason for not insisting on the current WTO minimum standards ruling seems to
lie more in the nature of the agreement itself, which represents a package of
compromises. Consequently, the concessions made by South Africa regarding the
issue of brand names cannot only be regarded from a isolated point of view, but has
to be judged from an overall perspective. South African politicians and economists,
for example, regarded the compromise on the "Port" and "Sherry" issue as necessary
and welcomed the signing of the free trade agreement with the EU. In their view the
TDCA is a landmark deal creating a free trade zone and adding one per cent per year
to South Africa's growth rate.552 Since the EU is South Africa's most important
551 Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
552 Mayo "EU-SA Trade pact clinched" The Namibian (1999-10-12) 1.
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trading partner, South Africa obviously regarded the retention of the Port and Sherry
designations as a less important issue compared to the overall agreement and clearly
aimed for more important gains in other fields.
However, one must bear in mind that the respective names do not qualify as
geographical indications and that South Africa's commitment in this case may not be
seen as a precedent under TRIPs for further trade negotiations between the EU and
other ACP countries. The EU took rather too great an advantage of its strong position
in the negotiations and South Africa's position therefore has to be regarded as a
compromise with the overall trade package.
Moreover, the question remains how to judge European negotiating policy towards its
trading partner. It is true that the TOCA allows South Africa to receive an amount of
15 million Euro for the phasing out of the two labels,553but a monetary compensation
does not make up for losing rights to the Port and Sherry names. Furthermore, the
question of who would receive this money, and what amounts would be allocated to
which sectors of the industry, still requires attention.
In addition to that financial matter, the dispute between the EU and South Africa
might have damaged European-South African relations and might have harmed
future EU credibility with developing countries. Highlighting the importance of the
issue for South Africa, former President Nelson Mandela warned in a letter to the EU
that "for ordinary people, such an agreement cannot be concluded by us
surrendering the household in southern Africa of our own Port and Sherry".554Trade
Minister Erwin complained that the EU had broken every agreement reached in the
last eighteen months before the ,conclusion of the TOCA. South African trade officials
even saw a dangerous precedent for developing countries dealing with the EU in the
EU's negotiating tactics.555
South Africa in fact is not alone in concluding trade agreements with the EU. Free
trade agreements with Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt include only limited concessions
in agriculture and Hungary, Cyprus, Australia and Switzerland were required to phase
553 See Appendix X to the TDGA at www.europa.eu.inUeur.lex/en/treaties/daUec_cons_treaty_en.pdf
(21.02.2001 ).
554 Honey "EU moots trade-oft to break impasse" Farmers Weekly (1999-01-15) 22.
555 www.ictsd.org.html.weekly/story4.29-02-00.htm (15.03.2001).
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out their use of the terms "Sherry" and "Champagne" in order to sign trade
agreements with the EU.556
With regard to those examples, one has to admit that the nature of the EU's strategy
to use regional trade agreements to introduce new "protectoral measures" is rather
alarming, because it constitutes proof that free trade agreements may negatively
affect multilateral efforts towards trade liberalisation.
556 Obeng & Me Gowan "The EU-SA FTA" SAJII (1999) 105.
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6. Conclusion
The apartheid regime resulted in South Africa being found empty-handed
economically, as far as international agreements were concerned, with regard to
trade, as well as in the sphere of cooperation. The start of negotiations towards an
agreement with the EU therefore provided South Africa with an excellent opportunity
to find its way back into the global economy.
However, the negotiations with the EU turned out to be more complicated and
complex than anyone had expected. The reason for this was the totally different
expectations of the two negotiating parties. On the one hand, South Africa took the
"poor man" line and tried to convince the EU that it forms part of a poor region in
desperate need of development aid. South Africa therefore preferred to become a
member of the Lomé Convention, instead of entering into a free trade agreement with
the EU on a reciprocal basis.55? On the other hand, the EU had the intention of
starting a new future cooperation with the ACP countries. This could be reached
through individual bilateral agreements with each of the ACP states and the splitting
of the Lomé Convention into regional agreements. With regard to South Africa, the
EU wanted to form a new long-term trade relationship with South Africa on a
reciprocal basis. Therefore the EU was unwilling to allow South Africa's accession to
the Lomé Convention.558 However, in analyzing the EU position, one has to bear in
mind that the EU is not a monolithic bloc of countries, but comprises fifteen Member
States that sometimes have very different interests, which are sometimes hard to
reconcile.559 The EU, furthermore, is undergoing a series of radical reforms with
regard to its financing and farming and regional spending, and is confronted with the
future enlargement of the EU towards Eastern Europe. The enlargement towards
Eastern Europe is a huge and difficult task for the EU and the EU might by then focus
more on its own problems than on accommodating the interests of African countries.
In the future it might therefore be difficult for the ACP countries to win concessions
from the EU.
557 See Chapter 2.2.
558 See Chapters 2.3.2 and 2.9.3.2.
559 This, for example, became apparent during the negotiations of the Wine and Spirits Agreement.
See Chapter 2.11.
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Nevertheless, the TOCA between the EU and South Africa elevates the existing
relationship to a higher level and provides South Africa with a formalized relationship
with the world's biggest trading bloc. This places South Africa in a special and
privileged relationship with the EU when compared to many other countries.
Furthermore, it confirrns South Africa's position as a credible player on the global
stage and it sends out the message that South Africa is willing to be considered and
to negotiate as a "developing state wanting to become developed" rather than being
grouped with the other ACP countries. With regard to further trade relations between
the EU and other ACP countries in the future, the political significance of the TOCA
should not be underestimated. It might serve as an indicator of how relations are
likely to develop and South Africa, as the new trading partner of the EU, has become
a significant influence for promoting development in the ACP countries.
In terms of commercial opportunities, it is to be acknowledged that the TOCA
provides South Africa with significant market access into the huge European market.
The inclusion of three-quarters of South Africa's agricultural exports is a major
achievement for Pretoria's negotiators and a unique commitment on the EU side.
Concerning the developmental character of the agreement, the TOCA confirms that
the EU will continue to assist South Africa in important areas of developmental need.
This becomes clear in the Science and Technology Agreement, in the clause relating
to political dialogue between the two parties and in the clause of good governance,
as well as in social and cultural cooperation.
However, one of the shortcomings of the TOCA is that the EU did not adequately
consider the fact that the agreement with South Africa might have a significant impact
on the whole Southern African region. In the case of SACU, for example, the agreed
tariff reductions within the TOCA between the EU and South Africa involves a
significant reduction in revenue for the BLNS countries due to their dependence on
the common fund. This is likely to have serious budgetary implications for the BLNS
countries and to lead to disputes concerning regional interests.56D
While disputes concerning regional interests are to be dealt with by the WTO Oispute
Settlement Bodies, the bilateral disputes between the EU and South Africa are to be
dealt with by the Cooperation Council. This Cooperation Council is responsible for
consultation and mediation between the partners and its decisions could also have
an impact on the neighbouring Southern 'African countries. However, until now its
560 S Cee hapter 4.2.2.1.
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composition does not reflect those regional interests and thus needs to be addressed
constructively in future talks between the parties.561
Concerning intellectual property rights, both parties accepted the application of the
TRIPs Agreement. In addition, South Africa agreed to the EU demand not to use the
names "Port" and "Sherry" for its exports to,the EU and to phase out the names on all
export markets within five years, except in the case of non-SACU SAOC countries,
where an eight-year phase-out period would apply. On the domestic market (covering
SACU) South Africa will phase out the names "Port" and "Sherry" du'ring the twelve-
year transition period. There was no legal obligation to do so under TRIPs, however,
because the respective names do not qualify as "geographical indications". South
Africa's commitment in this respect may not be seen as a precedent under TRIPs,
but rather as a compromise within the overall trade package.
Furthermore, the dispute between the EU and South Africa on the Port and Sherry
issue might have harmed future EU credibility with developing countries. One has to
admit that the nature of the EU strategy to use regional trade agreements to
introduce new measures is rather alarming, because it constitutes a proof that free
trade agreements may negatively affect the multilateral efforts towards trade
liberalisation.
With regard to the GATTIWTO provisions, both the EU and South Africa are bound
by the GATT and the WTO's rules governing preferential trade relations.562
Concerning a deviation by the EU and South Africa from the MFN obligation, this
seems to be justified under Article XXIV GATT, as Article XXIV GATT provides that
the TOCA substantially liberalizes about 90% of the trade involved and the interim
agreement leading to the formation of the free trade area includes a plan and a
schedule for the formation of such an area within a "reasonable length of time".
Furthermore, the EU and South Africa sought the necessary formal approval of the
contracting parties of the WTO.563 Thus the TOCA between the EU and South Africa
561 See Chapters 3.1.8.2 and 3.2.
562 As explained in Chapter 4.2.1, the MFN clause obliges each WTO member to extend most- .
favoured-nation treatment to all other states that are party to the agreement. The WTO framework,
however, provides exceptions to the MFN obligation (eg Article XXIV GATT) which justify preferential
trade relations between WTO members.
563 The TDCA is still under examination by the WTO.
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in principle complies with the prerequisites of Article XXIV GATT. The need to meet
these prerequisites is definitely one of the main reasons why the final outcome of the
TOGA is rather modest, compared to what South Africa had expected at the
beginning.564 The EU was not willing to jeopardize its aim of WTO compatibility by
allowing a greater degree of non-reciprocity.
The importance that the EU attached to the compatibility of the TOCA with the
GATT/WTO provisions throughout the negotiations is notable. The disputes with Latin
America and the USA, particularly over the banana regime of the Lomé
Convention,565 clearly had some effect. The EU now seems to be much more
cautious than it used to be in ensuring that its trade agreements with other countries
comply with the GATTIWTO provisions.
Concerning the impact of the TOCA on economic development in South Africa, one
has to bear in mind that the agreement only provides a legal framework for bilateral
trade relations between the EU and South Africa. Therefore the outcomes of the
TOCA are not predetermined. The realization of the objectives of the TOGA depends
on the South African government, which has to ensure that industries in South Africa
564 See Chapter 2.5.
565 The EU is the world's largest consumer of bananas and for that reason is considered a lucrative
market. In deciding to harmonise the different regimes on the importation of bananas, the EEC
introduced a common banana regime in 1993, under Council Regulation 404/93. This regime replaced
the previous system of national arrangements, which provided mostly open access to the European
market for Latin American bananas and shipping services, with the exception of France, Spain, Italy,
Portugal and the UK. Referring to Article 30 ECT as the legal basis for the exception of the free
movement of goods, the new regime introduced a complex, restrictive and discriminatory system of
measures. These measures favoured EU and ACP producers and EU suppliers, but caused injury to
Latin American and US banana producers and some EU service providers.
Five Latin American countries requested the establishment of a GAIT panel to investigate their
complaints. In a 1993 Report, the panel found that the quantitative restrictions applied by Spain,
France, Italy, Portugal and the UK were inconsistent with the obligation to eliminate such restrictions
under Article XI (1) GAIT. It also found that the tariff preferences were inconsistent with the MFN
clause and that a legal justification for the latter preferences did not emerge from Article XXIV GAIT.
However, the EEC refused to adopt this report, arguing that these conclusions raised a major problem
not only for them, but also for their non-reciprocal preferential agreements with developing countries,
especially the ACP.
In July 1993, the EEC established its common regime for bananas. The five Latin American countries
therefore requested a WTO Dispute Settlement Panel to examine the matter in terms of Article XXIII
(1) GAIT. The EEC argued that the preferential treatment granted the ACP under the Lomé
Convention was justifiable under Article XXIV (7) GAIT in the light of Part IV GAIT, as the Lomé
Convention was a free trade area agreement. In its finding against the EEC, the Dispute Settlement
Panel recognized the violations of Articles I (1), II (1) and III (4) GAIT. They disallowed the justification
under Article XXIV GAIT. After appealing against the findings in 1997, the EU Agriculture Council
adopted modifications to its banana measures and unilaterally declared these to be WTO consistent in
June 1998.
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are made aware of the potential benefits and dangers of the agreement, and on the
performance of South Africa's economy itself. Producers have to take cognizance of
the new economic relations under the TOGA and restructure their companies and
sectors accordingly in order to benefit from the new trade relationship.
I believe, however, that the EU-SA TOGA is part of the process of re-positioning and
re-integrating South Africa into the changing world economy, and that it will contribute
to the process of developing more globally competitive patterns of production in
South Africa. In my opinion it therefore provides South Africa with an important
opportunity for economic growth and development.
In considering the EU-SA agreement from a global point of view, the question that
remains to be answered is whether the TOGA could serve as an example for future
trade relations between the EU and the AGP countries.
A first step towards taking the EU-SA TOGA as a model for further EU-AGP trade
relations has already been taken by means of the conclusion of the Cotonou
Agreement between the EU and AGP countries in February 2000. The Gotonou
Agreement inter alia provides a framework for supporting the mutually reinforcing
effects of trade cooperation and development aid. The EG and the AGP states have
therefore agreed on a process to establish new trading arrangements, the so-called
Regional Economic Partnership Agreements (REPAs), . which will pursue trade
liberalisation between the parties and formulate conditions with regard to trade-
related matters.566
As explained above,567 these REPAs will replace existing non-reciprocal trade
preferences that will follow an eight-year transition period lasting from 2000 to 2008.
An application for a waiver from the WTO for this period has already been filed in
Geneva. The REPAs would be entered into with different ACP regions or countries.
Essentially, they would be free trade area arrangements, but with added benefits for
the ACP countries, and would include provisions for economic cooperation. In
principle, AGP partners in the REPAs would retain their current preferential access to
566 EU COM The new ACP-EU Agreement (2000) 7.
567 See Chapter 2.12.
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European markets, but would have to reciprocate by progressively opening up their
own markets to European imports on a preferential basis.s68
The EU and the ACP countries thus concluded an agreement that provides for the
establishment of free trade area arrangements. The successful negotiation of the
TDCA between the EU and South Africa could be interpreted as a green light to
REPAs. It appears rather doubtful, however, whether it could really serve as an
example for REPAs.
First, the initial economic and institutional conditions in South Africa and the ACP
countries are very different. The South African economy is more extensive, more
industrialized and more diversified than any of the other ACP economies. In the
WTO, South Africa is considered as a developed country, while all other ACP
countries are developing or least developed. The bigger development gap between
them and the EU makes it more difficult to reach a reciprocal agreement that would
benefit all parties rapidly. Besides, the effort and human resources required to
negotiate a free trade agreement with the EU should also not be underestirnated.P"
One has to bear in mind that it took the EU and South Africa 43 months and 21
rounds of negotiations to conclude the TDCA. During this time, both parties had to
gather the necessary information to formulate their proposals. South Africa, for
example, initiated a process of domestic and regional consultation to formulate its
own mandate for negotiations with the EU in 1996. This process involved
consultations with the other SACU and SADC member states and intensive research
on the impact of the agreement on trade and economic development in South and
Southern Africa.s7o Most of the ACP countries, especially in Africa, have less capacity
than South Africa to negotiate and implement a complex bilateral trade agreement
with the EU.s71
Second, signing a free trade agreement is largely a matter of political will. Regions
that have made progress with regard to their political and economic integration by
successfully concluding trade liberalisation agreements that brought down barriers
between members had strong political motives to do SO.S72 In this respect, it seems
568 EU COM Partnership for the new millennium (2000) 4-5; See Chapter 2.12.
569 Davies Forging a new relationship (2000) 14.
570 Mills "Free Trade with the EU" SAYIA (1996) 46; See Chapter 2.4.1.
571 Solignac Lecomte The impact on Lomé (2000) 66.
572 The EEC, for instance, was established in order to ensure a peaceful European Continent.
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that South Africa's motives were different from those of the ACP countries, and were
arguably stronger. At the time when South Africa started negotiating with the EU, its
motives were of a dual nature. On the political side there was the desire to return to
the international sce~e. On the economic side, South Africa needed to find a way to
improve its access to the markets of developed economies and reach beyond MFN
treatment. Since, in the case of the EU, it could obtain non-reciprocal Lomé
preferences,573 a bilateral free trade agreement represented a substantial
improvement. Moreover, opening up the economy beyond WTO-bound tariff levels
could be seen as part of a strategy aimed at restructuring a very protected economy,
particularly in the industrial sector.F"
Most ACP countries find themselves in a very different situation. The political impetus
that pertained to the EU-SA deal does not apply in the case of the ACP countries.
Economically, most of the ACP countries, when compared to South Africa, do not
have a very developed industrial sector and expect gains in agricultural rather than in
industrial products. Furthermore, signing a reciprocal trade agreement could mean
significant adjustment costs to them and would not offer any substantial improvement
in terms of market access when compared to the former Lomé Convention.
Thus, since South Africa was politically and economically active in concluding a free
trade agreement with the EU, its situation cannot be compared to that of the ACP
countries. This arguably provides a weaker basis for the successful negotiation and
completion of ambitious and complex free trade aqreernents.v"
However, alternative suggestions are hard to come by, as the preferences granted by
the Lomé Convention are considered violations of WTO rules - as was proved by the
banana dispute surrounding preferential treatment of ACP bananas on the European
market. It therefore seems that the ACP countries increasingly have to accept
reciprocity as the cornerstone of their regional economic agreements with the EU. ~
573 The EU offered South Africa a qualified membership of the Lomé Convention, as well as a bilateral
FTA in its two-track proposal of June 1995. South Africa's qualified membership of the Lomé
Convention means that only certain articles of the Lomé Convention are applicable to South Africa.
See Chapters 2.3.2 and 2.9.3.
574 Solignac Lecomte The impact on Lomé (2000) 66.
575 Davies Forging a new relationship (2000) 15; Solignac Lecomte The impact on Lomé (2000) 67.
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"'If the ACP countries consider entering into free trade area agreements with the EU,
some lessons should be learnt from the SA-EU TOCA, even though the situation of
the ACP countries is very different from that of South Africa.
Since the ACP countries currently lack negotiating capacity, they should bargain for
substantial human and financial resources during the negotiations if they want to
extract some meaningful concessions from the EU. The EU has offered technical
assistance in conducting the negotiations to the ACP countries. With regard to the
time frame, there must be some built-in flexibility of time frames for liberalisation. The
ACP countries must negotiate a longer transitional period. They, however, cannot
expect much assistance from the EU in addressing their structural rigidities within this
period. 576 According to the WTO, the normal transitional period for the establishment
of a free trade area is ten years and, in exceptional cases, twelve years.577 During the
negotiations, the ACP countries should furthermore focus on those products that they
are interested in. Mauritius, for example, would be interested in retaining the sugar
protocof'" and market access for textiles and clothing, while it may be prepared to
reciprocate in favour of the EU in a number of other areas.579
These are some suggestions relating to the idea of "new economic regional
agreements" between the ACP countries and the EU. As the EU-SA TOCA has
already shown, it will be very difficult to conclude agreements with the ACP countries
within the ambitious time frame of the Cotonou Agreement. The partnership between
the EU and the ACP countries needs a new perspective to help ACP countries to
playa more meaningful role in world trade, though. At this stage it is too early to
judge whether and how the REPAs will work, but regional trading arrangements are a
key to economic success and the continued survival of regions, and should therefore
be introduced between the EU and the ACP countries.
576 Tekere "Implications of EU-SA TDCA" lGD Occasional Paper No 24 (2000) 72.
577 See Chapter 4.2.1.4.1.2.
578 Four additional protocols for sugar, beef and veal, rum and bananas were attached to the Lomé
Convention. These protocols gave free access to EU markets for a fixed quantity of exports from
selected and traditional suppliers. The sugar protocol was annexed to the Lomé Convention in 1975,
but is not an integral part of it. Its separate status implied that its future is independent of the
continuation of the Lomé Convention See Chapter 2.2.2.
579 Tekere "Implications of EU-SA TDCA" lGD Occasional Paper No 24 (2000) 77.
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ANC African National Congress
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USA United States of America
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APPENDIX
Appendix 1: Article 19 (1) of the SACU agreement
A contracting party shall not, without the prior concurrence of the other contracting
parties and subject to such conditions as may be agreed upon by the contracting
parties, enter separately into or amend a trade agreement with a country outside the
customs area in terms of which concessions on the duties in force in the commqn
customs area are granted to that country.
Appendix 2: 1997 -1999 Multi-annual Indicative Programme
-Total Indicative Channels of Implementation
Programmable
Allocation (Indicative % Allocations)
_ ......... ._._ ....... _-._ ...... __ ......... _- .....•.. __ .....•..
Government Agents of
Decentralised
Coop.
I
Focal Areas
._.- -- ._- ... _0- _._ ..._ .. ,-_ ..- .................. _ ....._._._ .......
-1. Basic Social Services 50 - 60%
,
• Sector Support
Programme for Health
& Education 40 - 50% 100% -
,
Other Activities 10 - 20% 50% 50%•
L. r-IIV, e, n, 15 - 20% 50% 50%'v,"
/
3. Good Governance and
Democratization
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15 - 20% 50% 50%
Other Areas
Regional Cooperation
5. Unallocated
+/- 5% 100%
50%+/- 5% 50%
Appendix 3: EU grants under the EPRD on a yearly basis
YEAR N° of PROJECTS COMMITMENT (Euro)
1994 97 102,147,282
1995 17 123,320,821
1996 17 129,500,000
1997 11 ~ 127,500,000
1998 16 127,500,000
- ..._-- ----- --,. ...._.__ ._-_ ... .......... -_ ............ __ ....-...- --' ...._._.-_- .._-- ...-
1999 12 127,500,000
TOTAL 170 737,468,103
"---- "'- ............ _ .....- ,_,._- _ ..... ..._-- ._. ...._- ....... _ .....
EPRD 1995-1999 - BREAKDOWN BY SECTOR
Sector Allocation Euro . % of total
% foreseen in
MIP
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Basic social services: - 97,320,000 78.92%11
Education & training 19,800,000 16.060/011
Health
•
2,970,000 2.41%
Water supply 18,000,000 14.60%
.. -_ ..__ .- ......... - ... - ____ •• H •••• __ • _, ... ._.- .. ._.. -_ ..-
Other 56,550,000 45.86%
Private sector development II~f 8.92%----::1- ernance iJ; 12.16%,
•__ r ._, _ .~~v 129,211,100
84,006,000 65.01%
tion & training 36,406,00011 28.18%11
FY 3,100,000 2.40%"H' •__ ........ _ •• ..._ ..__ ..__ ...... _. .....5,000,000 3.87%
IOther ,j~, ..J •
~_._ ..;';or development 8,907:000 6.89%
d governance 35,1 -, 27.24%
.__ .....•... _-._ .._- - - - __ ••_ ,___ "'H. .--'-' ... ._ ..._ .... "-'-"- ._..--,- _ ..... _ .... ...... _-
Regional 1,1 0.85%
1~r
~
,_ _ 4997
89,200,000 II 50-60
Education and training 58,:~ 40.1L70 40-50
F 22,5 , 1
[Other
7,___ ,___
6.20% 10-20
Private sector development 17,O~f 13.33% 15-201-", _'_'0 __ - ._. ___ o. -- ._- . _ ...... .._._ ..
Good governance 18,200,0 14.27% 15-20
IOther 2,800,00011 2.20% 5
Regional 0.'24%11 5
>
TOTAL ALLOCA TION FOR 1998 127,500,000
Basic social services: 73,000,000 57.25%11 50-601
Education and training - 50,300,000 39.45%11 40-50~
Health il 3.37%11
Water supply and sanitation 18,
il 14.43%11 10-201
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1~,
II 10.90%11 15-
201
Good governance "", II 28.95%11
15-201
Regional ~, 2.89%11 5
li
PROJECTED ALLOCA nON FOR 1999 125,000,00011
Basic Social Services
;
53.00%11 50-60I
t 10.00%11 15-2°1
I
30.00%11 15-201
Regional 7.00% 5
.._-~......... _- ...._ .. -_ ......- -- ..._-- ._._0 ___ ...... w._ ...................... .- ......
i
~ .~ ,.w ~~~, 50 ..,,,", , rvv
61.36%11 50-60
Private sector development 10.27%11 15-201
Good governance 25.10%11 15-201
Other 0.55%11 5
Regional 2.72% 5
......... _ ..._ ...~.... _ ..-.........
Appendix 4: Coverage of the Free Trade Area
Agriculture Industry Total
South Africa 81,0% 86,5% 86,3%
European Union 61,4% 99,98 % 94,9%
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Appendix 5: Exclusion of sensitive products
Main Products excluded at EU side Main products excluded at SA side
(list to be periodically reviewed) (list to be periodically reviewed)
• Beef • Beef
• Sugar • Sugar
• Some diary (incl. milk, butler, • Some dairy (incl. milk, butler)
whey) • Sweet corn
• Maize and maize products • Maize and maize products
• Rice and rice products • Barley and barley products
• Starches • Wheat and wheat products
• Some cut flowers • Starches
• Some fresh fruits • Chocolate
• Prepared tomatoes • Ice cream
• Some prepared fruits and fruit
juices
• Vermouth
• Ethyl alcohol
• Some fish
• Unwrought aluminium • Petroleum and petroleum products
~ • Some chemical products
• Some textiles
• Automotive
Total of 304 tariff positions, representing Total of 120 tariff positions, representing
3.4 % of total imports from SA 10.9 % of total imports from EU
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Appendix 6: Partial liberalisation of products
Main products offered for partial Main products offered for partial
liberalisation at EU side liberalisation at SA side
• Several cut flowers (roses, orchids, • Footwear and leather (gradual
chrysanthemums, proteas - 1,6 tariff reduction, end-rate 10 or 20
tons per year, half duty) %)
• Strawberries (250 tons per year, • Some automotive (gradual tariff
duty-free) reduction, end-rate 6-11 %)
• Several canned fruits (60000 tons • Several textiles and clothing
per year, half duty) (gradual tariff reduction, end-rate
• Several fruit juices (5700 tons per 5-20%)
year, half duty) • Tyres (gradual tariff reduction,
• Wines (32 million litres per year, end-rate 10-15%)
duty-free)
Total of 44 tariff positions, representing Total of 2011 tariff positions, representing
1.7 % of total imports from SA 2.8 % of total imports from the EU
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Appendix 7: Protocol 3 ofthe Cotonou Agreement
ARTICLE 1
Qualified Status
1. The participation of South Africa in this Agreement is subject to the qualifications
set out in this Protocol.
2. The provisions of the bilateral Agreement on Trade, Development and
Cooperation between the European Community, its Member States and South Africa
signed in Pretoria on 11 October 1999, hereinafter referred as the "TDCA", shall take
precedence over the provisions of this Agreement.
ARTICLE 2
General Provisions, Political Dialogue
and Joint Institutions
1. The general, institutional and final provisions of this Agreement shall apply to
South Africa.
2. South Africa shall be fully associated in the overall political dialogue and
participate in the joint institutions and bodies set out under this Agreement. However,, ,
in respect of decisions to be taken in relation to provisions that do not apply to South
Africa under this Protocol, South Africa shall not take part in the decision-making
process.
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ARTICLE 3
Cooperation Strategies
The provisions on cooperation strategies of this Agreement shall apply to cooperation
between the Community and South Africa.
ARTICLE 4
Financial Resources
1. The provisions of this Agreement on development finance cooperation shall not
apply to South Africa.
2. However, in derogation from this principle, South Africa shall have the right to
participate in the areas of ACP-EC development finance cooperation listed in Article
8 below, on the understanding that South Africa's participation will be fully financed
from the resources provided for under Title VII of the TDCA. Where resources from
the TOCA are deployed for participation in operations in the framework of ACP-EC
financial cooperation, South Africa will enjoy the right to participate fully in the
decision-making procedures governing implementation of such aid.
3. South African natural or legal persons shall be eligible for award of contracts
financed from the financial resources provided for under this Agreement. In this
respect, South African natural or legal perSOI]S shall, however, not enjoy the
preferences accorded to natural and legal persons from ACP States.
ARTICLE 5
Trade Cooperation
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1. The provisions of this Agreement on economic and trade cooperation shall not
apply to South Africa.
2. Nonetheless, South Africa shall be associated as an observer in the dialogue
between the Parties pursuant to Articles 34 to 40 of this Agreement.
ARTICLE 6
Applicability of Protocols and Declarations
The protocols and declarations annexed to this Agreement that relate to parts of the
Agreement that are not applicable to South Africa, shall not apply to South Africa. All
other declarations and protocols shall apply.
ARTICLE 7
Revision Clause
This Protocol may be revised by decision of the Council. of Ministers.
ARTICLE 8
Applicability
Without prejudice to the previous articles, the table hereunder sets out those articles
of the Agreement and its Annexes which shall apply to South Africa and those which
shall not apply. This Article is followed by a table:
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Applicable Remarks Not applicable
Preamble
Part I, Title I, Chapter 1:
"Objectives, principles and
actors" (Articles 1 to 7)
Part I, Title II, "The political
dimension"; Articles 8 to 13
Part 2, "Institutional In accordance with Article 1of
provisions"; Articles 14 to this protocol, South Africa shall
17 not have voting rights in any of
the joint institutions or bodies
in areas of the Agreement
which are not applicable to
South Africa.
Part 3, Title I,
"Development strategies".
In accordance with Article 5 Part 3, Title II, Economic and
above, South Africa shall be Trade Cooperation.
associated as an observer in
the dialogue between the
Parties pursuant to Articles 34
to 40.
Article 75(i) (Investment In accordance with Article 4 Part 4, Development Finance
promotion, support for the above, South Africa shall have Cooperation
ACP-EU private sector the right to participate in
dialogue on regionalleve!), certain areas of development
Article 78 (Investment finance cooperation on the
protection) understanding that such
participation will be fully
financed from the resources
provided for under Title VII of
the TDCA.
In accordance with Article 2
above, South Africa may
participate in the ACP-EC
Development Finance
Cooperation Committee
provided for in Article 83,
,
without enjoying voting rights
in relation to provisions that do
not apply to South Africa.
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Part 5, General Provisions
for the Least Developed, -
Landlocked and Island ACP
States, Articles 84 to 90
Part 6, Final Provisions,
Articles 91 to 100
Annex I (Financial Protocol)
Annex II, Terms and In accordance with Article 4 Annex II, Terms and conditions
conditions of Financing, above, South Africa shall have of Financing, Chapters 1, 2, 3
Chapter 5 (link to Article 78 the right to participate in and 4
I investment protection) certain areas of development
finance cooperation on the
understanding that South
Africa's participation will be
fully financed from the
resources provided for under
Title VII of the TDCA.
Annex III Institutional fn accordance with Article 4
Support (CDE and CTA) above, South Africa shall have
the right to participate in
certain areas of development
finance cooperation on the
understanding that South
Africa's participation will be
fully financed from the
resources provided for under
Title VII of the TDCA.
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Annex IV, Implementation In accordance with Article 4 Annex IV, Articles 1 to 5
and Management above, where resources from (national programming); 15 to
Procedures: the TOCA are deployed for 19 (provisions relating to the
Articles 6 to 14, (Regional participation activities in the project cycle), 27 (preference
cooperation) framework of ACP-EC financial to ACP contractors) ana 34 to
Articles 20 to 32 cooperation, South Africa will 38 (Executing agents)
(Competition and enjoy the right to fully
preference) participate in the decision-
making procedures governing
implementation of such aid.
South African natural and legal
persons will moreover be
eligible for participation in
J
tenders for contracts financed
from the financial resources of
the Agreement. In this
context, South African
tenderers will not enjoy the
preferences provided for
tenderers from the ACP
States.
Annex V / trade regime during
the preparatory period.
Annex VI; List of Least
Developed, island and
landlocked ACP States.
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